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By N.C.Borrie 
Since the 1970s there has been a growing interest in, and utilisation of, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) techniques to resolve environmental conflicts in western 
societies. ADR was incorporated into one of New Zealand's main environmental 
statutes, the Resource Management Act 1991(RMA). Under s.268 of the RMA the 
Environment Court (the Court) may, if the parties agree, conduct mediation in order to 
facilitate settlement of resource management disputes. 
The RMA, which has now been in operation for ten years, gives no guidance as to the 
way in which mediation is to be conducted. The Court has developed procedures and 
processes for administering and conducting mediation. This study critically evaluates 
the practice of Court assisted mediation of environmental disputes under the RMA. A 
literature review and interviews with stakeholder groups are used in this evaluation. 
The study shows that mediation generates benefits for the Court and participants. It also 
identif~es limitations with the current mediation procedures and processes. These may 
impact the effectiveness of participants in mediation, their satisfaction with, and 
support for, the mediated settlement and with the environmental outcomes. 
The study recommends a series of guidelines be prepared on the functions and 
administrati ve procedures of the Court and on the mediation process promoted by the 
Court. Further research is also recommended. It is considered that these 
recommendations, if implemented, will enhance the process for participants, ensure 
more equitable and consistent environmental outcomes, in terms of present and future 
generations, and retain public confidence in the mediation process. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Environmental conflict & alternative dispute resolution 
Awareness of human impact on the global environment and its associated ecosystems 
has increased significantly in the post World War II era (Millar & Rothman, 1997). 
Modern communication systems have helped increase this awareness through 
publicising environmental catastrophes (Kamieniecki, 1993). This awareness has, to 
varying degrees, helped change the perception of those who make decisions relating to 
the environment. It has led to policy makers legislating to address environmental 
concerns at nationai and international levels (Kamieniecki, 1993). 
Differing views about the state of the environment can result in conflict. Environmental 
conflict can occur wherever the allocation of resources, essential or non-essential, are 
subject to differing social, cultural and economic expectations and values. Such 
conflicts are complex and can be difficult, costly and time consuming to resolve. They 
can also be socially divisive (Sandford, 1989). The ability of traditional dispute 
resolution techniques such as litigation to handle complex environmental conflicts has 
therefore been questioned and alternative ways to resolve conflict have been sought. 
Since the 1970s, interest in mediation as a method of conflict resolution has grown. In 
various parts of the world, particularly North America and Australasia, mediation has 
been promoted as a technique for resolving conflicts involving the allocation, 
management and use of natural resources and the built environment. 
Support for the mediation of environmental disputes saw mediation incorporated into 
the reform of environmental legislation in New Zealand during the 1980s which 
culminated in the Resource Management Act 1991 (the RMA) (Baylis, 1992, p. 143). 
The reform of environmental legislation in New Zealand in the 1980s was partly 
influenced by international trends towards public participation in resource planning 
decision-making and support for the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
techniques such as mediation for resolving environmental disputes (Sandford, 1989, p. 
89). The purpose of one of the main environmental statutes in New Zealand, the RMA, 
is 'to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources' 1. This 
I S.5 Resource Management Act 1991. 
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legislative purpose, coupled with the opportunity for input into policy fonnation2 and 
decision-making3 by the public at large, has provided a forum for the expression and 
debate of differing social, cultural and economic values regarding the use and 
management of the natural and physical environment of New Zealand. 
In New Zealand the law, and in particular the RMA, with its limited rights of appeal to 
superior Courts, is the traditional way of resolving environmental disputes. Under the 
RMA, where environmental disputes cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties 
at regional or local (luthority level, they are able to refer the matter to the Environment 
Court for adjudication. Court action may involve the expenditure of considerable time 
and money by the parties involved. With only limited legal aid being available, not all 
citizens have the financial resources to participate in Environment Court proceedings. 
Additional Dispute Resolution was incorporated into the RMA by Parliament with 
specific mention being made of mediation and conciliation in s.268 (1). Under the RMA 
the Environment Court may, if affected parties agree, initiate or facilitate mediation to 
encourage settlement of resource management disputes. These provisions of the RMA 
are innovative and potentially of far reaching significance. 
The workload of the Environment Court, and the complex nature of environmental 
disputes, has resulted in delays in proceedings being adjudicated by the Court. 
Environment Commissioners have been called upon to mediate an increasing number of 
disputes referred to the Environment Court for resolution (Registrar of the Environment 
Court, 2{)OO·, p. 11). The Court facilitates mediation by providing a mediator and venue 
free of charge with each party bearing their own costs. Mediation is thus an attractive 
method of dispute resolution for some parties. Mediation has therefore been promoted 
as an alternative dispute resolution technique that offers a speedier, more flexible and 
less costly dispute resolution process than litigation. 
1.2 Research aim and objectives 
The RMA has been in operation now for ten years. The purpose of this study is to 
critically evaluate the current practice of Environment Court assisted mediation of 
environmental disputes under the RMA with a view to recommending ways to enhance 
2 See Part V of the RMA for various procedures for public input into policy statements and plans. 
3 See Part VI of the RMA for various procedures. 
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practice in New Zealand. It is accepted that environmental mediation has a role within 
New Zealand as a method of dispute resolution. 
Objectives: 
1. To review the international literature on environmental dispute resolution as a 
broad conceptual context to inform the analysis of mediation of environmental 
disputes by the Environment Court under the RMA. 
2. To analyse current environmental mediation practice under s.268 of the RMA. 
3. To make recommendations about possible ways to improve environmental 
mediation practice within New Zealand. 
1.3 Research design 
The research objectives were developed into a series of research questions to frame the 
i~vestigation. The key research questions were: 
1. What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of mediation as a means of 
resolving environmental disputes? 
2. What are the requirements of the mediation process in order for it to be an effective 
tool for resolving environmental disputes? 
3. What are the provisions for mediation by the Environment Court under the RMA 
and how are these provisions being implemented? 
4. What are the perspectives of different stakeholder groups on the practice of 
Environment Court assisted mediation under the RMA? 
A review of the literature on environmental mediation was undertaken and the 
prerequisites for effective mediation identified. Using these prerequisites, a framework 
against which to evaluate environmental mediation practice in New Zealand was 
prepared. Based on this framework, questionnaires were designed for each stakeholder 
group. Interviews were undertaken throughout New Zealand. The responses were 
analysed and the Court assisted mediation process evaluated. Good practice guidelines 
were recommended with a view to enhancing environmental mediation practice in New 
Zealand. 
3 
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1.4 Research limitations 
This research has two limitations. First, the scope of the study had to be limited for a 
number of reasons. It was recognised that there were many individuals practising as 
mediators in the area of environmental planning and management in New Zealand. In 
addition to the Environment Commissioners, there are local authorities with staff trained 
in mediation, lawyers specialising in mediation and private individuals offering their 
services as mediators. However, given the limited time and resources available for this 
study, it was considered that the restriction of the study to Environment Court appointed 
mediators would yield a useful initial overview of the way in which the environmental 
mediation process was being conducted in New Zealand. 
Secondly, a decision was made, in consultation with my supervisors, to limit the 
investigation of the mediation process to cases where participants had settled their 
di.spute with the assistance of a Court appointed mediator. The parties had resolved the 
matter and an Environment Judge had signed the matter off. It was recognised that final 
settlement was at one end of the conflict resolution spectrum. There were other matters 
that could be usefully investigated, the main categories being: 
• The reasonls for parties' unwillingness to enter into mediation. 
• The extent to which mediation narrowed the issues in dispute. 
• The nature of disputes unable to be resolved by mediation. 
It was recognised that each of these categories could, potentially, provide valuable 
insights into the current practice of environmental mediation within New Zealand. 
Unfortunately time and resources did not permit such an extensive investigation. 
1.5 Importance of the research 
The use of alternative dispute resolution techniques such as mediation has been 
encouraged and promoted by various government agencies and is, increasingly, being 
used to resolve disputes. The RMA enables mediation, but gives no guidance as to the 
process and format to be followed. After a decade there has been virtually no in-depth 
evaluation of the mediation process instigated under s.268 of the RMA. An evaluation 
of current practice enables an assessment of the extent to which mediation is achieving 
its objectives, both in terms of procedures and substantive outcomes. This study also 
endeavours to provide a better understanding of environmental mediation in New 
Zealand. 
4 
1.6 Study structure 
This study is organised as follows: 
Chapters Two and Three provide a critical overview of recent intemationalliterature. 
These chapters review the major themes in the literature as a basis to inform the analysis 
of the situation in New Zealand. 
Chapter Four explains the methodology used for data collection and fieldwork 
procedures. Using the themes developed in Chapters Two and Three, a framework is 
drawn up using the ~ey points considered as necessary prerequisites for environmental 
mediation in the New Zealand context. Using this framework as a basis for interviews, 
responses were sought from stakeholders in mediation. The responses are then analysed 
qualitatively. 
Chapter Five explains the relevant legislative provisions in New Zealand, describes the 
current environmental mediation practice within the Environment Court and the extent 
of Court assisted mediation. 
Chapter Six presents the findings from interviews with Environment Judges. 
Chapter Seven presents the findings from interviews with Environment Commissioners 
and Chapter Eight presents the findings from interviews with participants in the Court 
assisted environmental mediation process. 
ChaptecNine discusses the findings and considers their implications for the continued 
use of mediation as a means of resolving environmental disputes in New Zealand. 
Chapter Ten makes recommendations for good practice guidelines based on the findings 
of the study and recommends areas for further study. 
5 
Chapter 2: The Broader Context for Environmental 
Mediation: A Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The practice of mediation has increased and mediation of environmental disputes has 
been promoted and institutionalised in a number of western nations, including New 
Zealand, since the 1970s (Sandford, 1989; Baylis, 1992; Stephens, Stephens & Dukes, 
1995 cited in Blackbl,lrn & Bruce, 1995). 
Based on a literature review, the purpose of Chapters Two and Three is: 
1. To identify the reasons for the interest in, and promotion of, mediation, 
particularly in the context of environmental conflict; 
2. To identify the benefits and limitations of using mediation as an alternative dispute 
resolution technique; 
3. To discover those factors generally considered necessary for the settlement of 
environmental disputes through mediation. 
2.2 The reality of environmental conflict 
Conflict has been defined as 'struggles between two or more people over values, or 
competition for status, power, or scarce resources' (Moore, 1996,-p·. 1). An action by 
one party can 'trigger' a conflict or dispute4• Conflict over resource use and 
management has been part of the global experience 'since time began' (Johnson & 
Duinker cited in Mitchell, 1997, p. 218), as has concern at human impact on the 
environment (Conca, Alberty & Dabelko, 1995, p. 3). Throughout history, the allocation 
of resources has been subject to different interests and expectations. In tum, such 
differences may lead to armed conflict (war) between competing national groups or 
nations (Mitchell, 1997, p. 20). War is generally seen as an undesirable way of 
resolving competing demands for resources and alternative methods of resolving 
disputes have been promoted through organisations such as the United Nations. 
International Treaties, Agreements and Protocols have been drawn up between countries 
4 Conflict arises when two (or more) parties perceive that their deep human values or needs are 
incompatible. It does not need a specific focus. A dispute arises when parties with incompatible interests, 
needs or goals, seek to maximise their personal benefit at the expense of others (TiIlet, 1991, p. 7). 
6 
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to resolve conflict over resource use, for example, the Law of the Sea Conventions. In 
nation states, laws and regulations seek to allocate and manage physical resources so as 
to minimise disputes. Where these allocations or actions are disputed, then various 
dispute resolution mechanisms may be used, such as litigation, negotiation, mediation, 
arbitration or lobbying for changes in legal or administrative procedures (Bingham, 
1986, p. xvi). 
The term 'environmental conflict' covers a very wide range of areas, such as resource 
use and management," air and water quality, pollution, hazardous substances, and the 
health and safety of present and future generations (Tillet, 1991, p. l37). Environmental 
conflicts therefore tend to be more complex than interpersonal disputes. They may 
include the possibility of irreversible environmental effects, the inability to accurately 
estimate the effects of complex activities in advance, and the claim of 'interest' by 
gr?UPS representing the public, future generations and the 'planet' (Rosenau cited in 
Kamieniecki, 1993; Tillet, 1991, p. 137; Parliame~tary Commissioner for the 
Environment (PCE), 1996, p. 7; Adler, Barrett, Bean, Birkhoff, Ozawa, Rudin, 2000). 
Actions taken by individuals within nation states can impact other nationals or nations. 
An example is trans-boundary pollution on the Mexico/US border (Szekely, 1993). The 
scope of environmental effects therefore creates difficulties in deciding the boundaries 
of who should be involved in any dispute resolution process (Susskind & Weinstein 
cited in Kartez & Bowman, 1993), with the number of possible parties varying 
considerably (Tillet, 1991, p. l38). Bingham found that the average number of parties to 
an environmental dispute is typically four but may reach as many as forty (Bingham, 
1986, p_-100). 
Some ways in which environmental conflict manifests itself globally are follows: 
Competition for resources 
As world population grows, so do demands on the world's finite and renewable 
resources (Blackford, 1992b, p. iv). Many of these resources ensure survival as well as 
generate wealth and prosperity for nations. Environmental scarcity is already 
contributing to conflict in parts of the developing world. Environmental change and 
degradation is seen as having the potential for increasing conflict through increasing 
5 The Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) was signed in 1982 by 117 UN members and by 1994 had 
been ratified by over 60 nations. It came into effect in 1994 and relates to the exploration, exploitation & 
conservation of global marine resources. 
7 
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scarcity, economic deprivation and forced migration (Homer-Dixon, 1993, p.245, 255; 
Homer-Dixon cited in Mitchell, 1997, p. 13). For some societies the threat from 
environmental change, with its social implications, is greater than the threat from 
military sources (Homer Dixon, 1993, p. 252). Diminishing resources, such as water, 
have the potential to impact global and local stability (Stein, 2000, p. 1). The search for 
new and supplementary resource sources, such as water or sites for the storage of 
hazardous waste, crosses national and cultural boundaries (Vig & Axelrod, 1999, p. 4). 
This can bring with it conflict between the present owners or guardians of those 
resources, often indi,genous peoples and scientists, and resource development agencies. 
Rosenau defines this environmental struggle as being between the experts with a long-
term view of the cumulative effects, and those desiring short term gain (Rosenau 1993 
cited in Kamieniecki, 1993, p. 259). 
C.onflict of ideologies 
Environmental conflict can cover ecological, anthropocentric (social Icultural) and 
economic spheres. Within each of these spheres, there are different values and interests, 
some stemming from deeply held cultural or religious beliefs (Saddler & Armour cited 
in Mitchell, 1997, p. 219; Carpenter & Kennedy, 1987; Moore, 1996). When an 
environmental dispute arises, the debate may stem from a conflict of these various 
values and interests and the apportioning of the benefits and costs (O'Hare, Bacow & 
Sanderson 1983 cited in Rundle, 1986, p. 256; Blackford, 1992b, p. iv). Industrialisation 
has seen the application of technology to resource use and management. As scientific 
knowledge increases, the impacts of industrial development on the global environment 
and human health are better understood, giving rise to concerns at their implications 
(Von Weisacker, Lovins & Lovins, 1997). Increasingly, cultural groups are resisting the 
dominant western development paradigm and seeking to develop their resources in 
ways that are culturally and spiritually ayceptable (Taylor, Hadsell, Lorentzen & Scarce 
cited in Kamieniecki, 1993). 
Perception of risk 
There is a growing global awareness of the risks and uncertainty surrounding some 
technological advances. These may impact on the health and safety of present and 
future generations (Renn, Webler &Wiedemann, 1995). Some sectors of society may be 
more affected by environmental hazards than others (Hayward, 2000, p. 3) with the 
8 
term 'environmental racism' being used to explain the inequitable distribution of 
unwanted and dangerous land uses (Hester, 1998, p. 18). 
2.3 The inevitably of environmental conflict 
Change is inevitable in life and can bring with it 'turbulence' due to complexity and 
uncertainty. This, in tum, can result in environmental disputes at local, national and 
international levels (Mitchell, 1995; Mitchell, 1997, p. 74). Conflict can be beneficial 
when it exposes differing viewpoints and approaches to common problems and acts as a 
catalyst for collaborative decision-making (Carpenter et ai, 1987; Crowfoot & 
Wondolleck, 1990; Sherman & Livey, 1992; Tice, 1993; Mitchell, 1997). There can be 
conflicts of interest and conflicts of principle (Amy cited in Crowfoot et ai, 1990, p. 
14). Conflict as such is therefore never 'ended', rather settlements are made for specific 
disputes (Crowfoot et ai, 1990). The settlement can, depending on the method of 
re~olution, leave a dissatisfied minority (Pammer, 2000, p. 2). 
Disagreement in environmental disputes can arise on account of the information used in 
decision-making. Often the information available is inexact, open to interpretation, 
politicised, theory unsupported by research and the nature and extent of environmental 
or ecological problems uncertain, as is the consequences of any actions taken (Morris & 
Su, 1999; Mason, 1999, p. 23; Adler et ai, 2000). The way information is used may 
increase confusion and complexity (Adler et ai, 2000). 
Environmental conflicts are therefore complex and may defy simple or traditional 
dispute resolution techniques, such as litigation where one party wins and the other 
loses. Where the use of a resource may generate ecological, recreational, social and 
economic benefits or costs, there is the potential for a clash of conflicting values. It has 
been noted that a state of tension exists between the desire for economic development 
and the protection and enhancement of the environment (Richard, 1993). In the case of 
undesirable land uses, e.g. prisons, hazardous waste treatment, the traditional approach 
to siting these land uses stimulates public opposition (O'Hare et ai cited in Rundle, 
1986, p. 256). Parties tend to develop 'positions' with preconceived ideas as to how to 
achieve their goals. Rigidity, suspicion, hostility and lack of communication are 
common (Rundle, 1986). 
9 
In litigation, the underlying concerns that are at the crux of the conflict may not be 
considered relevant (Ministry for the Environment (MfE), 1988). The conflict, while 
decided, essentially remains unresolved and 'seldom does any party emerge feeling like 
a winner' (Rundle, 1986, p. 257). The underlying concerns continue to exist and may 
resurface in another or similar form, at a later time, when favourable circumstances 
exist. If discounted or ignored long enough by those implementing the accepted dispute 
resolution mechanisms, these underlying issues may then emerge in a less acceptable 
and potentially socially destabilising form, for example sit-ins, protests or civil 
disobedience (PCE, 1996, p. AI6). In New Zealand there have been protests over 
disputed resources, for example Lake Manapouri hydroelectric development proposals 
of 1960s, Moutua Gardens in Wanganui in 1990s, and the current West Coast forest 
controversy. The limitations of traditional ways of resolving disputes have caused 
people to look for more participatory methods of decision making that take into account 
th.e values and views of various groups within society. 
2.4 Theoretical basis for environmental mediation 
There is a strong emphasis on participatory decision-making in the recent literature on 
democracy and planning theory. Mediation, with its direct involvement of all affected 
parties in discussion with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable settlement or 
decision, could be considered a form of participatory decision-making. Although much 
has been written about mediation, there is no clear theory (Noll, 2001) and, in particular, 
no single agreed upon theory of environmental mediation (Blackburn et aZ, 1995). 
Mediation theory is evolving and debate continues among the theorists as new theories 
emerge (Della Noce, 1998). Theoretical ideas are drawn from a wide range of 
disciplines (Susskind, 1986). As recently as 2001 Noll was suggesting a theory of 
mediation based on conflict dynamics (Noll, 2001). There appears to be no agreement 
over what are the essential requirements for mediation (O'Leary cited in Blackburn et 
aZ, 1995) or its core features (Boulle, Jones & Goldblatt, 1998, p. 3). In the next section 
I turn to the recent writings on democracy and planning theory in an endeavour to find 
the theoretical basis and justification for the use and promotion of environmental 
mediation. 
2.4.1 Democracy and participation in decision-making 
Participation in decision-making is based on the theory of democracy. Equality 
(everyone has equal political power) and liberty (people are not controlled by any 
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individual or group) are considered fundamental requirements for democracy (Harrison 
cited in Craig, 1998, p. 867).- The general adherence to the democratic ideal of all adults 
having the opportunity or 'right' to participate in decision-making has occurred in the 
last 100 years (Held, 1987). 
The concept of democracy is a contested concept (Harrison cited in Craig 1998, p. 867) 
in that different systems of democracy have been promoted and implemented in society 
over time (Lively cited in Metcalfe 1999, p. 9). The two main models of democracy are 
direct or participatory' democracy, where citizens self govern or self regulate, and liberal 
or representative democracy, where elected representatives make decisions on behalf of 
the collective community within the framework of the law (Renn et ai, 1995, p. 21; 
Held 1987). 
The direct or participatory democracy of Greek city-states has historically been seen as 
promoting liberty and equality (Harrison cited in Craig, 1998; p. 868). Having citizens 
directly participate in decision making, as in Greek city- states, was not considered 
feasible or necessarily desirable in large nation states and there was a move towards a 
small number of citizens undertaking the task of governance (Honderich, 1995, p. 183-
4; Harrison cited in Craig, 1995, p. 868). 
Representative or liberal democracy involves the election of a small group of citizens 
who serve as representatives of the community as a whole for a set period of time 
(Reeve cited in Craig, 1995, p. 271, Held, 1987, p. 4). Representatives are confirmed by 
majority~vote and their performance reviewed periodically through the election process. 
Citizens, by their vote, give their representatives authority to make decisions on their 
behalf in particular matters. The government is given lawful authority over the people 
through laws passed by the elected representatives. Within a liberal democracy humans 
are seen as 'individuals' with 'rights' that need to be protected from the excesses of the 
state (Mason, 1999, p. 21). 
Representative democracy assumes that, if people as a whole are put in charge, they will 
promote the interests of the people as a whole (Harrison cited in Craig, 1995, p. 870). 
When seeking to represent the various interests of electors, elected representatives can 
decide between conflicting interests by using the theory of utilitarianism, that is 'the 
best action is the one that will result in the greatest happiness and least pain for the 
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greatest number of people' (Harrison cited in Craig, 1995, p. 870). The theory of 
utilitarianism helped form the concept of 'the public interest'. An action is considered in 
the public interest 'if it is to the interest, advantage, benefit or good of some group or set 
of persons considered members of the same society'. It assumes that a wide range of 
people within a society share common interests (Weale cited in Craig, 1995, p. 832), 
though this is disputed (Renn et ai, 1995, p. 2). It may also include the idea of a 
common good from which all citizens benefit such as clean air or environmental 
amenity. Decisions can be made by balancing the advantages and disadvantages of 
competing but incompatible activities (Weale et ai, 1995, p. 834). Limitations of the 
concept of the public interest are that it may not necessarily satisfy all subgroups or give 
weight to relevant or significant values held by the minority. The winner (the majority) 
takes all and self-interest in the short term can take precedence over important long-
term interests (Millar cited in Harrison, 1995, p. 870). 
Within liberal democracy there are diverging viewpoints. Social democracy arose in the 
1880's as a consequence of theorists, such asMarx, considering that some liberal ideals 
could only be realised through some form of socialism. Social democracies tended to 
have strong regulatory powers invested in government agencies (Millar et ai, 1995, p. 
827). In the post World War II era, social democracy gained widespread electoral 
support and sought to achieve social justice through government control of public 
expenditure, the provision of welfare services and the redistribution of income and 
wealth. Nevertheless by the 1970s social democracy was being challenged by two 
divergent approaches: neo liberalism (New Right) and participatory democracy. 
Neo liberalism opposed the state's attempts to control people's lives or pursue social 
justice or the common good (Millar et ai, 1995, p. 828). The role of the state was as a 
neutral or minimal body whose role was primarily restricted to correcting market 
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failures (Wolfe cited in Craig, 1995, p. 619; Held, 1987, p. 243; Memon et ai, 1993, p. 
70). Regulating the market and redistribution of wealth was seen as morally illegitimate 
and likely to be self-defeating (Millar et ai, 1995, p. 828). States were encouraged to use 
market forces and economic instruments to solve environmental problems (Williams, 
1997, p. 15). The need for some direct state involvement in environmental matters was 
recognised in some areas, for example ensuring pollution-free atmosphere (Wolfe, et ai, 
1995, p. 618; Buhrs cited in Memon et ai, 2000, p. 29). Electoral success by those 
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promoting libertarian views has meant the state's role of integrating private and public 
interests has declined (Buhrs et ai, 2000). 
The interest in participatory democracy was renewed through the popular protest 
movements ofthe 1960s and 70s that raised awareness of citizens' concerns and sought 
to influence decision makers (Renn et ai, 1995, p. 18-19). The effectiveness of and 
justification for representative democracy was questioned, due to its limited 
responsiveness to citizens concerns (Mason, 1999, p. 22). It was considered that it 
contributed to political apathy due to the perception that there was little meaningful 
civic self-determination within liberal democracies (Dunn cited in Mason, 1999, p. 22). 
The desirability and potential advantages of citizen input into decision-making came to 
be acknowledged and a number of methods for enabling citizen participation were 
promoted: citizens advisory committees; planning cells, citizens juries, negotiation and 
m~diation (Renn et ai, 1995). Later theorists advocated a return to participatory 
democracy (Barber cited in Metcalfe, 1999, p. 14). Participatory democracy 
' ... emphasises debate and reasoning about and toward public interests and actions' 
(Dryzek, 1990, p. 124). More recently the term environmental democracy has been 
used. It has been defined as a participatory and ecologically rational form of collective 
decision-making. It ' ... prioritises judgments based on long-term generalis able interests, 
facilitated by communicative political procedures and radicalisation of existing liberal 
rights' (Mason, 1999, p. 1). Communicative decision-making procedures, such as 
mediation, are considered to respect the social and ecological conditions of 
communicative freedom (Mason, 1999, p. 2). 
Effectiveness of participatory democracy 
The recent literature on democracy identifies three facets to participation: the selection 
of participants, the extent to which participants can participate and the way in which 
participation is managed. In an ideal situation, parties reach a consensus that reflects the 
different perspectives and concerns of each participant (Rowlands, 1999, p. 12). The 
quality and quantity of participation can affect its effectiveness. It was recognised that 
the way the participation process is conducted can impact the outcome. Discourse 
theorists put emphasis on the importance of the nature or type of 'discourse' that occurs. 
A discourse can be defined as 'free and open communication in political life' , which 
encourages reciprocal understanding, trust and consensus (Dryzek, 1990, p. 38). 
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Factors that potentially affect participation in discourse are: 
• . Gender, class or racial bias 
Feminist epistemology recognises that bias can occur on a gender, class and racial basis, 
so it is therefore necessary to understand the underlying assumptions behind any 
participatory approach. Of concern is where there is an unintentional bias towards 
particular groups within the community, e.g. the literate, articulate, informed (Harding, 
1986). Groups potentially disadvantaged may be cultural groups with an oral tradition; 
where English is a second language; those with poor literacy skills or the young. 
• Procedure 
The hearing procedure, room layout and presence of technical staff can impact where 
power lies. Such features may impact on the decision makers and the participants. 
Officials and staff may give the impression of enabling open, committed, participatory 
d~cision-making but what happens in reality is only marginal inclusion of the public 
(Futrell, 1999). 
• Language 
Language is recognised as having the power to influence the way people perceive and 
behave in the world (Burman & Parker, 1993). Language or 'speech acts' can be used to 
communicate many things depending on the speaker's intention, e.g. ask questions, give 
orders, make promises. What is said, what is done in saying it and what is done by 
saying it, are all significant (Austin cited in Craig, 1995, p. 82). Thus, a statement can 
lead hearers to believe certain things and to respond or act in a certain way (Bach cited 
in Craig, 1995, p. 82). Speech acts generally have an ulterior purpose, depending on the 
type of language used that can be distinguished by the type of attitude expressed. 
Deception may be used. If exposed the speaker then has to regain trust by convincing 
the audience that they are sincere and possess the attitude expressed (Bach et aI, 1995, 
p.85). 
Language is made up of tokens that create a mental image in a person's mind. When a 
person communicates what they believe is important, they use images that mean the 
most to them. The type of language and choice of words is therefore important. 
Language can take direct or indirect, literal or non-literal, explicit or inexplicit forms. It 
is important therefore to differentiate between language use and linguistic meaning 
(Bach et aI, 1995, p. 86). It may be necessary to rephrase a statement to ensure the 
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correct meaning has been conveyed (Mulholland, 1991). This is particularly important 
where statements shared in a discussion are being rephrased into more specialised 
language such as legally defined concepts or statements. 
• The type of information used in decision making 
Knowledge can be valuable as it reduces uncertainty, can change people's preferences 
and can build trust. Lack of knowledge can perpetuate conflict (Noll, 2001). By 
supplying, withholding, selectively revealing information or lying, parties can gain an 
advantage (Applbaunl, 1987, p. 280-283; Wasch, 1995, p. 42; UNECE, 1996, p. 346). 
Often decision makers rely heavily on the scientific realist mode of collecting, collating 
and using 'facts' to define what is possible and predictable within the realm of scientific 
knowledge. This approach considers that some things can be proven and there are rules 
that allow prediction. A difficulty is that the decision-making process may not accept a 
prpblem exists until it can be proven or predicted. 
When it comes to decision-making, the facts strongly influence the outcome despite the 
input of experiential acknowledge, which is perceived to be of limited merit. Decision 
makers often appear reluctant or unable to use types of research and some forms of 
experiential knowledge in the decision-making process, seeing it as less scientific and 
less reliable (Christie, 1991). 
For those wishing to put an alternative scenario the cost of buying factual data, with its 
associated research cost, is often prohibitive (Shields, 1991; Walker, 1996; Adler et ai, 
2000) and may exclude or deter some from participating in the process (PCE, 1996, p. 
46). Often the lack of evidential information has been 'critical to the outcome of a 
hearing' (Shields, 1991). That there may be an imbalance in the level and quality of 
information provided to decision makers by parties has been recognised (MfE, 2001b). 
It has been noted that participation has become more difficult than in the 1960s as 
idealism, good intentions and protest are no longer enough due to the legal and 
technological requirements of the decision-making processes. Input has changed from 
amateur to high-tech professional (Hester, 1998). Some participants have adapted to 
these changes and become more sophisticated and selective (Pellow, 1999). 
6 UNECE: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The Aarhus Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
was adopted June 1998 and came into force 30 October 2001 [Online]. http://www.unece.org!env/pp/. 
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• Interpretation of data 
The interpretation of data can be affected by bias, egocentric and self-serving tendencies 
(Morris et at, 1999, Adler et at, 2000). Those who interpret the data may bring 
assumptions to that interpretation which can undermine the 'facts' they find from the 
information. While the goal is to empower the people through participation and give 
them a voice, there is a danger that through the interpretation of the discussion much of 
its impact and power is lost (Burman et at, 1993). 
• Speaking for. others 
The practice of speaking for others (as an advocate) in various contexts has been 
identified in theories such as critical theory. It recognises that a person's location or 
position affects the meaning and truth of what is said. Speaking for others can be 
unhelpful and even harmful in some situations. To overcome these problems, 
repuctionist theory can be applied, thus truth and meaning of what someone says is read 
straight from the discursive text. All parties affected should therefore be given an 
opportunity to participate and put forward their viewpoint (Alcoff, 1991). 
The discourse process aims to be inclusive and impartial. People must be motivated to 
reach agreement by convincing reasons rather than by any form of coercion or 
deception. Ideally all parties should be communicatively competent and have unlimited 
participation opportunities. Participants may need education in order to become 
competent to participate (Dryzek, 1990, p. 43). In such circumstances all that counts is 
the strength of the argument and its supporting evidence (Dryzek, 1990; Dobson cited in 
Doherty--& de Geus, 1996, p. 134-5). 
• Inequality 
Inequality and the inability of groups and individuals to develop and challenge 
arguments may exist. Participants need to be communicatively competent (Dryzek, 
1990) and have appropriate information (Shields, 1991). 
• Entrenched ideas and manipulation 
People bring in preconceived ideas and notions. Individuals must learn in order for these 
to change. It is considered that individuals rather than organisations learn. It is therefore 
possible that individuals in a discussion will learn and their ideas change but the 
underlying values of the organisation they represent will not (Argyris, 1988, p. 540). 
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Some people may have ulterior motives for participating and seek to manipulate the 
situation (Dryzek, 1990, p. 125). 
• Role setting 
In some instances participants are required to overcome misconceptions or limitations 
imposed by their 'role' in the discussion (Mulholland, 1991). 
2.4.2 Planning theories and participation in decision-making 
There is a parallel emphasis within recent planning theory literature on the importance 
of public participation in decision-making. Planning has been defined as ' ... selecting a 
course of action to achieve an end' (Banfield cited in Faludi, 1973) or a process for 
determining appropriate future action (particular ends and means) through a sequence of 
choices (Davidoff, 1965). Planning has, over time, come to be viewed as both a 
te~hnical and political action (Taylor, 1998, p. 17) that seeks to maximize welfare and 
solve problems using analytical tools (Sandercock,.1998, p .86,89). 
In the post World War II era, as support for social democracy grew, the State was seen 
as having a significant role in many activities. Rational comprehensive or 'blueprint' 
model of planning was dominant. In this model, planning was considered primarily a 
'physicalist' activity (Taylor, 1998, p. 4) undertaken to improve the world by using 
scientific knowledge and instrumental rationality (Young cited in Healey, 1997, p. 9). It 
was assumed by those in charge of the process, that all people agreed with the aims of 
planning, that the experts 'knew' what people wanted and were therefore best placed to 
look after the public interest (Taylor, 1998). The involvement of or consultation with 
existing or future inhabitants was not seen as relevant (Sandercock, 1998, p. 88). 
Decisions were considered morally justified when they brought about the greatest 
happiness or utility for the greatest number (Taylor, 1998, p. 80). 
By the late 1960s public and professional confidence in rational planning had been lost, 
with planning being criticised by both the people affected and theorists (Brindley, Rydin 
& Stoker, 1996, p. 9; Taylor, 1997, p. 45,47; Sandercock, 1998, p. 88; Jacobs cited in 
Hayward, 2000, p. 29). Public protests highlighted the fact that planning was a 
politically contentious subject with planners criticized for promoting the consensus view 
(i.e. people are an undifferentiated group) and failing to consult and take public attitudes 
into account (Goodman, 1972; Brindley et ai, 1996, p. 14,17). Marxists considered that 
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planning was in the service of capital with planners putting land interests before people 
and the environment (Healey, 1993, p. 234; Sandercock, 1998, p. 92). In an endeavour 
to address criticisms, planning theorists have looked for ways to involve the public in 
planning through participation, mutual learning and empowerment (Taylor, 1997; 
Sandercock, 1998, p. 91). Davidoff (1965) promoted advocacy planning where the 
planner was an advocate for low income and marginalised groups in a bottom-up 
participatory approach (Goodman, 1972; Hayward, 2000, p.30). Arnstein (1969) 
considered that participation had limitations, as within the participation process there 
could be degrees of citizen power and degrees of tokenism. Such differences were 
important as: 
There is a crucial difference between going through the empty ritual of 
participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the 
process ... the fundamental point [is] that participation without the redistribution 
of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless. (Arnstein cited in 
Taylor, 1997, p. 89). 
It was considered that a fundamentally flawed economic and political system could not 
empower people (Goodman, 1972) and the power to make or influence decisions still 
resided with ' ... the possessors of large amounts of wealth, power and influence' 
(Davies cited in Taylor, 1997, p. 51). Radical planning sought to bring about political 
and social changes to address such issues (Friedmann cited in Hayward, 2000, p. 31). 
Equity planning sought to redistribute power, resources and participation from local 
elites to the poor and working class (Sandercock, 1998, p. 93). The planner was still an 
'elite' but endeavoured to enable and enhance communication by all sectors of society. 
By the 1980s the value of local or experiential knowledge acquired through social 
learning was being acknowledged. The term 'deliberative' planning has been used by 
Hayward to describe the approaches taken by planning theorists during the 1980s and 
1990s to promote inclusive, democratic discussion on planning issues and urban 
problems (Hayward, 2000, p. 16,17). Hayward uses the term deliberative to describe the 
common thread of public deliberation that exists within the 'communicative', 
'participatory', 'critical or 'collaborative' planning theories. Planning has taken an 
'argumentative turn' (Fischer & Forester cited in Hayward, 2000) becoming 
increasingly 'an interactive, communicative activity' (Innes cited in Hayward, 2000, p. 
17). Collaborative approaches to decision-making that acknowledge and respect 
differences and encourage collective responses to issues are promoted. Some planners 
consider that it extends to social and economic issues (Sandercock 1998 cited in 
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Hayward, 2000, p. 18). Better administrative decisions are potentially possible due to 
the technical, scientific and environmental knowledge of individuals being brought into 
the decision-making procedure at an early stage (Kramer, 1999, p. 7). 
It is considered that people are generally more supportive of decisions they have been 
involved in developing than those imposed on them without consideration of their 
concerns (PCE, 1996, p. AI6). Barriers to communication are to be removed in order to 
have open discourse (Sandercock, 1998, p. 98). Haberrnas (1984) considered that for 
communication tooqc'ur there were certain preconditions and presuppositions for an 
'ideal speech' situation. The process would require a framework of communicative 
ethics (Johansen cited in Craig, 1995, p. 312). Planning thus becomes the course of 
action chosen after informed, inclusive debate (Healey cited in Fischer, 1993, p. 237-8). 
2.5 Conclusion 
Environmental conflict and disputes are inevitable due to the different values and 
interests of members in society. Various dispute resolution mechanisms may be used to 
manage or resolve conflict. Recent literature on democracy and planning has put a 
strong emphasis on public participation in decision-making. Participation has, 
consequently, been endorsed in planning and dispute resolution regimes. The 
significance of environmental mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism that enables 
participation and enhances democratic decision-making should be judged in that 
context. 
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Chapter 3: The Process of Environmental Mediation: A 
Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
Mediation currently enjoys a high profile as a method of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) for environmental disputes. The extent to which mediation is used and the 
approach taken varies (Rubin, 1994; Boulle et ai, 1998; Adler cited in Devine, 2001). In 
this chapter I will review the recent international literature on different aspects of 
environmental mediation as a process, based on the experience during the last thirty to 
forty years. 
3.2 Defining mediation 
The definition of mediation varies on account of the terms used in the definition itself, 
the lack of agreement on an accepted set of core features, the wide range of situations in 
which it is used, the flexibility of the process and variations in current practice 
(Crowfoot et ai, 1990; Chornenki et a11996, p. 81; BoulIe et ai, 1998). Some go so far 
as to suggest that self-interest may determine how different professions and 
organizations define mediation (BoulIe et ai, 1998, p. 7). The definition may also be 
influenced by either the conceptualist 'ideal' approach to mediation, which sets out 
procedural ideals, or the descriptive approach, which draws from current practice 
(Boulle, 1996, p. 5). 
A general definition is therefore seen as beneficial (BoulIe, 1996, p. 7) and necessary 
(Devine, 2001, p.2, 3). To help define mediation it is useful to state the key attributes of 
the process. It is a consensual decision making process; a third party helps the parties in 
dispute to achieve improved decision-making and the parties reach a decision they can 
accept (Boulle et ai, 1998, p. 8). The parties themselves make the ultimate decision 
(Mills, 1990, p. 65). A general definition of mediation is ' ... an acceptable, neutral, third 
party, who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power, assists disputants to 
voluntarily work through disputed issues in order to reach a mutually acceptable 
resolution' (Moore, 1996; Borisoff & Victor, 1998). This definition can be extended to 
include' ... settlements based on the parties' needs, wants and concerns (their interests) 
and on an examination of their alternatives to a negotiated settlement' (Chornenki et ai, 
1996, p. 79). 
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Environmental mediation is considered to differ from other mediation contexts. Features 
of family or industrial mediation may not be appropriate for environmental disputes 
(McDuff cited in MfE, 1988, p. 27). Environmental disputes can involve issues that 
refer to competing claims to, control over, and use of, the environment by individuals 
and groups with differing value systems and a variety of vested and community interests 
(Tillet, 1991; Stein, 1997a, p. 5; Richard: 1998; Boulle et ai, 1998, p. 218). Decisions 
can be highly technical, as they have to take into account the dual perspective of present 
and future economic and environmental needs. The impact of the decisions made can 
extend beyond the present immediate neighbours to other areas and future generations 
(Kramer, 1999, p. 7; Stein, 1997, p. 5). Often it is the decision of the local government 
authority that is being challenged in Court. The dispute may have been publicized in the 
media (Tillet, 1991, p.140) and the parties may have preconceived ideas about the other 
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parties as a consequence (Stein, 1997, p. 5). 
The definition of environmental mediation therefore varies from the general definition 
of mediation. Environmental mediation has been defined as: 
The use of an impartial or independent (we prefer not to use the term neutral) 
third party who helps to convene and facilitate discussions and dialogue among 
parties in conflict over issues concerning the use, allocation, protection, or 
enhancement of natural resources. (Stephens et ai, 1995, p. 175). 
It involves: 
Bargaining, sharing information, and ultimately compromising on original 
positions so as to achieve a solution 'acceptable' to all parties involved. 
(Jacobs & Rubino 1987 cited in Blackford, 1992b, p. 2). 
The 'wins' or 'losses', therefore, may impact not only on the immediate parties but also 
the wider society. A decision or settlement does not necessarily mean that the dispute is 
resolved (Boulle et al, 1998, p. 8). The appropriateness of applying environmental 
mediation practices in different cultural and legal contexts has also been raised. It has 
been suggested that there is a need to define a mediation process that takes into account 
the uniqueness of New Zealand's circumstances (Blackford & Matunga, 1991; Bollard 
et al, 1998, p. 70). Mediation is considered to resemble the consensus approach taken to 
decision-making by Maori (Blackford & Matunga cited in Blackburn et al, 1995, p. 
188). 
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Further debate centres on the meanings of such words as 'acceptable', 'successful' and 
'voluntary' in the above definitions. Voluntary7 is taken to mean freely chosen yet it 
can, in fact, involve pressure to try mediation, including pressure to at least try 
mediation before resorting to the Court (Moore, 1996). A 'mutually acceptable' 
outcome requires the defining of what is acceptable. Acceptable has been defined as 
'worthy of being accepted, pleasing, welcome, adequate, satisfactory, tolerable' 
(Concise Oxford Dictionary). It can be difficult to determine the success of mediation. 
'Success' has been defined as the accomplishment of an aim or purpose. Settlement 
may be reached during the stresses of negotiation and the mediation seen as a success 
on account of resolution. However a party may, on reflection, or after interaction with 
other parties or constituents, consider the settlement is intolerable (Buckle & Thomas-
Buckle, 1986, p. 56) or an illusion (Kartez & Bowman, 1993, p. 329) and the mediation 
unsuccessful. A party may decide to put resources into litigation in order to 'win' rather 
th.an accept a mediated settlement that is just tolerable. 
Success may be measured in a number of ways, some of which are: 
• How often agreements have been reached (Bingham cited in Lake, 1987, p. 
316; Cormick cited in Buckle et ai, 1986; Noll, 2001); 
• The extent to which the parties support the agreement through the 
implementation phase (Bingham, 1987; Buckle et ai, 1986, p. 56); 
• Whether or not the parties gained a sense of empowerment and 
understanding of other viewpoints (Barach Bush & Folger 1994 cited in 
Noll, 2001); 
• Whether-or not interpersonal relationships were maintained or enhanced 
(Noll,2001); 
• The fairness, efficiency and stability of the process and the outcome 
(Susskind and Ozawa cited in Buckle et ai, 1986, p. 56). 
Bingham (1987) endeavours to define those principles that appear to increase the 
likelihood of success. They are: 
• The mediator's assistance in assessing the dispute at the outset; 
• The party's incentive to negotiate and 
• The way the consensus-building process was conducted. 
7 Voluntary: done, given, or acting of one's own free will (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 2001). 
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Poitras explains the relationship between the principles and prerequisites of 
successful mediation (Poitras & Renaud, 1997). See Table 1. 
Table 1: Interaction between the principles and prerequisites ofsuccessful mediation 
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Willingness to resolve the dispute Prevent conflict from escalating 
Reconcile interests Willingness to explore areas of 
disagreement 
Seek a mutual gain solution Willingness to seek a win-win outcome 
Authority to make decisions Coordinate party effort 
In Mediation and Reconciliation ofInterests in Public Disputes, Poitras & Renaud, 
(1997). 
There is a danger of judging the success of mediation by the number of signed 
agreements achieved. Mediators may feel required to achieve an outcome when, in 
reality, the outcome is for the parties to decide. Mediation frequently fails (Buckle et al, 
1986). A 'failed' mediation could however be considered successful if: 
• 	 It improves relationships between parties; 
• 	 It creates procedures that assist the parties (Buckle et al, 1986, p. 55); 
• 	 The issues in dispute are narrowed, thereby making it easier for the court to handle 
(Talbot cited in Buckle et al, 1986, p. 58); 
• 	 The parties go on to settle the matter themselves (Buckle et al, 1986, p. 63); 
• 	 The parties are educated as to the positions and interests of others; 
• 	 Their ability to handle future disputes is increased through the infonnation and 
experience gained (Buckle et al, 1986, p. 59). 
Some parties may see a failed mediation as a success if it delays the case proceeding to 
court, enables them to discover infonnation for a later trial, or means the Court views 
them favourably on account of their willingness to cooperate and try mediation. This 
view of success could be considered flawed (Buckle et al, 1986). 
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3.3 The promotion of environmental mediation 
Litigation, with specialized judicial intervention, is perceived as having a number of 
strengths. Acknowledged strengths are: an impartial third party making the decision 
based on facts (Kubasek & Silvennan, 1996, p. 36;Stein, 1993, p. 279); all evidence that 
supports a position is presented (Kubasek et ai, 1996); the taking of evidence on oath; 
the testing of evidence by cross examination (Williams 1985 cited in Blackford 1992b, 
p. 9) and the public nature of the process (Blackford, 1992b, p. v). It allows precedent-
setting interpretation of the law.by the Court and may produce more consistent 
outcomes (Kubasek etal, 1996, p. 61). hnpending court action can provide an impetus 
for parties to enter mediation. However, increasingly, it has been recognised that the 
adversarial approach has limitations when confronted with complex multi party, multi-
issue disputes. As Sherman and Livey state 
The processes we have devised to resolve our conflicts need fixing. Simply put, 
we can no longer afford the cost in terms of dollars, time, lost competitiveness 
and relationships required to make our adversarial decision-making mechanisms 
work. (Sherman et ai, 1992, p. 13). 
Litigation has been perceived by some writers as lacking flexibility (Mitchell, 1995; 
Sandford, 1989; Reed, 1995; Shennan et ai, 1992), procedural barriers exist (Valiante & 
Muldoon, 1993), the Court system is over loaded and subject to time delays (Shennan et 
ai, 1992), which can lead to frustration with the system and its associated expense 
(Aspinall, 2001). In a market-orientated economy, market dominarrce requires speedy 
resolution of conflict to maximise returns (Crowfoot et ai, 1990). The adversarial 
system: 
Resembles a contest where opposing parties call (usually) expert witnesses to 
provide evidence, both fact and opinion. Legal advocates endeavour to 'build 
up' their clients case and 'break down' that of their opponents by examination, 
cross examination and re examination of witnesses and by legal submission. 
(Williams 1985 cited in Blackford, 1992b, p. 9). 
The Judge then decides the 'winner' after hearing the evidence and argument 
(McDowell & Webb, 1995, p. 4). It is suggested that adversarial procedures focus on 
positions and interpreting the law rather than the underlying concerns or interests of the 
parties (Williams cited in Blackford, 1992, p. 9; McKenzie, 1998, p. 22). The Court 
may be able to overcome such tendencies through the impartial interpretation of data. 
The Court is restricted in the decisions it can make by the grounds of the appeal, the 
relief sought and the efficient way in which the legal arguments and technical 
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infonnation are presented (Blackford, 1992b). Disputes may be broader than the 
statutory procedures (Sheppard 1993 cited in Bollard et ai, 1998). The need to fit the 
dispute to the legal framework can potentially distort the issues and fail to deal with the 
underlying issues. Parties may become polarised and entrenched in their position (Chart, 
1988, p. 5). Such an approach can affect the perception of the facts by the parties, 
impede the discovery of efficient settlement options, produce unwise agreements and 
affect on-going relationships (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1999, p. 5-7). Infonnation can be 
used as a weapon rather than a tool in a creative decision-making process (Andrews, 
1992, p. 203). Egocentric tendencies to interpret, accept or discount data to serve a 
particular cause have been observed where environmental conflict exists and may 
prevent a fair decision (Morris et ai, 1999, p. 3; Kubasek et ai, 1996, p. 37). 
3.3.1 The benefits of mediation 
There are various conflict resolution models available as an alternative or supplement to 
litigation. Some of the tenns used to describe these.techniques are: conflict resolution, 
environmental dispute resolution, conflict management, alternative dispute resolution, 
mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and mini-trials. The main approaches are 
negotiation, mediation, arbitration and litigation (Spiller, 1999). These ADR 
techniques, such as mediation, are being promoted as a more effective way to deal with 
environmental conflict in western democracies on the following grounds: 
Cost saving 
Legal rights can often only be realised or enforced through litigation (Valiante et ai, 
1993; p. -44; Dal Pont, 1996, p. 74). This may create inequity in that some parties may 
be able to afford skilled legal expertise while others may not (Kubasek et ai, 1996, p. 
37). The cost of legal and technical expertise can be considerable (MfE, 2001) and may 
affect a party's ability to participate effectively (PCE, 1996, p. 45). The cost may be a 
reason to avoid, or withdraw from, litigation (Bevan, 1992, p. 7; Kubasek et ai, 1996, p. 
37). The awarding of costs, where the loser pays the winner's costs, can make the risk 
of losing litigation doubly prohibitive (V ali ante et ai, 1993, p. 145; Salmon, 1998, p. 
13). Environmental conflicts can be technically complicated and expensive to litigate. It 
has been suggested that, when parties reviewed a dispute for mediation, only 20% of 
legal costs and 40% of technical investigative costs had been incurred at that point 
(Young, 2000). It is recognised that access to the speedy and inexpensive detennination 
of justice is required if legal rights are to be realised (Hearn, 1987; Webb, 2000). For 
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these reasons there has been a trend away from litigation towards the use of alternative 
dispute resolution for resolving environmental disputes (Sandford, 1992). 
Mediation enhances participation in decision-making by virtue of a less formal and less 
expensive process (Crowfoot et ai, 1990; Blackford, 1992). Mediation is therefore 
considered closer to a true form of democracy, where people have input into decisions 
that affect their lives and environment (Fischer & Forrester, 1993; Taylor, 1998). It is 
not, however, cost free. There are costs for the preparation and attendance by parties 
and their legal, technjcal and professional advisers and for the mediator and venue 
(Stein, 1995, p. 6; Chornenki et ai, 1996, p. 85). 
That environmental interests have found it difficult to fund mediation from their own 
resources has led to the concern that the process favours the parties with the money to 
pay the mediator (Harrison, 1997, p. 82). In New Zealand, the use of a member of the 
Environment Court as mediator is seen as a cost saving (Somerville, 1997, p. 47). 
Parties appear to accept the lack of choice of mediator where the mediation service is 
provided free (Saxe, 1997, p. 239). Whether mediation is, in fact, cost effective could be 
disputed if other matters, such as the environmental trade-offs, were taken into account 
(Bevan, 1992). 
Time saving 
Time is taken in preparing for, and participating in, litigation. Some environmental 
disputes can take years to resolve. It has been suggested that conflicts require time to 
mature, while the parties play out their legal options, to the point of understanding when 
the sides are deadlocked and that negotiation is· the only option. An impending court 
case, with its potential for loss of control over the outcome, can be an incentive for 
mediation (Talbot, 1983). Weariness caused by the time and expense of litigation can 
impact participants' lives and can be a catalyst for parties to mediate during litigation 
(Talbot, 1983, p. 7; Webb, 2000, p. 365). 
While mediation saves time compared to litigation, it nevertheless takes time and should 
not be treated as a quick fix option. Negotiating quick agreements or 'deals', such as 
side agreements, may not be successful in the long term as conflict may continue and 
undermine the agreement when the limitations and side effects of the agreement become 
apparent (Kartez et ai, 1993, p. 329). 
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Improved and more appropriate outcomes 
It is considered that mediation leads to improved and more appropriate environmental 
decision-making due to the fact that interested parties discuss and share facts and goals 
while working towards a solution (Mitchell, 1997; Grigg, 1997; Trenorden 1997; 
Salmon, 1998). Discussion can increase understanding and reduce or resolve conflict. It 
can help parties get 'unstuck' from narrow win/lose solutions (Chart in MfE, 1988, p. 
3). Mediation could be considered to: 
Encourage the growth of cognitive (importance of knowledge and learning) and 
normative (usual, typical) understanding that facilitates voluntary co-operation 
whether or not the resulting agreements take the form of fully binding legal 
agreements or not. (Vig et ai, 1999, p. 4). 
It provides a way of reframing issues that recognise and incorporate the perspective of 
the local community or fringe groups (Reed 1995; Crowfoot et ai, 1990; Grigg 1997; 
Sheppard 1997). It is seen as allowing more flexible decision-making than litigation in 
that it cannot be used to establish legal precedent (Sandford, 1989). It aims to create 
workable solutions that are orientated to add value or benefits to each party and to 
create win/win or mutual gain solutions ratherthan winners and losers (Fisher et ai, 
1999, p. 12; Moore et ai, 1998; Bollard et ai, 1998, p. 715). It is considered that, in 
many environmental disputes, creative compromises rather than legal winners are 
desirable (Kubasek et ai, 1996, p. 37). Mediation assumes that conflict is resolved 
because people wiIl accept what they help create (Blackburn et ai,1995). In addition, it 
is considered more responsive to cultural traditions and aspirations (Blackford et ai 
cited in Blackburn et ai, 1995, p. 188; Sakar, 1998, p. 31). 
Reduces "theworkioad in the Court 
In western democracies there is concern at the increased workload of the Courts. 
Mediation is considered to lessen the Court's workload as matters are either settled 
without the need for a hearing before the Court, or only those parts that remain in 
dispute are heard (Kubasek et ai, 1988; Kenderdine 1998; SomerviIle 1996; Sheppard 
1996). The case list within the New Zealand Environment Court system is large with 
appeals waiting up to 22 months to be heard in Court (Registrar of the Environment 
Court, 2000; Department of Courts, 2001, p. 19). The cost of delays can be significant 
to a commercial entity (Hardie, 1997, p. 2). Increasing Court efficiency and reducing 
delays in the Court were reasons for the Review Group on the Resource Management 
Bill favouring mediation (Baylis, 1992, p. 143). In 2001 these reasons still remain, with 
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mediation now being promoted by the Court as a means of alleviating caseload 
pressures (Mill, 2001d, p. 5). 
Rebuilds trust between disputing parties 
Frequently environmental disputes are caused by, or result in, a lack of trust between 
disputing parties. There can be a history of past violations of trust (Tenbrunsel, 1999). 
On their own, the parties may be unable to make the first step towards rebuilding trust. 
A mediator can be a 'trust facilitator' by assisting parties to communicate, listen to each 
other, express emotion constructively, and look beyond self interest and, in time, 
establish trust (Moore cited in Tenbrusel, 1999, p. 10). Trust develops as people 
communicate and their intentions become transparent. It is not however quick or easy. 
Time and face-to-face interaction are seen as crucial (Tenbrunsel, 1999, p. 8). Once 
trust has been re-established then solutions are possible (Applbaum, 1987, p. 280). 
Re.peated exposure to the same negotiators or mediators is considered to encourage a 
climate of trust (Tenbrunsel, 1999). 
Impacts personailives 
Entry into mediation has personal benefits for the participants as the dispute is dealt 
with and no longer dominates their lives. It can be therapeutic for participants to vent 
their emotions and express their viewpoints directly to the other parties (Eisen, 1998). 
3.3.2 Limitations of environmental mediation 
Despite the many proponents of mediation, there are those who question its use. Some 
ofthe pefCeived limitations of mediation are: 
Unrealistic expectations 
In some circumstances mediation of disputes is considered undesirable or unrealistic 
(Cormick cited in Lake, 1987; Amy 1987). Limits exist where there is inflexibility, 
where interests can only be met at the expense of the other party, or where parties 
believe they have alternative forums in which to pursue their interests. Win/win 
solutions may not be possible (Burgess et ai, 1995, p.3). One New Zealand mediator 
(pers.comm.) considers that win/win is promulgated only in the textbooks. Over time 
they have come to believe that it is a 'mostly ok/mostly ok' process. Most parties have 
to give something away (Powell, 1999, p. 456). In some circumstances litigation may be 
a more effective option (Bingham cited in Crowfoot et ai, 1990, p. 5). There is also an 
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underlying assumption that the parties are good judges of what the real issues are and 
whether they are resolved adequately (Bingham cited in Lake, 1987, p. 316). This may 
not, in fact, be the case. 
Potential disregard of the public interest and democracy 
Confidentiality is considered necessary for mediation, but therefore means mediation is 
hidden from the public view. In mediation regulatory agencies potentially become 
unaccountable and loose transparency (Harrison, 1997, p. 88). The desirability of 
mediation where a dispute has a significant public interest or public law aspect has been 
raised (Somerville, 1997, 1996, p. 10; Milligan et aI, 1998, p. 35; Sakar, 1998, p. 33; 
Boulle, 1999). Concern has been expressed at public interest issues being debated and 
trade-offs made in a confidential process (Hardie, 1997). Environmental issues could be 
considered of interest to the public. For that reason UNECE has stated that there should 
be.1egal guarantees that proceedings are fair, open, transparent and equitable (UNECE, 
1996,p.35) 
People coming to the Court with bona fide public interest concerns could be considered 
to be rendering a public service (Rosencranz et aI, 1995, p. 325). Some can make a 
significant contribution in environmental issues. However, the cost and complexities of 
participating in hearings can be a deterrent (Randerson, 1995, p. 15). Where there is no 
public funding for persons or groups who represent the public interest that input is lost 
(Hardie, 1997). In New Zealand, the lack of legislative requirement to consider the 
public interest, as under the RMA, could be considered to further reduce expression of 
the publi€interest (Sheppard 1997; Milligan & Turley, 1998; Trenorden, 1997; Tow & 
Stubbs, 1997). 
Maintaining inter-generational equity is also a concern (Blackford, 1992). There is a 
danger that the present generation will disregard future generations on account of its 
.. .inherent bias towards its own well-being, and if conditions appear threatening, 
may well abandon its sense of noblesse oblige towards the well being of future 
generations. (Brown Weiss, 1995, p. 231). 
The mediator 
The mediator is seen as crucial for the success of mediation. Historically, mediators 
received informal training. However, during the 20th century, mediation has been 
institutionalized and become a profession (Moore, 1996). Training, credentials and a 
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code of ethics to produce competent and effective mediators have been advocated 
(Davis et ai cited in Boristoff et ai, 1998, p. 23; Stein 1997; Hardie, 1997; Manring et 
al, 1990; Cooley, 2000). It is considered that participants in mediation are entitled to 
certain minimum standards being met (Stein, 1997, p. 3). Some writers go so far as to 
state that parties should only mediate where the mediator has the trust and confidence of 
all parties (Fowler cited in Bollard et al, 1998). How this is to be ensured is unclear. 
The approach and style of mediators may vary, depending on their objective or focus in 
mediation and their perception of their role in the process (Newman, 1999; Levin, 
2001). A mediator may choose to pursue one of a number of strategies when managing 
mediation: compensation, pressure, integration or inaction. The particular strategy 
chosen is determined by the mediator's perception of the situation, including the 
probability of a settlement being reached, and how much value he/she puts on the 
Parties achieving their aspirations (Carnevale cited in Noll, 2001). 
The type of dispute resolution and the nature of the dispute can determine the particular 
mediator used (Kovich & Love 1998 cited in Noll, 2001). Some qualities considered 
necessary in mediators are skill, wisdom, political insight, fairness and commanding 
respect (Blackford et al cited in Blackburn et ai, 1995, p. 198). It is considered that 
effective mediators are those who are sensitive to and aware of cross-cultural and inter-
cultural issues (Hauser & Kelter cited in Boristoff et aI, 1998, p. 23). 
The lack of accountability of the mediator has been raised as a concern. Local authority 
decision~makers are accountable to constituents, the Court to the law, but mediators are 
accountable to no one. They may be biased in favour of achieving a settlement or a 
particular party (Harrison, 1997, p. 95). Amy (1987) has suggested that mediators may 
have an interest in securing a settlement. Challenges from the parties and self-interest in 
retaining their professional reputation are considered to be a disincenti ve to showing 
bias (Amy, 1987; Harrison, 1997, p. 96). Mediation is a private process and mediators 
need to conduct themselves appropriately. Naughton QC (1995) considers 
If mediation is court-related it enables, and probably obliges, the Court to 
maintain some degree of quality control over mediator personnel and the 
mediation process (Naughton cited in Keogh, 1996, p. 176). 
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This quality control can extend to mediator selection, training, supervision of their 
conduct and accountability for their conduct (Naughton, 1995, p. 381); In Australia, the 
NSW Law Reform Commission recommended that ' dispute resolution programs 
connected with courts and tribunals must operate in accordance with clear guidelines 
( ... ) to ensure the integrity of the process and quality of service' and' ... require 
mediators to undergo appropriate training in dispute resolution techniques as a condition 
of their employment' (Naughton, 1995, p. 384). LEADR8 and AMINZ9 have procedures 
in place to maintain standards of their registered mediators. These standards do not 
apply to mediators outside these organisations (Powell, 1999, p. 21). 
Dangers inherent within the mediation process 
• Co-optation or conversion 
This occurs when a party is encouraged to change their stance to that of the majority or, 
by. virtue of the discussion and its persuasive power, change their opinion. Where this 
happens the constituents or organisation they represent, who has not heard the 
opponent's viewpoint, may feel betrayed by their representative and find a replacement 
(Burgess et ai, 1994, p. 3, 7) .. 
• Coercion 
To coerce someone means to 'persuade or restrain (an unwilling pe!~on) by force' 
(Concise Oxford Dictionary). While entry into mediation and participation in mediation 
is said to be voluntary, and there is no legal compulsion to participate, people may feel 
coerced into participating. A coerced settlement is not considered to be a 'quality 
settlemen1' and can perpetuate injustices, leading to dissatisfaction and further conflict 
(Adler cited in PCE, 1996, p. A51; Naughton, 1995, p. 380). Pressure is imposed by: 
(a) The perception that the Judge considers the case is suitable for mediation and is 
advising the parties to settle. There could be a temptation for' ... busy overworked 
judges, disinterested ones, or even well-intentioned but nevertheless over-zealous ones, 
to subtly (or unsubtly) pressure the parties to use mediation' (Naughton, 1995, p. 381). 
8 LEADR: Leading Experts in Alternative Dispute Resolution, previously known as Lawyers Engaged in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution. An Australasian non-profit membership-based organization established in 
1989 to promote the use and awareness of alternative dispute resolution. It has accredited mediators, 
offers a referral service and conducts training in mediation (MtE, 2001, p.28). 
9 AMINZ: Arbitrators and Mediators Institute of New Zealand. It is a not-for-profit incorporated society 
that represents the New Zealand profession of arbitration, mediation and dispute resolution generally. It 
has a panel list of suitably qualified and experienced mediators (MtE, 2001, p.28). 
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(b) Other parties agreeing to mediate, which leaves the party that refuses as 'the 
odd man out' . 
(c) The potential for parties to gang up in Court against the party that did not 
wish to mediate and seek costs. Seeking 'security for costs', or advising that 
costs will be sought could be considered a form of coercion. 
(d) 'Sponsors', such as legal aid organisations, requiring that mediation be 
attempted. 
This less than voluntary situation is not necessarily viewed as undesirable as 'the 
process is often useful and initially unwilling participants can be surprised at 
what happens.' (Bevan, 1992, p. 30). It does however go against the fundamental 
right of the individual to choose. During mediation, parties may feel forced to 
compromise and accept the mediated settlement. Being forced to accept an 
agreement can create resentment and cause a backlash as parties then work to 
reverse the situation at the next opportunity (Burgess et al, 1994, p. 6). 
• Power imbalance 
Parties have varying degrees of power that can be used to influence the outcome of 
mediation (Powell, 2000). A power imbalance may exist where there is: inequality of 
the parties with respect to financial resources, social position, access to expertise and 
knowledge, legal legitimacy, precedent and negotiating ability (Tillet, 1991, p. 143; 
Blackford et al, 1991, p. v; Harashina cited in PCE, 1996, p. 8; Cooley, 2000, p. 78; 
Powell, 2000, p. 420). Unequal access to expertise may advantage parties and give them 
a stronger position in negotiations (Amy cited in Blackford et al, 1995, p. 189). This 
may create an 'intellectual environment' that impacts on the parties' willingness to 
participate (Grant, 2001, p. 80). A power imbalance may also arise as a result of 
physical intimidation and an unequal desire to avoid conflict (Cooley, 2000, p. 78), or 
create nuisance (Powell, 2000, p. 420). The informal nature of the process can create the 
impression that the parties are equal when they are not. The mediated agreement may 
look equal but is in fact an unequal compromise (Kubasek et al, 1996, p. 62). The less 
resourced party may have lacked experience of the process, or resources (legal and 
technical) to review information or obtain their own (Harashina cited in PCE, 1996, p. 
8; Adler et al, 2000). 
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The mediator may be able, by ensuring the process is procedurally fair, to influence 
some factors but not completely redress the imbalance. Fundamental power differentials 
may exist within a society and participants may not be able to be overcome these e.g. 
Government participants have influence conferred by the political or economic system 
(Blackford et ai, 1995, p. 188). It is suggested that, if the power imbalance is too great 
and cannot be redressed, the mediator should refuse to act (Cormick cited in Harrison, 
1997, p. 100; Hardie, 1997, p. 4). As some opponents of mediation put it: 
Mediation has turned out to be a dangerous instrument for increasing the power of 
the strong to take advantage of the weak. Because of the informality and 
concensuality of the process and hence the absence of both procedural and 
substantive rules, mediation can magnify power imbalances and open the door for 
coercion and manipulation by the stronger party (Rubin, 1994,p.22). 
• Loss of visibility 
Mediation is a confidential process and is ' ... not subject to the glare of publicity or 
press reporting.' (AMINZ). This lack of pUblicity may impact on groups who rely on 
public exposure to attract funds necessary for their survival and effective operation 
(Crowfoot et al, 1990, p. 4). This loss of support may impact on an organisation's 
ability to raise funds to pursue a matter in the Court. Involvement in symbolic conflict 
and 'fighting for a principle' enables parties to be seen as taking a position (Tillet, 1991, 
p. 11). 
Citizens groups contending with powerful government agenGies or large 
corporations often must take the hardest possible line- total victory- to keep the 
support of their members and maintain their momentum (Carpenter et ai, 1988, 
p.2). 
• . Lack.Qf skills 
Mediation is a demanding process that takes work, organization, clear thinking and 
stamina (Cormick cited in Crowfoot et ai, 1990, p. 5). Parties that lack knowledge of, 
and experience in, negotiation or bargaining may, when faced with highly experienced 
and sophisticated opponents, compromise and accept unjust or undesirable settlements 
(Amy 1983; Forester, 1985; Crowfoot et al, 1990; Harrison, 1997; Blackford et ai, 
1995, p. 189). Sometimes the process breaks down when parties become entrenched in 
their positions (McKenzie, 1998) and become unwilling to alter their strategy or 
perspective (Burgess et ai, 1994, p. 9). In the United States of America some 
organisations are teaching people how to mediate prior to an actual mediation occurring 
in order to teach people joint problem-solving techniques, such as packaging the options 
so as to make them attractive to other parties (Rundle, 1986). 
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• Pressure to settle 
Putting a deadline on people to get them to resolve an issue can be counter productive. 
It may mean that time is not wasted through stalling but that the parties use the pressure 
they were under as an excuse for their ineffectiveness (Argyris, 1989, p. 546). 
• Implementation 
While mediation may work well for settling disputes, it does not necessarily result in 
higher rates of compliance and implementation by the parties (Sipe, 1998). It is 
considered that 'procedural satisfaction' is important if the outcomes of voluntary 
dispute resolution processes are going to last. Procedural satisfaction indicates that 
parties believed they were better served by using the voluntary process than fighting in 
Court and that they would use such a process again (Lincoln & Associates in Kartez et 
ai, 1993). 
3.3.3 Suitability of disputes for mediation 
Some writers have sought to devise ways of working out which disputes are suitable for 
resolution by mediation. Three suggested categories are: 
Category 1: Characteristics of disputes easy to resolve 
The issue is divisible; the stakes are small; there is interdependenc~5)f the parties; there 
is continuity of interaction; there is strong, cohesive leadership; the third party is 
trusted, powerful, prestigious and neutral, and parties have done or could do equal harm 
to each other (Eunson, 1997). 
Category 2: Characteristics of disputes difficult to resolve 
The issues are a matter of principle; there is low motivation to settle; the stakes are 
large; parties are negotiating over scarce resources; there is no interdependence between 
parties; there is no ongoing interaction required between parties; parties are fragmented 
or without clear, strong leadership; the process is unbalanced with one party feeling the 
more harmed; there are numerous parties or difficulty in defining parties; or it involves 
industrial projects that revolve around complex scientific factors. In Australia research 
found that disputes with these characteristics had a 49% success rate in mediation 
(Eunson, 1997; Talbot, 1983; Tow & Stubbs, 1997, p. 278). Disputes with these 
characteristics are considered likely to defeat even the most able mediators (Kresel et al 
cited in Baylis 1999, p. 288). 
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Category 3: Characteristics of disputes unsuitable for mediation 
The issues are vague and undefined; they involve deeply held values; are likely to set 
important nationwide legal precedents and the issues lack deadlines or time pressures 
(Blackburn, 1995). It has been suggested that often, precedent cases will settle for 
money, whereas principle cases will not (Chornenki et al, 1996, p. 83). 
While creating categories may be useful, they might not be an appropriate way to 
'sieve' or predict disputes suitable for mediation, as in each situation unique 
characteristics came irito play (Chornenki et al, 1996, p. 82). The issues in a dispute 
appearing unsuitable for mediation maybe overcome due to the will of the parties to 
make the mediation process work (Bingham, 1987). 
3.4 Models of mediation 
Fopr models of mediation have been identified. They are: 
• Settlement or compromise mediation. The main objective is to encourage 
incremental bargaining towards a compromise; 
• Facilitative, interest-based or problem solving mediation. The main objective is 
to negotiate on the basis of needs and interests rather than positions; 
• Therapeutic, reconciliation or transformative mediation. The main objective is to 
deal with the underlying causes of the dispute and improve!.~lationships so 
resolution can be reached and 
• Evaluative, advisory or managerial mediation. The main objective is to reach 
resolution based on the legal rights, entitlements and anticipated outcomes in 
court {Boulle et al, 1998, p.29, 30). 
Each type of mediation has benefits and limitations. Facilitative mediation, considered 
appropriate for environmental disputes, is seen as the classic or pure form of mediation. 
Other forms of mediation may, however, influence mediators during mediation (Boulle 
et al, 1998). A mediator may provide reality checks for the parties but not assess or 
predict outcomes or urge settlement (Riskin cited in Noll, 2001). Another may define 
the case in terms of strengths and weaknesses of positions and give an opinion on the 
likely outcome of the case in Court. Giving advice is justified on the grounds that this 
avoids a settlement being drawn up which fails to comply with the legislation (Baylis, 
1999, p. 283-4). The dangers with giving advice are that an opinion may be incorrect, 
could be used as a form of blackmail to get settlement or gi ve the impression that the 
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mediator is siding with one party. This can destroy a party's trust in the mediator (Stein, 
1997, p. 3; Kovich et al cited in Noll, 2001). 
3.5 The process of mediation 
Mediation practitioners and theorists agree that the mediation process requires a fairly 
prescribed fonnat (Boristoff et aI, 1998, p. 22) that has a proven capacity to work 
(Hardie, 1997). It requires public institutions and an institutional nonn to ensure it 
occurs in a fundamentally democratic way among equals (Reed cited in Blackburn et aI, 
1995, p. 14). Without this, questions of legitimacy of the process can arise (Baylis, 
1992). The public perception of the legitimacy of the process is considered important 
(Chart, 1988, p. 9; Baylis, 1992). 
There are three generally recognised main~tages in the mediation process with steps 
within each stage. The main stages and steps in mediation are: 
Stage 1 :Pre-negotiation 
• Initiation 
The mediator is identified (Blackburn, 1995, p. 270) and invited to participate. The 
mediator's objectivity is seen as critically important and technical expertise in 
mediation as very important (Blackburn, 1995, p. 270,276; Saxe, ~?97). Mediator 
styles are known to vary. Blackburn suggests that at this initiation stage the suitability 
of the dispute for mediation may be assessed (Blackburn, 1995, p. 271). Factors 
considered critically important are: 
. •. That mediation is the best alternative and 
• There is uncertainty as to the outcome in another context. 
Factors considered very important are: 
• The issues are concrete and specific; 
• There is a perceived balance of power between the parties; 
• A stalemate has been reached; 
• There will be economic costs if mediation fails; 
• No legal precedents will be set; 
• There are no strongly held ideological or philosophical differences (Burgess et 
ai, 1994) and 
• There is no history of contentious relationships (Blackburn, 1995, p. 272). 
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It is also considered an appropriate time for the parties to prepare a dispute resolution 
strategy. During this, they define their objective; assess the appropriateness of 
environmental mediation for the dispute; evaluate its costs and benefits; consider 
options available for ADR and their BATNA 10; decide their bottom line; choose the 
favoured option and consider implementation and review (Burgess, 1994; Blackford et 
ai, 1995, p. 195). One writer considers that strategic preparation is a key to successful 
mediation and gives prospective mediation participants a worksheet to work through 
(Chornenki et ai, 1996, p. 111-120). It is considered that parties who do not have a clear 
idea of the process and what they want from it are likely to be disappointed (Cormick 
cited in Crowfoot et ai, 1990, p. 5). 
• Recruitment 
This requires the identification of the main and potential interest groups. The selection 
of participants is considered critically important with participants being representative 
spokespersons of clearly identifiable constituents (Blackburn et ai, 1995, p. 271,277; 
Blackford et ai, 1995, p. 191). Adequate time has to be allowed for appropriate 
representation (Boulle et ai, 1998; Blackford et ai, 1995, p. 192; 270). A further 
consideration is whether or not the participants can maintain participation if it goes on 
over a period of time (Blackburn et ai, 1995, p. 272). Participation must be on a 
voluntary basis. At this stage it is considered very important that th~mediator educates 
the parties on the mediation process (Blackburn et ai, 1995). 
• Orientation 
This covets the protocols and process design, costs, defining of the issues to be resolved 
and nature of any information to be gathered and exchanged (Blackford et ai, 1995; 
Boulle et ai, 1998; Crowfoot et ai, 1990, p. 21,22). Of critical importance are: the 
parties' participation in designing the process; the joint development of, and agreement 
to, ground rules; ground rules for dealing with the media and building trust between the 
mediator and the parties (Blackburn et ai, 1995; Moore, 1996). The physical, 
intellectual and emotional environment of mediation is important as it can affect 
whether or not participants feel comfortable to contribute in discussion (Futrell, 1999; 
Grant, 2001, p. 80). 
10 BATNA: Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. WATNA: Worst Alternative to a Negotiated 
Agreement (Powell, 2001). 
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Stage 2: Negotiation 
• Issue identification 
The issues are identified, and the mediator endeavours to get the participants to give all 
parties an adequate understanding of the relevant facts (Blackburn et al, 1995, p. 277). 
The attitudes and concerns of participants are explained; different values and beliefs are 
identified and explained (Blackford et al, 1995). During this phase the hidden interests 
of parties may be uncovered, feelings expressed and parties, for the first time, explain 
their viewpoint to one another (Chornenki et ai, 1990, p. 108). Issues are reframed in 
ways that recognise and respect the perspective of each party (Reed, 1995). 
It is important that the mediator identifies the core issues in the conflict. Possible core 
issues are fundamental moral issues or distributional questions. Issues that may overlay 
these are misunderstandings, disagreement over technical facts, questions of procedural 
fairness and polarisation. These may obscure the core issues in the conflict and become 
so severe as to dominate the mediation (Burgess et at, 1994, p. 4). 
• Options outlined 
Parties are encouraged to brainstorm and think laterally without commitment to come 
up with possible options for settlement. Options are recorded but not criticised or 
evaluated as they are being generated. It is considered important th~~. the options should 
come from the parties, not the mediator, and that every party contributes (Powell, 1999, 
p. 454; Grant, 2001, p. 79). The suggested options are then worked on and assessed. The 
parties may break into private sessions to work on and consider alternatives, consult 
others, such as head office, experts, or hold private sessions with the mediator 
(Chornenki et al, 1990, p. 109). During this stage a mediator's conduct can influence the 
parties willingness to engage in lateral thinking (Grant, 2001, p. 81). 
• Bargaining/Negotiation 
Bargaining occurs and decisions or agreements are recorded. It is considered of critical 
importance that any agreement reached, including agreements in principle, should be 
documented before the parties leave the session (Blackburn et al, 1995, p. 278). 
Alternatively, the mediator may, as the mediation proceeds, draft an agreement based on 
how they perceive key interests for the parties to criticise rather than to commit to. It is 
reworked, the previous copy is destroyed and a revised agreement made (McKenzie, 
1998). Drafting possible agreements during the session enables acceptable language to 
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be worked out with the parties present (Chornenki et aI, 1990, p. 109) and the 
settlement drafted. At this point parties may consider and try the other powers available 
to them such as Court action, lobbying, or economics, e.g. financial settlement with side 
agreements (Burgess et aI, 1994, p. 3). 
• Drafting and Signing of Agreement 
The agreement is then finalised and signed (Moore, 1996; Blackburn, 1995; Boulle et 
aI, 1998). It has been suggested that at this stage the mediator needs to 'reality check' 
the agreement 'what if ... ' so that parties are aware of the implications of their 
settlement. The mediator needs to ensure that the heads of agreement are accurately 
recorded and reflect the needs and wishes of the parties. Failure to accurately record the 
proposed settlement may mean parties are unwilling to sign the agreement or dispute the 
wording. There may be a danger to rush this stage in order to finalise an agreement. An 
adjournment, ranging in length from hours to weeks, would enable time for parties to 
reflect on the proposed settlement (Case note, NZU 1999, p. 455; Powell, 1999, p. 454; 
Pollard, 2000). 
Stage 3:Implementation 
The parties undertake implementation and, if necessary, it is ratified or approved by the 
people represented in mediation (Blackburn et aI, 1995, p. 279). ItIEay also be 
necessary to review the settlement if circumstances require it (Blackburn et aI, 1995; 
Boulle et ai, 1998). Implementing and monitoring agreements can be included in the 
settlement but it has been noted that often monitoring is not built in, due to the rush to 
finish the~agreement, participant burnout and lack of funds (Manring et aI, 1990). 
3.6 Prerequisites for mediation 
There is a wide range of mediation styles and practices (Forester 1989; Blackburn et al 
1995). There was no definitive list but rather there appeared to be a range of key 
requirements that were considered important by a number of writers (Bingham, 1986). It 
is considered that these prerequisites should either be present or be put in place before 
the parties engage in the actual mediation. The mediator may be instrumental in 
fostering these prerequisites (Poitras et aI, 1997, p. 37). The necessary prerequisites are 
described in the following way: 
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Voluntary participation 
Participants are assumed to be there of their own free will and are willing to resolve the 
dispute (Poitras et ai, 1997, p. 33). No one has to consent to mediation and parties can 
walk away or withdraw at any time (Bevan, 1992, p. 27-8; Fisher et ai, 1999). 
Face-to-face discussion 
Face-to-face discussion enables understanding of others' concerns, interests and 
viewpoints to develop (Susskind, 1985, p. 372). It causes participants to leave their 
familiar, day-to-day situation and focus on the issues (Hardy cited in Eisen, 1998). It 
may restrict the number of people who can be involved (Hayward, 2000, p. 226). The 
use of cyberspace for mediation has being promoted in the United States but this has a 
number of inherent limitations, one of which is face-to-face contact (Eisen, 1998; 
Blackford, et ai, 1995). 
Mutual agreement or cooperative decisions 
All affected parties join in defining the issues, developing alternatives and outcomes 
that satisfy the parties (Poitras et ai, 1997, p. 34). All are searching for joint gains 
(Susskind, 1985, p. 372-3). 
Third party entry and role infacilitating negotiation and consensus building 
The mediator should ensure that the rules of natural justice apply (Boulle et ai, 1999). 
Key requirements are: the mediator ensures all parties are heard; shows no bias; is 
honest; has integrity; ensures that the process is fair; ensures that any settlement reflects 
the agreement between parties (Orchiston, 2000, p. 6) and parties are not forced into a 
settlement. 
Authority to implement the agreement 
Those with the authority to implement the agreement participate directly in the process 
(Susskind et ai, 1987; Cormick 1987; Crowfoot et all990;Blackburn et ai, 1995). Some 
writers extend their work to cover matters such as implementation and renegotiation 
(Bingham, 1986; Susskind et ai, 1987; Sipe, 1998). 
The parties are open and flexible 
The parties are flexible and able to recognise aspects of the dispute beyond themselves 
and their interests (Chornenki, 1996, p. 84). Parties must at least try to be objective 
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enough to understand other points of view. This can be difficult as environmental 
disputes often involve strongly held or entrenched views (Sakar, 1998, p. 33). Parties 
may have prejudged or exaggerated their opponents' viewpoint and openness to 
accepting the reality is difficult (Monis et ai, 1999) as they have negative expectations 
(Tenbrunsel, 1999). 
Confidentiality 
Mediation is described as a confidential process (Boulle et ai, 1998, p. 276-7) with only 
the agreed outcome b.eing revealed. Confidentiality is considered to be one of 
mediation's greatest assets (Goldblatt, 2000, p. 392) in that: 
• It allows parties to share freely, and make concessions or compromises in an 
endeavour to reach a mutually acceptable outcome, without political and public 
pressure. 
• . If mediation fails and the dispute goes to Court, information divulged in mediation 
cannot be used against parties in the court process (Boune et ai, 1998). 
• It protects mediators as it excludes them from pressure to divulge details of the 
mediation, both during and after mediation (Boulle et ai, 1998). 
Some writers suggest that a formal agreement about confidentiality should be reached 
prior to mediation. The AMINZ provides a suggested Memorandum of Confidentiality 
for parties to sign prior to mediation (AMINZ). At the end of medi<i!ion, some 
mediators may collect and destroy all notes made during mediation or return all 
documents relating to the mediation to the participants. Others indicate that no reports 
or notes are made on the file regarding the mediation (Stein, 1997). 
Fairness 
'The perceived fairness of public participation procedures can affect public satisfaction 
as much as the substantive nature of the resulting decision' (Lawrence, Daniels & 
Stankey, 1997, p. 578). Fairness can therefore be as important as efficiency. Concerns 
over fairness can cause some parties to reject valuable offers that are perceived to be 
inequitable. Fairness is not always construed as equality. Differing backgrounds and 
perspectives lead to differing perspective of fairness (Monis et ai, 1999). 
Procedural fairness is seen as a component of environmental justice (Sheldon cited in 
Bosselmann et ai, 1999, p. 26). Procedural justice considers that the manner in which 
public involvement is conducted can affect public reaction to the subsequent decisions. 
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The use of infonnation by decision-makers and feedback to participants is seen as 
. important in creating the perception of fairness. People become unwilling to participate 
where procedures are perceived as unjust or unfair (Lawrence et ai, 1997). Factors that 
enhance the perception of fairness are: equality of opportunity, following consistent 
rules, basing decisions on accurate infonnation, avoiding bias; responsive regulatory 
authority; representation at all stages and ethicality (Leventhal cited in Tata, 2000; 
Justice, 2001). The process must be procedurally fair and perceived to be fair in order 
for settlements to be accepted and a commitment made to implement them (Tyler & 
Lind cited in Morris ei ai, 1999). 
3.7. The permanence or otherwise of mediated agreements 
One issue, which finds limited coverage in the literature but which has the potential to 
be of increasing importance, is the pennanence of any mediated agreements. Of 
importance is whether mediated agreements will stand the test of time or lead to 
grievance claims from future generations (Matunga, H., pers. comm.) and whether there 
is the need or opportunity for renegotiation or flexing in the future as circumstances 
change and new infonnation regarding some activities comes to light (Mitchell, 1997). 
The circumstances in which agreements may be reviewed in light of new infonnation, 
such as technological findings that raise serious inter-generational or ecological issues, 
do not appear to have been covered to any degree. This does, however, need to be 
addressed as the limited scope for review detennines a party's approach to mediation. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In the above review I have examined the recent literature on environmental mediation 
from several different perspectives. Against the backdrop of this literature review, the 
focus of this study is on evaluating environmental mediation under the umbrella of the 
Environment Court within the framework of the RMA. As explained in the next chapter 
I will examine two particular aspects of the environmental mediation process: 
1. How the process of environmental mediation is initiated, how it is conducted and 
how the settlements are implemented and 
2. The extent to which the prerequisites for successful mediation are being met. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research procedures that were followed in order to address 
the objective of this study: to evaluate Environment Court assisted mediation of 
environmental disputes and develop good practice guidelines that would improve 
mediation. As stated in Chapter one the research objective was redefined in terms of key 
research questions as follows: 
1. What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of mediation as a means of 
resolving environmental disputes? 
2. What are the requirements of the mediation process in order for it to be an effective 
tool for resolving environmental disputes? 
3. What are the provisions for mediation by the Environment Court under the RMA 
and how are these provisions being implemented? 
4. What are the different stakeholder group's perspectives of the practice of 
Environment Court assisted mediation under the RMA? 
4.2 Research approach 
While the focus of my study was to evaluate the legislative provisions of s.268 (1) of 
the RMA as they relate to mediation and their implementation, it was by no means clear 
what should be evaluated. As Rossi and Freeman (1989) note, the effectiveness of any 
evaluation can be determined by the details (or lack of them) given in the authorising 
legislation as to the nature and implementation of a program, in this case mediation. 
Usually ... only a set of general goals and some broad guidelines is authorised, 
while leaving the details of program design and implementation to the agency or 
organisation to whom the authority to run the program has been given. 
It cannot be over emphasized that the specificity with which a program is 
designed is a key determinant of whether or not it will be effective, as well as 
how well its evaluation can be conducted (Rossi & Freeman, 1989, p. 116). 
Such a situation could be considered to exist with regard to environmental mediation in 
New Zealand. The RMA has not defined the mediation process under s.268 and it has 
been left to the Court, and in particular the Commissioners who conduct mediation, to 
define and undertake the mediation process. Baylis (1999) has noted this lack of 
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specificity in New Zealand legislation and the implications of the resultant uncertainty 
and variation on the legitimacy ofmediation in general. As there were no explicit 
criteria given within the RMA or supporting Environment Court or MfE documentation 
against which to evaluate the mediation process, I reviewed the literature to identify 
those criteria considered to be prerequisites for mediation and to develop these into a 
framework for evaluation. 
Based on the literature review in the previous two chapters, I developed the following 
'ideal type' criteria as a framework for the evaluation of Environment Court assisted 
mediation: 
Parties' entry into mediation is voluntary. 
Parties are competent to participate, i.e. informed and prepared for mediation. 
On-going participation in mediation is voluntary. 
The mediator upholds natural justice and the process is procedurally fair i.e.: 
• Participants are involved in defining the process. 
• An understanding of the process is drawn up. 
• All parties have an opportunity to put their viewpoint. 
• Power imbalances are redressed. 
• Parties are given adequate time to consider proposals. 
• A record of discussion is kept. 
• There is no undue pressure on parties to settle. 
• The agreement reached is a consensus decision. 
• The memorandum of understanding is drawn up by all parties. 
The parties are involved in face-to-face discussion. 
The mediator is competent to undertake the mediation, i.e. knowledgeable and 
experienced. 
Those with the authority to implement the outcome are present in mediation. 
The outcome of mediation meets the purpose of the RMA. 
The mediated settlement is a workable outcome that parties consider will last. 
Participation in mediation results in time and cost savings. 
4.3 Research methods 
A range of research methods was used to answer the four research questions. 
The relative advantages and disadvantages of, and prerequisites, for 
environmental mediation were identified from the literature review. Based on the 
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information obtained, a framework for evaluation was drawn up and used as a 
basis for preparing a series of structured interview questions for each stakeholder 
group. The main stakeholder groups involved in environmental mediation were 
considered to be the Environment Judges, Environment Commissioners and 
private mediators and participants, i.e. parties to a reference or appeal in the 
Environment Court. This last group may include Ministers of the Crown, 
government agencies, territorial and local authorities, commercial firms, public 
interest groups and private individuals. The stakeholders were identified, and if 
willing, interviewed using the structured interview questions (See Appendix 1). 
The purpose of the structured questions was to examine the particular role of 
each stakeholder group within the mediation process and to ascertain whether or 
not the prerequisites for mediation, as listed above, were present in the Court 
assisted mediation process. Questions were also included so as to obtain each 
stakeholder's perspective of mediation under the RMA and any improvements 
they considered necessary or desirable. Personal interviews were conducted, in 
all but one case, using the structured questions, copies of which were given to 
stakeholders immediately prior to the interviews. Responses were taped, 
transcribed and the results were collated and analysed. Meaning was taken 
directl y from the responses. 
4.4 Research sample 
The aim was to conduct the study nationwide. The small size of New Zealand and the 
limited number of Environment Judges and Environment Commissioners meant that it 
was possible to survey the Judges and Commissioners relatively easily. The small size 
of the groups to be sampled did, however, have implications for confidentiality and 
anonymity. 
My goal was to get honest feedback on the Court assisted mediation process. I 
recognised that confidentiality and anonymity were of paramount importance on 
account of the potential to identify stakeholders. Some stakeholders relied on the Court 
for employment while others would be required to use the Court's services in future. It 
was considered that all would be unwilling for their responses to be published if this, in 
any way, enabled them to be identified. All individuals were therefore interviewed on 
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the condition that their participation would be kept confidential and their anonymity 
preserved (See Appendix 2). 
Confidentiality and anonymity were also a consideration when writing up my findings. 
The systematic utilization of references, such as Judge A, Commissioner B or 
participant C, may enable a reader to build up a profile of a particular stakeholder that 
may enable identification. This had implications for the way in which results were 
presented. I therefore sought to summarise and report stakeholder responses in a random 
way to protect their confidentiality. All participants were given the opportunity to 
withdraw from the research at any time, including withdrawal of any information they 
had provided. 
Systematic sampling was used to collect data for this research. Stakeholder groups 
subject to systematic sampling were as follows: 
Environment Judges and Alternate Environment Judges 
This was a small group with only six nationwide at the time of interviews (2000). I 
approached all Judges and, in addition to their willingness to participate in a personal 
interview, their availability for an interview was also dictated by Court schedules, 
locational considerations and their personal commitments within an_~. outside New 
Zealand. Four Judges were interviewed personally. 
2. Environment Commissioners 
It was recognised that there were a number of individuals offering m~diation services in 
New Zealand. In addition to the Environment Commissioners and Deputy 
Commissioners who conducted mediation in the Court, there were privately employed, 
trained mediators, professionals and, in some of the larger local authorities, officers 
with training and qualifications in mediation. It was decided to restrict the study to 
Commissioners operating as mediators within the Court-assisted mediation system. 
Reasons for this decision were: 
1. Commissioners were a defined group and operated under the Court's authority. 
Private mediators were a more diverse and geographically dispersed group, did not have 
access to the Judges in the same way as Commissioners and did not have the experience 
of determining cases as provided for in s.265 (3) of the RMA. 
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Confining the study to Commissioners enabled it to be kept manageable and realistic 
within the existing time and financial constraints. 
ii. The Court assisted mediation process came under authority of the Court and was 
administered by the Court. 
I approached all Commissioners and sought their participation in a confidential personal 
interview. As with the Judges, in addition to their willingness to participate, their 
availability for an interview was also dictated by Court schedules and personal and 
professional commitments within and outside New Zealand. I was able to obtain 
representation from male and female Commissioners who acted as mediators. The 
sample comprised eleven of the thirteen Commissioners. 
3. . Participants 
I did not consider it appropriate to randomly select cases that had been mediated, rather 
the cases needed to representative of resource management cases in New Zealand. The 
criteria I used were: 
Category of dispute: Plan reference/resource consent. 
Location: Urban/rural; North Island/South Island 
Cultural: Maori interestslPakeha interests 
Number of parties present: Single/multi -party. 
All participants in a settlement were willing interviewees. 
The selection of participants (i.e. parties to a reference or appeal) chosen to interview is 
explained-below. 
4.5 Modifications to the research 
I had to modify my approach to locating references or appeals that been resolved in 
Court assisted mediation. The Court was unable to provide a list of all cases that had 
been resolved by mediation. I approached all Commissioners, who were willing to be 
interviewed, and asked for the names of cases in each of the references or appeal 
categories. Only one Commissioner responded, listing one case. I informally 
approached some regional and local authorities regarding the resolution of appeals and 
references by Court assisted mediation. It became apparent that a number of regional 
and district! city councils sought to negotiate appeals and references without Court 
assistance. The Court had noted this tendency (Bollard et al, 1998, p. 711). Sometimes 
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these negotiations were referred to as 'mediation' as a Council officer trained in 
mediation had chaired the session. Some Council's had been able to dispose of the 
majority of plan references in this way. I therefore used publicly available case 
summaries to locate cases that had been resolved by mediation. 
A further constraint was that I needed to receive a positive response from all the parties 
who were parties to a mediated settlement. If any party to a settlement declined an 
interview, the case was discounted. Some parties approached did not wish to be 
interviewed and some did not respond. No attempt was made to find out the reason for 
declining. Willing participants were located in cases that covered the following criteria: 
1. Nature o/the dispute: Plan policy/resource consent 
2. Location: North/South Island; Rural. 
3. Cultural: Maori and Pakeha interests. 
3 .. Number o/parties present: Multi and single party. 
4. Individual, community/ interest groups 
5. Regional and local authority. 
The total number of parties to a reference or appeal in the Environment Court 
interviewed was ten. They comprised male and female, regional and district council 
representatives, iwi, interest! community group representatives and individuals. A 
second interview was conducted with two participants, seeking their view regarding a 
second later mediation conducted by the same mediator. This was done in order to 
detennine the way in which the earlier mediation impacted the later mediation, in 
particular if it had built trust among the parties and the mediator (Tenbrunsal, 1999). 
4.6 Data collection 
To obtain the background information necessary to undertake the evaluation I used 
primary and secondary data sources. My primary source of data on the way in which 
Court assisted mediation was undertaken was willing participants from the various 
stakeholder groups. I used secondary sources such as published reports, to find out the 
nature and extent of mediation. Data collection did impose limitations on my research. 
4.7 The extent of mediation 
It was assumed that the Court held information on all cases where mediation was 
attempted and that those records would enable the extent of mediation and nature of the 
dispute to be identified. This was not, in fact, the case. 
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Within the various Court regions, Judges recorded the outcomes of mediation in 
different ways. Some gave each Consent Order or Memorandum of Understanding a 
decision number. It therefore became a published decision. Other Judges did not follow 
this practice. A Consent Order or Memorandum of Understanding remained within the 
Court file system and interested members of the public would require the Court-given 
RMA file number or the name of the parties in order for the Court staff to access a copy 
of the mediated agreement. If the parties had requested that confidentiality apply to the 
Consent Order or Memorandum of Understanding then there would be no record of the 
agreement available to the public. 
It was estimated that it could take at least a week to manually extract the data I sought 
from the 3000+fi1es held in the Court Registry in Wellington and its associated storage 
facilities in Lower Hutt. Manual searching was potentially of limited value, as it may 
not.reveal those cases where mediation had been used, unless such information had been 
noted on the file, in the Consent Order or Memorandum of Understanding. The Court 
had set up a system of recording the details of mediated cases in November 1999 but it 
became apparent during the interviews that it did not enjoy the full support of 
Commissioners and was not being used consistently. This has subsequently been 
confirmed by the Court. 
It was recognised that there were a number of ways in which cases could be resolved, 
including complete or partial resolution (e.g. narrowing of issues) through mediation; 
using Court provided or private mediators; private settlement (e.g. negotiation) or 
withdrawal by one or other party. It was acknowledged that such information would 
give a valuable insight into the extent of environmental mediation in New Zealand. 
However, given the aforementioned difficulties in obtaining such data, this matter was 
not pursued. 
4.8 The interview process 
All but one interview was carried out in person. The telephone interview was necessary 
due to time and travel constraints. The stakeholder in the telephone interview was sent 
the questions prior to the interview. All stakeholders were given the opportunity to 
withdraw from the interview at a number of points including just prior to the interview. 
All were given the questions at the start of the interview and interviews were taped and 
transcribed (except the phone interview) with their agreement. Where stakeholders gave 
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unsolicited comments these were noted. If participants wished to make 'off the record' 
comments these were not recorded or noted. Comments were deleted if participants so 
wished. Answers given and comments made in response to the structured questions 
were used in the analysis. 
Assumptions made regarding interviews 
The assumptions I made in undertaking the interviews were that settlement could be 
taken as a measure of success; participants would, on account of confidentiality and 
anonymity of the details of the interview, feel free to be honest regarding their 
experience and perception of Court assisted mediation and meaning could be taken from 
the discursive text. 
4.9 Limitations of the research 
There were limitations in restricting the research to a relatively small number of 
participants in settlements mediated by Commissioners. It was recognised that private 
mediations would not be covered. Matters to explore within the context of private 
mediation were: how the mediator was selected; whether the fact of paying for the 
mediator increased participants desire to settle; what pressure this put on the participants 
and whether or not this impacted on the quality of the settlement. These questions 
require investigation, particularly if the Court should, in time, cease to fund a mediation 
serVIce. 
A survey of 'unsuccessful' mediations would also provide valuable information as to 
why mediation failed and could confirm or disprove the necessary prerequisites for 
'successful' mediation. The surveying of participants from Court and private, successful 
and unsuccessful mediation may validate the observations made by a sole participant in 
this study. 
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Chapter 5: Court Assisted Environmental Dispute Resolution 
Under the Resource Management Act 1991 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the legislative context within which the mediation of 
environmental disputes occurs in New Zealand. It looks in particular at the provisions 
for mediation by the Court under s.268 of the RMA and the extent to which mediation 
is being used. 
5.2 Mediation under the RMA 
The way in which the mediation of environmental disputes is undertaken and the 
~xtent of its use in New Zealand have been influenced by a number of factors. 
5.2:1 Provision in the legislation 
The RMA provides a regulatory and administrative framework for the use, development 
and protection of natural and physical resources (Williams, 1997, p. 60). It has set up 
procedures for public participation in decision-making relating to these resources (PCE, 
1996, p. 2; Woods, 1997, p. 37). It gives statutory authority to national, regional and 
local authorities to draw up policy statements and plans that promote the purpose of the 
Act as set out in s.5. Provision is made for public submission on these statutory 
instruments 11 and the hearing of these submissions 12. The RMA has open standing 
provisions that allow people to participate (PCE, 1996, p. 45). The decisions of regional 
and local authorities may be referred to the Court for reconsideration 13 (Milne, 1996, p. 
58-60). 
The RMA also gives regional and local authorities quasi-judicial powers to grant or 
refuse applications for consent to use or develop resources (Williams, 1997, p. 33;14). 
Where an application for consent is publicly notified 15 the public may make 
submissions to the consent authorityl6. Consent hearings are public and written 
II Sections 48,49 RMA; First Schedule Part I & Part II; The Resource Management (Forms) Regulations 
1991, Part I; 
12 Section 50; First Schedule, Part I & Part II, Clause 8 RMA 
13 CI.14 (3) First Schedule of the Act 
14 Part VI RMA 
15 Sections 93,94 
16 Section 97 
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decisions are made pubbc l7• Where a decision, or its terms and conditions, are disputed, 
any party who made a submission may appeal that decision to the Courtl8 . The PCE has 
noted that the Court process is expensive, adversarial, and not conducive to finding 
solutions that incorporate concerns of all interested parties (PCE, 1996, p. AI4). 
The Court, until 1996 known as the Planning Tribunal, was constituted under the RMA. 
It is a court of record 19 (s.247) that exercises special and limited jurisdiction as defined 
by the RMA (Mulholland, 1990, p. 106). The RMA is ' ... part of a legislative trend to 
state broad principles. of national policy rather than to attempt to prescribe detailed rules 
of conduct in statutes' and' .. .lays down the overriding purposes and principles of the 
Act in Part II' (Williams, 1997, p. 32). It was left it to the Court to interpret and, in the 
case of references, appeals, inquiries and declarations, apply the law (Williams, 1997, p. 
32,33). The Court has the powers of a District Court in its civil jurisdiction. These 
powers relate largely to procedural rather than substantive matters20. The Court is both 
adversarial and inquisitorial in style (Mulholland, 1990, p. 106). It is free to develop its 
own procedures so long as they are fair and efficient21 . These centre on inquiry into the 
actual or potential effects on the environment (Bollard et al, 1998, p. 709). The Court 
can receive or call for any evidence it thinks fit and is not bound by the rules of law 
about evidence 22. Parties are not required to have legal representation23 (Sheppard, 
1997). Hearings are public unless special circumstances require a p~vate hearing24. A 
hearing before the Court may be adjourned so that mediation, conciliation or other 
procedures can occur. The hearing may be resumed (Bollard et al, 1998, p. 709). 
All decisiuns-by the Court are final 2sunless they meet the review conditions of s.294 or 
s.295. Any party to the Court proceedings may appeal a decision on a point of law to the 
High Court 26. Every decision, determination, or order, unless it is an oral decision, must 
be in writing27 . It is usual for the Court's determination to be accompanied by a 
17 Section 100,101 
18 Sections 120,121,271A. 
19 A court whereof the acts & judicial proceedings are permanently recorded & which has power to 
punish for contempt of its authority. Butterworths New Zealand Law Dictionary, Spiller, 4th ed. 1995 
p.76. 
20 Section 278 
21 Section 269 
22 Section 276 
23 Section 275 
24 Sections 277, 279 (3) 
25 Section 295 
26 Sections 299 
27 Section 297 
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reasoned decision. 'The reasoned judgment helps to ensure not only that justice is done 
but that it is seen to be done' (Mulholland, 1990, p. 107). 
The Court consists of Environment Judges, who are also District Court Judges, 28and 
Environment Commissioners29. Judges are appointed by the Governor-General, on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Justice after consultation with the Minister for the 
Environment and the Minister of Maori Affairs3o. Judges hold office until age 68 during 
good behaviour, or until they resign or are removed from office under the RMA 31. At 
anyone time there are to be no more than eight Environment Judges holding office 32. 
Alternate Environment Judges may be appointed 33. 
In New Zealand the independence of the judiciary from political interference and 
influence is maintained by the Constitution Act 198634, appointment procedures and 
conventions (McDowell & Webb, 1995, p. 253-255). The Beattie Report of 1979 
suggested a Judicial Commission to appoint judges. -Such a Commission was intended 
to make the process more visible to the public to promote its legitimacy. However this 
was not adopted (McDowell et ai, 1995, p. 270). It is assumed that the appointment of 
judges to the Environment Court is on merit and interest rather than political influence. 
Environment and Deputy Environment Commissioners are appoint~~. by the Governor-
General on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice after consultation with the 
Minister for the Environment and the Minister of Maori Affairs. There is no statutory 
process for the appointment of Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners. The 
Cabinet Office Manual sets out the steps all ministers must take before advising the 
Governor-General to make appointments35 . Ministry of Justice (MoJ) on behalf of the 
Minister of Justice administers the appointment process. The positions are not publicly 
advertised, with candidates being identified in a number of ways. Interested people may 
write directly to the Minister or the Ministry of Justice (MoJ, 2001). The Court 
endeavours to attract Commissioners from a variety of professions and experiential 
backgrounds so as to represent the broader public interests of the community at large 
28 Section 249 
29 Section 248 
30 Section 250. 
31 Section 258 
32 Section 250 (3) 
33 Section 252 
34 Section 23,24 
35 Current requirements are at Cabinet Office website: www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet. 
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(Palmer cited in MtE, 1988,p.37). It is suggested that this enhances the acceptability of 
decisions on appeal (Williams, 1997, p. 32). Therefore the Minister may seek 
nominations from Ministerial and/or Parliamentary colleagues to obtain a wider range 
of candidates. If particular professional skills are required, the Minister may seek 
nominations from certain professional groups. The Minister would look for a mix of 
skills and representativeness in candidates (MoJ, 2001). 
The criteria for Commissioner appointment have been divided into three categories: 
statutory requirements; qualities of character and personal technical skills and 
knowledge. Under statutory requirements the Minister of Justice considers, among other 
things, whether a person has knowledge and experience in alternative dispute resolution 
processes (MoJ2001). Section 253(da), which was inserted into the legislation by s.8, 
Resource Management Amendment Act 1996, does not specify these processes. The 
pet:sonal technical skills and knowledge specified in the Position Description include 
mediation skills. Qualities of character include, among other things, personal honesty 
and integrity, impartiality, open mindedness and good jUdgement36. The Minister would 
normally consult the Principal Environment Judge. Candidates are not interviewed for 
the position (MoJ, pers.comm. 2001). Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners can 
resign from office or may be removed from office by the Governor-General for inability 
or misbehaviour37• 
A Commissioner is appointed for a term of five years and may be reappointed any 
number of times. When the term of office expires, it is the Minister's decision whether 
or not to reappoint the Commissioner, taking into account the views of the Principal 
Environment Judge and any gaps in the skills and representativeness of Commissioners 
(MoJ pers.comm. 2001). There is no limit placed on the number of Commissioners or 
Deputy Commissioners who may hold office 38. A Commissioner or Deputy 
Commissioner must, before commencing duty as a Commissioner, take an oath of 
office that 'he or she will honestly and impartially perform the duties of the office ,39. 
As mediation takes place under the jurisdiction of the Court, there is an obligation for 
Commissioners to act in good faith (Bollard et ai, 1998, p. 710). Members of the Court 
have protection from legal proceedings if they acted in good faith in the performance of 
36 Environment CommissionerlDeputy Commissioner position description, Ministry of Justice. 
37 Sections 257 and 258 
38 Section 254 
39 Section 256 
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their duties4o. It is assumed this protection applies to all Commissioner duties, including 
those of mediator. It appears that the protection applied to Commissioners does not 
apply to a private mediator who might undertake mediation at the Court's request 
(Bollard et ai, 1998, p. 712). 
The use of alternative dispute resolution is provided for in s.99 and s.268 of the RMA. 
In s.99 Pre-hearing Meetings, mediation is provided for as a means of resolving 
environmental disputes at the regional or local authority level, prior to a public hearing. 
It is not compulsory as the consent authority 'may' , invite' participants to meet with 
others for' ... the purpose of clarifying, mediating or facilitating resolution of any matter 
or issue,,41. No formal mediation procedure is provided in s.99 (Sakar, 1998, p. 31). The 
term, Additional Dispute Resolution, has been used in s.268, and indicates that 
mediation is an additional form of dispute resolution, not an alternative to litigation: 
Unper s.268 the parties retain their right to go to Court if they are not satisfied with the 
outcome of mediation (PCE, 1996, A49). 
The PCE considered that there was no clear guidance in the legislation as to how 
sections 99 or 268 were to be applied (PCE, 1996, p. 67). As Baylis comments 
Among some practitioners there is a kind of post-modem resistance to the notion 
that processes should be defined in any detaiL ... However, when 
mediation/conciliation is established as part of a statutory pwcess of dispute 
resolution and can affect people's rights and entitlements under the law clarity 
and consistency are necessary (Baylis, 1999, p. 293). 
Such a situation could be considered to exist in New Zealand where mediation has been 
incorporated into a number of statutes. Many of these have been passed since 1989 and 
give no guidance on fundamental process issues (PCE, 1996, p. 67; Baylis, 1999, p. 
279,290). There has been debate within New Zealand as to the desirability of mediation 
being incorporated into court processes in general, with concerns being expressed that 
ADR could' ... deprive citizens of their right of access to justice, or subvert the 
traditional right of access to the courts' by directing parties into mediation rather than 
litigation (NZ Law Society (NZLS) in Mahoney, 2000, p. 226). Despite these 
reservations, mediation is being endorsed and promoted by some leading law firms, the 
courts and organisations (Dept. of Courts; MfE, 2001, p. 28). Some organizations 
favour 'court-filtered' mediation as opposed to court-annexed mediation. In court-
40 Section 261 
41 Section 99(1) 
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filtered mediation the Judge encourages mediation during court proceedings, and grants 
adjournments to allow that to happen, but leaves it to the parties and their legal advisers 
to initiate. There is no directive or compulsion to mediate (Mahoney, 2000, p. 226). At 
the time of interviews (2000) the Court appeared to be involved in both court-filtered 
and court-annexed mediation with Judges sometimes suggesting mediation during court 
proceedings (Bollard et ai, 1998, p. 709). 
Proceedings lodged with the Court may be treated in a number of ways: 
• A party may withdiaw the appeal or reference. 
• The parties may negotiate an agreement. If the agreement relates to the proceeding, 
it must come before the Court. Side agreements, including financial incentives to 
settle, are outside the Court's jurisdiction. 
• An Environment Judge may require parties to attend a conference42• 
• . With the parties consent or at their request, the Court may ask a member of the 
Court or another person to conduct mediation, conciliation or such other 
procedures which are designed to resolve the matter and encourage settlement43 . 
• Parties may apply to the Court, under s.356, to have the matter settled by 
arbitration. Arbitration is at the Court's discretion and could be considered an 
anomaly, given the role of the Court. 
• The matter may proceed to a hearing before the Court44 that USUJllly comprises a 
Judge and two Commissioners. It is a full re-hearing of the matter (de novo) 
' ... uninhibited by what has gone before' (Spiller, 1995, p. 82). Under s.279, a Judge 
or Commissioner, where authorised by the Principal Environment Judge under 
s.i80;~inay sit alone (Sheppard, 1998, p. 18). Where the Court sits the Judge 
presides at the hearing45 . 
• At any time during a Court hearing, a Judge may of their own motion or at the 
parties request, ask a Court member or another party to conduct mediation, 
conciliation or some other dispute resolution procedure46. 
42 Section 267 
43 Section 268(1) 
44 Section 272 
45 Section 265 
46 Section 268(1). 
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5.2.2 Guidance from Environment Court Practice Notes 
Parliament has left the interpretation and administration of the RMA to quasi-judicial 
and judicial bodies. To assist in the administration of the RMA the Court has published 
Practice Notes which are ' ... a guide to practice in the Environment Court generally. 
They are not to be seen as inflexible rules, but should be followed unless there is a good 
reason not to' (Environment Court Practice Notes, 1998). These notes set out the 
Court's case management procedure following the lodging of proceedings. The 
Environment Judge who views the case may initiate any of the following actions: 
• Suggest the parties may consider mediation or other alternative dispute resolution 
processes as contemplated under s.268 of the RMA. 
• Give directions as to disposal of preliminary issues, or about a priority hearing or 
special fixture. 
• Give directions for a pre-hearing conference. 
• ·Give directions to include the case in a call-over list47. 
Regarding entry into mediation, the Court advises in Practice Note 11 that all parties 
are entitled to have their proceedings heard by the Court and there is no obligation to 
participate in mediation. The Court does, however, encourage parties to consider 
mediation and other forms of ADR. No party is forced to accept the result of mediation. 
However, once signed by the Court, any mediated agreement is binc;lj.ng on the parties 
(MfE, 2001, p. 6). 
Mediation and how it will be conducted has not been defined in the RMA or 
Regulatioll"s. In working papers written during the Resource Management Law Reform 
process, it was suggested that' ... principles of legitimacy, fairness and cost-efficiency 
should guide the design of any mediation procedure proposed for resource management 
conflicts' (Chart cited in MfE, 1988, p. 9). It was also suggested that it would be 
necessary for all mediated solutions to be approved by the Court or Judge alone so as 
, ... to avoid decisions which may be contrary to the wider public interest'48 (Palmer 
47Callover: The procedure by which proceedings which have been placed in a list pursuant to rules of 
court or by direction are assessed to determine whether or not they are ready to be allocated a hearing date 
before a judge or master. (Butterworths Guides. 'Legal terms '. 1998. Gen.Eds. Nygh P.E. et al. p.16). 
'A callover allows opportunity for proceedings to be withdrawn; or (following settlement of issues) for 
consent orders to be proposed for disposal of the proceedings; or for directions to be sought and given in 
preparation for hearing of the proceedings including disposal of preliminary questions, timetables for 
delivery of evidence, and the time of hearing of the case.' (Environment Court Practice Notes 13 1998). 
48 Public interest is an interest common to the public at large or a significant portion of the public. [Public 
Policy 2]. Public Policy 2: the interests of the community in general. (Spiller, 2001, p. 246). 
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cited in MfE, 1988, p. 39). Flexibility in defining the types of dispute that may use 
- mediation and monitoring of mediation efforts was also encouraged. It was considered 
this would allow policy and procedure to evolve in the light of practice (Chart cited in 
MfE, p.1988, p. 9). It would appear that this flexible approach has been adopted, with 
s.268 being left open for the Court to interpret and design mediation procedures 
(Mulholland, 1990, p. 81). 
The legislation has not defined mediation, neither has the Court. As the Court cannot 
initiate issues, it remains for a party to bring the matter before the Court in order for the 
Court to define the nature and process of mediation under the RMA (Mulholland, 1990, 
p. 116). In the absence of a definition of mediation within the RMA, the general rules 
of statutory interpretation must be applied (Mulholland, 1990, p. 128). 
The Court has adopted the following administrative procedure for mediation. Once 
proceedings are lodged with the Court, an explanatory letter, suggesting the parties 
consider mediation, may be sent out by the Registrar of the Court if the case is 
considered by the Judge to be suitable for mediation (PCE, 1996; Practice Note 10). 
This letter gives a brief explanation of the mediation process, indicates that a 
Commissioner could act as mediator at no cost to the parties or a private paid mediator 
could be used. Section 268 is considered to be an empowering provision. There is no 
requirement that the Court provide a mediation service (MfE, 200lb). The Court, 
however, provides this service because mediation is 'recognised as an effective way for 
parties to come to a solution themselves and help reduce the Court's case load' (MfE, 
2001b) .. ~ 
An undertaking is given by the Court that the Commissioner will not be involved in any 
subsequent hearing of the appeal. This appears a matter of Court policy as s.268 (2) 
does not require this if the parties agree and the Court considers that it is appropriate 
(Bollard et aI, 1998, p. 711). The Court, again as a matter of policy, advises that no 
person's case will be prejudiced if mediation is unsuccessful. The process is conducted 
'without prejudice,49. An unsuccessful attempt was made by a party to access notes 
made by a mediator during mediation. See Mortimer v Whangarei District Council 
49 Without prejudice: Without loss of any rights. The phrase describes a legal action that in no way harms 
or causes the legal rights or privileges of a party (Garner, 1995,p.937). 
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C023/97. This raises the matter of notes from a without prejudice process being kept on 
the file where a Judge could later read them. 
S.297 requires every decision, determination or order of the Court to be in 
writing and signed by the Court member who sat at the hearing or inquiry. This 
Court 'endorsement' could be considered a 'safety net' (Rive, 1996, p. 217). 
The legislation gives no guidance as to the procedure followed if settlement is reached 
through mediation. Since mediation is not a hearing or inquiry under s.269, the Court 
has devised a procedure for signing off consent orders (Bollard et ai, 1998, p. 715). The 
parties submit a draft consent order and explanatory memorandum to the Judge in 
chambers or the Court in an ordinary sitting (Bollard et ai, 1998, p. 715). The parties do 
not have to appear before the Court if they supply the text of the consent order, which 
has. been signed by all the parties, ' ... with a sufficient explanation of what is proposed 
and why' (Practice Note 17). The assumption is that the Court will assess the settlement 
to ensure that it complies with the RMA, in particular Part II, and policy statements 
(Baylis, 1992, p. 150; PCE, 1996; Bollard et ai, 1998; MfE, 2001). The Court has 
indicated that it looks for aspects of the public interest that may go beyond the interests 
of the parties in mediation (Sheppard 1996 cited in Rive, 1997, p. 216), that the 
settlement is within the Court's jurisdiction and in keeping with the purpose of the 
RMA (Bollard et ai, 1998, p. 716). 
In the absence of clear legislative guidelines, it would appear that the review of 
mediated-~ettlements is limited to exceptional cases, unless review conditions have 
been incorporated into the agreement (Bollard et ai, 1998, p. 714). 
5.2.3 Guidance from case law 
In the absence of clear directions in the legislation, case law contains comments and 
statements (dicta) from the Judges that help to clarify some matters relating to 
mediation. Many of the Court's statements arise in the context of seeking costs after a 
case is resolved, either by mediation or a Court hearing. The following decisions give 
some guidance as to the Court's approach to mediation. 
Nature afthe process 
Mediation is a legal instrument utilised by parties to try and settle issues and 
prevent expensive hearings. The costs involved should not be part of cost 
59 
applications because there has been a mutual (and genuine) attempt to try and 
settle issues. Following the mediation, as is the usual procedure when no 
agreement is reached, the case is set down for hearing (Clover v Auckland City 
Council W034/97). 
The foundation of the mediation process is a level playing field in terms of shared 
information and an adequately informed basis. (Campbell JA and Others v Southland 
District Council W027/95). 
Entry into mediation 
Participation is voluntary. Parties are not obliged to submit to mediation even though 
the RMA encourages alternative dispute resolution (Duncan v Wanganui District 
Council A149/92). Parties are entitled to wait to have their case heard by the Court. 
Mediation is a process that the parties must freely agree to (Waikato District v Jacobs 
DC.C028/95). 
Role of the Court 
Once an appeal has been lodged the most appropriate course regarding the initiation of 
mediation is to apply to the Court under s.268. (Wood v Selwyn District Council 
C073/94). The Court can encourage mediation (Buller District Council C029/98). The 
Court can indicate that it considers that mediation should be possible (New Plymouth v 
St. John Ambulance W139/95) and that the matter should have been referred for 
mediation (Rodney District Council v Shephard A103/99; KiddIe v-Wellington City 
W024/97). The Court has expressed concern where a party is unwilling to explore the 
possibility of settlement (Ward v Queenstown Lakes District W056/97). Parties can 
requ~st ~edi~tion but other parties may not agree that the matter is suitable for 
mediation (Stephen v Far North District Council A074/98). All parties must agree to 
mediation. 
Cost of mediation 
Consent to mediate or otherwise is not taken into account when assessing costs of an 
appeal (Wood v Selwyn District Council C073/94). The cost of time spent in mediation 
cannot be claimed (Waikato District v Jacobs DC C028/95). Parties should feel free to 
participate in mediation without the risk of costs being awarded against them (Bayview 
Subdivisions Ltd. v Nelson City Council W070/97). 
Parties should not be penalised for failing to agree to mediation (Campbell JA & Ors v 
Southland District Council W027/95). Parties who refuse to mediate should be 
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prepared to bear some part of the costs of the consequent appeal (Kiddie v Wellington 
City Council W024/97). 
Mediation must be treated with urgency 
The Court's workload and backlog of cases are such that attempts to settle must be 
made sooner rather than later (Te Ehanau ATe Ehutu Iwi Authority Inc. v Historic 
Places Trust A053/97). Mediation cannot be used by parties to delay resolution of the 
matter by the Court (Awaarora Bay Limited v Auckland Regional Council AI18/98). 
Mediators' notes are confidential 
Where an Environment Commissioner acts as mediator, their notes are like that of a 
Judge under District Court Rules and covered by r69 (12). They cannot be searched 
under the Privacy Act 1953 and the Official Information Act 1982 (Mortimer v 
.; 
Whangarei District Council C023/97). As reference is made in that decision to 
Commissioners, as defined in the RMA, it would appear that this rule does not apply to 
private mediators. If parties chose such a mediator then the notes of that mediator would 
not be confidential in terms of the Privacy Act 1953 and the Official Information Act 
1982. 
Information shared in mediation 
There is a need for privacy, during the mediation process, to ensure-that information 
shared and actions taken during mediation cannot later be used against any party in the 
Court hearing (Winstone Aggregates Ltd v Franklin District Council AI41100). No 
guidance .!s giyen as to whether or not information shared in mediation can be used in a 
context other than the Court as it refers only to its use in Court. A requirement that 
information cannot be used in 'any other proceedings' may avoid such situations 
arising (AMINZ, 2000, p. 4). 
Consent memorandum 
Any agreement reached in mediation has to be approved by the Court as, once an 
appeal has been lodged, it can only be resolved by the Court. Approval is not a 
foregone conclusion. There is no obligation on a Judge to grant a consent order, as the 
Court has' ... the power and responsibility to ensure that a consent order is consistent 
with the purpose of the RMA, or relevant policy statement or plan' (Wood v Selwyn 
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District Council C073/94). Any consent memorandum must be within the Court's 
jurisdiction (Central South Island Fish v Canterbury Regional Council CI53/99). 
5.2.4 Guidance from publications 
As ADR has increased so has the availability of information on mediation in general. 
Specialised publications and training are available for individuals involved in the area 
of dispute resolution. Prior to 2001, when the publication You, Mediation and the 
Environment Court (MtE, 2001) was released, the amount of information available to 
the general public that related specifically to mediation in the Environment Court was 
very limited. The MtE publication aims to assist those considering mediation by 
providing an explanation of mediation, its advantages, limitations, basic principles and 
the stages in the mediation process. 
The parties I interviewed had participated in mediation prior to this publication being 
available. Participant interviews highlight the lack of information on mediation 
generally that existed prior to this publication .. 
5.3 The extent of environmental mediation under s.268 of the RMA 
The number of appeals or applications lodged with the Court has increased significantly 
over the period 1993-1999, in part due to the completion of the first generation of 
planning instruments under the RMA (Dept. of Courts, 2001, p. 2:19). The Court's 
heavy caseload has been of concern to those administering the system (Registrar of the 
Court, Annual Report 2000, p. 6) and lead to the promotion and support for mediation 
as part of the Court's case management strategy. 
The mediation of cases has only been included in Court records since 1997. As is 
evident from Table 2, only a small portion of matters referred to the Environment 
Court, were settled by mediation. Prior to 1996 the Court did not keep a record of all 
cases that went into mediation or cases that were settled as a result of mediation (W. 
Dougherty, pers.comm.2001). Figures since 1996 indicate that the use of mediation has 
increased although the outcomes are less clear. Comments made by Commissioners 
during interviews, arid the increased figures for the years 2000 and 2001, would 
indicate that the use of mediation since 1996 may be significantly higher than the Court 
figures indicate. 
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Table 2: Summary ofCases before the Environment Court 1994-2000 
860 1055 1840 1224 1373 2263 1270 
792 756 1080 1198 1184 1380 1195 
355 
54 
357 
304 
378 
1670 
414 
349 
1840 
64 
408 
1999 
121 
502 
2869 
188 
8321 
2940 
188 3343 
35 
94 
95 
144 
295 
3 
46 222 
finalised 
24 
waiting 
77 
64 
175 
settled! 
with­
drawn 
95 
Source: Figures taken from Reports of the Registrar of the Environment Court for the 12 
months ended 30 June 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. E.49. Presented 
to the House of Representatives pursuant to section 264(1) of the Resource Management 
Act 1991. 
1. This increased figure reflects a change in the recording of determinations, with all Court issued 
consent orders, interlocutory or other determinations now treated as formal decisions. 
2. It indicates a change in the recording system for mediation. 
3. Provisional figures supplied by the Registrar of the Court, September 200l. 
4. Number of mediations conducted by Commissioners (Source: Rive, 1997, p. 211). 
5. Settlements reached (Source: Rive, 1997, p. 211). 
50 Provisional Figures supplied by Environment Court September 200 1 
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In the 1997 to 1999 Annual Reports there was little detailed infonnation on the use of 
mediation apart from the comment about ' ... a growing trend towards mediation' . One 
of the Judges has provided the following information on the extent of mediation in that 
period. 
One Commissioner's caseload has provided the following statistics of 
what has so far occurred in the years between 1995 (when mediation was 
not frequent) and 1998. In 190 hours of meetings (an average of 3+ hours 
each for 52 mediations) 71 % of those cases referred have been completed 
with a successful outcome: 13 % have been adjourned for further 
research etc to be undertaken, the Commissioner stating that more than 
likely these will be resolved satisfactorily. So far only 15% (that is 8 out 
of 52 cases) have come to the Court for final resolution (Kenderdine 
cited in RMLA, 1999, p. 16). 
This indicates that at least one Commissioner was personally keeping records of time 
spent in mediation, as the Court did not instigate the keeping of records of mediation by 
Couunissioners until November 1999. A three-week pilot study carried out by the 
Environment Court in Nelson resulted in 16 out of 30 cases being resolved without a 
hearing, a success rate of approximately 50% (PCE, 1996, p. 41). It is not clear under 
what circumstances the parties entered mediation i.e. at the Judge's suggestion or of 
their own volition. 
In the year 1999-2000 188 appeals or applications before the Court were referred for 
mediation. These cases comprised 15% of the total number of appeals lodged. These 
occurred on 116 days. The average length of time taken for mediation was not given. 
Judge Kenderdine's figures indicate 3+ hours (Kenderdine, 1999). Participants in the 
interviews-indicated the time ranged from a day to days. They were not asked to give an 
exact figure on the time spent in the actual mediation. A 'day' may mean that, with 
travel time included, it took a day. 
Concern was expressed about the Court's recording system. Only successful mediation 
appeared to be recorded. Additional categories, which could be recorded, are: 
• Partially successful mediation, i.e. where issues were narrowed and the Court made 
a determination on a reduced number of issues; 
• Mediation that failed to result in a consent order but was later settled privately 
without recourse to the Court, and 
• Cases where mediation could be considered to have assisted settlement. 
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The inability of the Court system to record these categories had been recognised and led 
to the introduction of a record form for Commissioners in November 1999. During the 
interviews, some Commissioners expressed reservations regarding this form because of 
the without prejudice nature of mediation. The length of the form (six pages) appeared 
to act as a deterrent to busy Commissioners. It is not compulsory for Commissioners to 
complete the forms in their entirety. The Court has advised that not all Commissioners 
are completing them. 
In informal discussions, Registry staff indicated that, prior to November 1999, it was 
hard to record what had happened to appeals or references on account of the way in 
which files were handled. Cases, once lodged, were given a file number and sent out to 
the relevant region for the Judge to action. Regional Court offices may direct cases for 
mediation to a Commissioner or give it to the Registry to action. The Registry in 
We.1lington may not be aware of the action taken unless it was noted on the file. Where 
cases were withdrawn, the reason for withdrawal was not necessarily noted on file. The 
instances where mediation had led to a withdrawal of an appeal or reference were 
therefore unknown. Also unknown were the number of instances where parties had 
signed an agreement then changed their mind and reneged on the mediated settlement. 
The Report of the Registrar of the Environment Court 1998 stated that: 
Of the 121 mediations, undertaken during the year, 46 cases resulted in consent 
orders. In many of the remaining 75 cases, even though mediation was not 
achieved, the discussions led to a narrowing of the issues and reduction of Court 
hearing time (Registrar of the Environment Court (Registrar), 1998). 
Actions by th~ Court and Ministry for the Environment have encouraged the use of 
mediation. The Court continues to commit funds to mediation training for 
Commissioners (Registrar, 2000, p. 14). The Environment Court Practice Notes 10 Case 
Management advises that a Judge may suggest that parties consider mediation or other 
dispute resolution processes. The Court also' ... encourages parties to consider 
mediation and other additional dispute resolution procedures'. The Registrar has 
indicated that 'Parties will need to show they have been diligent in their attempts to 
resolve their dispute by other means (such as the assistance of a Court appointed 
mediator) and that all other reasonable avenues have been exhausted' (Registrar, 2000, 
p. 11; Sakar, 1998, p. 33). The Court has been 'delighted' with the increased use and 
success of it (Sheppard, 1998, p. 18). 
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The MfE has reinforced the use of mediation through the administration of the 
Environmental Legal Assistance scheme. One of the criteria taken into account when 
assessing the merits of applications for funding for legal aid is whether the group is 
open to having the case resolved by mediation. Where groups do not wish to enter 
mediation they need to explain why on their application form (MfE, Feb., 2000). These 
initiati ves, combined with the recent publication of a guide to mediation in the 
Environment Court, give the impression of a concerted effort by Government to make 
parties give serious consideration to mediation as a method of dispute resolution. 
An issue that became apparent during my investigation of mediated settlements was the 
circumstances in which final settlements were available to the public. Recorded 
decisions, which are public documents authenticated by the seal of the Court, enable the 
public to access these decisions and view the terms upon which the settlement was 
gra(lted. Such openness is desirable given that many resource management decisions 
may directly or indirectly impact on the public. As noted earlier, the practice of not 
giving consent orders a decision number has reduced the ease with which the public can 
access them. This appears to be contrary to the open nature of all other hearings under 
the RMA and the encouragement of public participation. It was therefore pleasing to 
note in the Report of the Registrar of the Environment Court for the 12 months ended 
30 June 2000, that the Court had, during the year, changed the way in which it recorded 
determinations. As from 2000, all Court issued consent orders, interlocutory or other 
determinations were to be treated as formal decisions (Registrar, 2000, p. 6). Some, but 
not all, Environment Court regions had previously followed this practice. The 
difference-in recording methods can be seen in Tables 3 and 4. Christchurch Region 
appears to have been giving all consent orders a decision number prior to the Court's 
directive in 2000. This is reflected in the number of decisions issued. 
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Table 3: Decisions issued by Environment Court Regions 
.:. ,.-~~.;', {:···;~<~~-L,;'~~~~;~>~>~~. 
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1992 101 59 80 
1993 140 107 103 
1994 90 133 123 
1995 125 169 85 
1996 110 192 99 
1997 152 132 135 
1998 155 140 144 
1999 158 126* 231 
2000 150 105 216 
Figures taken from Brief. New Zealand Resource Management Appeals. Full 
Consolidated index and case summaries of all reported and unreported resource 
management cases 1993-2001 (Butterworths of New Zealand). 
*NZ Environment Court Decisions 1999. Wellington Registry. Decisions 
Wl/99-W 126/99. 
In the absence of readily available figures from the Court, consent order figures were 
taken from New Zealand Environmental Digest in order to determine the extent to 
which consent orders were being used to resolve matters. Table 4 shows the number of 
published consent orders within each Court region. These figures indIcate a significant 
difference in the number of consent orders published in the three Court regions. It is not 
known what proportion of these consent orders were achieved as a result of mediation. 
Table 4: Consent Orders issued by Environment Court Regions 
1996 8 9 40 
1997 7 9 46 
1998 7 10 47 
1999 8 11 117 
2000 7 30 124 
Figures taken from New Zealand Environmental Digest Index Nov.1999, p. 40-
45; April 2001, p. 15-18. 
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Infonnal comments by Court staff and interviews with Commissioners would suggest 
that Auckland's low numbers are due to the way in which consent orders are recorded. I 
did not investigate this matter with the Judges during the interviews. 
5.4 Conclusions 
The RMA has legitimised mediation as a way of resolving environmental disputes but 
has left the procedures relating to the initiation and implementation of mediation 
undefined. The Court, in the absence of clear legislative guidelines, has issued Practice 
Notes and determinations that give some guidance as to the nature and way in which 
mediation is undertaken. Some matters relating to the mediation process remain 
undefined and unclear. 
Published records, confirmed by anecdotal evidence from Commissioners, indicate that 
Court assisted mediation has increased significantly since 1993. The full extent of the 
use of mediation and the types of issues being resolved is unclear due to the way in 
which the Court has recorded mediation. The Court's system for recording the use and 
outcomes of mediation has developed as the practice of mediation has increased. 
Monitoring of mediation, under s.24 RMA, is considered important, as these mediated 
settlements could be considered to constitute some of the more significant resource 
management decisions occurring in New Zealand. Until those organisations 
administering the RMA record the outcome of all Court assisted mediation, it will not 
be possible to identify the extent to which mediation is resolving environmental 
disputes i~N~w Zealand. This task could be considered beyond the scope of the 
Court's administrative functions and more correctly the task of the MfE. 
The promotion of and support for mediation by the Court and various government 
departments and agencies has increased in the past decade. The increased Court 
caseload appears to be one of the main reasons for the promotion of mediation as an 
additional method of dispute resolution under the RMA. 
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Chapter 6: Perspectives of the Environment Court Judges 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the interviews with the Judges. Judges are 
politically independent of government and seen as symbolising impartiality, justice and 
fairness (McDowell et al, 1995, p. 252). When interpreting legislation that is not clearly 
defined, Judges may exercise their own judgment and discretion. Such a situation could 
be considered to exist with regard to mediation under the RMA (McDowell et al, 1995, 
p. 105, 256). It was therefore anticipated that there might be some variation in each 
Judge's perception of mediation, given the independent nature and role of the judiciary. 
6.2 Findings from the interviews with Judges . 
At the time I undertook my interviews (late 2000), there were five Judges and one 
Alternate Judge working a demanding court schedule throughout New Zealand. While 
it was desirable to personally interview all Judges, IDeational considerations and work 
commitments did not allow this to occur. I undertook personal interviews with four 
Judges. My findings from my interviews with the Judges are presented under the 
following headings: 
• Judicial action prior to mediation. 
• Judicial involvement during mediation. 
• Judicial action post mediation. 
6.2.1 Judicial action prior to mediation 
The Judges are the first group in the Court process to assess a reference or appeal. The 
following is an outline of the basic case management strategy that emerged from my 
findings. 
Case management strategy 
Once the Court Registry in Wellington received a reference or appeal, the Registry 
checked it had arrived within the statutory time frame and that all documentation was 
correct. A file, with an RMA file number, was made up, comprising all the initiating 
documents. Case files were sent to the relevant Judges as the cases were lodged. Each 
Judge was responsible for case management in a particular region of New Zealand, 
although they did not necessarily hear every case in that region. The Judge read the file 
with the initiating documents then made a decision as to how the case was to be 
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managed. At that time the Judge decided what directions to give Registry regarding 
case management. 
Assessment of cases 
The matters looked for at the case management phase varied between Judges. Reading 
the initiating documents on file was considered to be one way to get an impression of 
whether or not mediation may be possible. The criteria on the case management sheet 
attached to the file were also checked. Examples of the types of matters that may be 
looked for by a Judge ,during their assessment were: 
• The issues in dispute. 
• The type of parties involved. 
• Whether or not any issues could possibly be mediated. 
• Whether or not the case warranted asking the parties if they were prepared to 
mediate. 
• The best place to hear a case. 
• Any jurisdictional issue and 
• Whether or not there was urgency for a hearing. 
This assessment is limited, given the nature of the documents put before the Judges and 
their workload. This may explain why the Judges are careful to suggest that a case may 
be suitable for mediation rather than say that it is. 
Determining the suitability of a case for mediation 
Experience was considered an important factor in deciding whether or not a case was 
suitable for mediation. Some Judges had learnt from experience that sometimes it was 
not worth suggesting mediation. Some matters were so hard fought and the public 
interest issues such that a Judge would not set the matter down for mediation unless 
requested by the parties. All Judges agreed that some cases were more amenable to 
mediation than others. The characteristics of cases they considered amenable to 
mediation were: 
• Issues that were clear cut in ambit and related to (say two party) neighbourhood 
disputes. 
• Issues that were fairly confined without a major number of submitters or potential 
submitters who wished to appear under s.271 A. 
• Cases of simple value judgments. 
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• Cases where the matter had dragged on for a long time and where some common 
sense could, potentially, be brought to bear. 
• S.120 appeals against conditions on resource consents. In these cases, no one had 
asked the Council to overturn its decision so there was more room for the Council to 
move. 
• Where it looked, from reading the file, like parties may be able to reach a solution. It 
was noted that it was hard to describe in absolute terms what these might be. 
• Where there were very technical issues that the experts may be able to work 
through. 
Those cases considered less amenable to mediation were: 
• Cases containing some major matter of principle or law and 
• Cases involving large numbers of people where mediation might be difficult to 
·manage, e.g. 30-40 people wanting to be heard and/or appear under s.271A. 
Examples of such cases were cell phone towers and major public works. It was 
questioned if it was realistic to run mediation with so many people. 
Each Judge had a trigger point at which they would suggest mediation with several 
considering they had a low trigger point. A Judge may suggest that mediation be 
explored if they thought it was reasonably possible that it may achi~ye something. Even 
in cases where there was a large public interest component, there may be issues that 
could be mediated out of the hearing thus allowing the core issues to go to the Court. 
While mediation was supported, compulsory mediation was not. While a Judge may 
favOlir meaiation, with its agreed solutions, it was for the parties to decide if a case was 
unsuitable for mediation. It was recognised that the public interest was a big factor in 
the Court's work. If people considered there was enough public interest to warrant 
bringing a matter to Court then that had to be respected. A large part of the Court's 
work was simply between two parties with no public interest component. References 
were considered high public interest issues. However the idea of mediation had spilled 
over into settling references and Councils were negotiating with the respective parties. 
A Judge had noted that there appeared to be a different process for Plan references. 
Parties did not want them set down for hearing by the Court, as they wanted, through 
negotiation, to sift the cases to see what should and should not go to Court. The residual 
cases came to Court. 
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Judicial action if a case was considered suitable for mediation 
If a Judge considered a case may be suitable for mediation that was noted on the file. 
The Registry then sent a standard letter to all parties explaining what mediation was 
and advising them that the Judge managing the case had suggested that the case may be 
suitable for mediation and asking whether the parties agreed. 
It was considered that case management did not necessarily mean the Judge waited for 
the parties to initiate mediation but rather the Court was pro-active in asking about the 
possibility of mediatiQn. Taking a more pro-active approach could, however, give rise 
to some problems. Where a Judge shared their reasons for suggesting mediation, it 
could be taken as indicating something of a view on the merits of the case. In such a 
situation a Judge may feel they should disqualify themselves from the hearing. 
It was pointed out that, under the RMA, participation in mediation was voluntary and 
Judges could only refer cases to mediation if all parties agreed. It was considered that if 
only a few stakeholders were willing to participate, mediation was unlikely to be 
successful. One Judge commented on this point in some depth. It was recognised that, if 
the majority of the parties wished to mediate in order to narrow issues or had all 
reached a consensus except one, then pressure could be put on that party to agree. 
Much would depend on whether or not the party standing out was a vital party, for 
example a s.271A party. It was suggested that, if a party did not want to mediate or 
agree to a mediated settlement, especially if it was a s.271A party, then that party may 
have to show why mediation or an agreement should not proceed. 
The Judges considered that parties were entitled to have their case heard by the Court 
so must be allowed that opportunity. If parties considered there was enough public 
interest to warrant bringing the case to Court then the Court must respect that. It had 
been noted that it was rare for parties to say they would agree to mediation when they 
filed proceedings in the Court, so a Judge could only suggest, via the Registry, that the 
parties may like to consider mediation. 
Once parties agreed to the Court's suggestion of mediation, two possible courses of 
action were taken. The Registrar consulted with the Judge responsible for the case and 
resolved issues such as the availability of a suitable Commissioner, the expertise of the 
Commissioner and possible venue, subject to what the parties had suggested. 
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Commissioner availability, interest and expertise all came into the selection process. 
The Court Registry has subsequently advised that now (2001), in general,-availability 
more than anything else determines Commissioner selection. 
Alternatively, a Judge may assign it straight away to a Commissioner, in order of 
preference, based on the Commissioner's expertise and interest. No indication was 
given of the parties being consulted. It was recognised that in 'pure' mediation such 
matching might not be acceptable. Matching was supported in this context as it was 
considered good mediators achieved good results. The comment was made that some 
Commissioners may be more suited for mediation work than others and those who did 
not enjoy it should not have to do it. A good result was considered to be a happy 
mediator, a good consent order or a withdrawal of the appeal. Often a withdrawal was 
seen as a good outcome as people may not have been litigating the matter that was the 
real issue. Some grievances went back over time. Groups or individuals may have been 
marginalised. Mediation may be the first time that parties have had a relatively non-
threatening, supportive forum in which to express their concerns. 
No Judge considered cases were unsuitable for mediation. While a Judge may not think 
it worth suggesting mediation, this did not prevent parties from asking the Court for 
Court assisted mediation or arranging their own. If a Judge did not suggest a case for 
mediation, the parties said 'no' to mediation or it involved major public interest issues, 
then it was set down for hearing. Parties may be encouraged to have a pre-hearing 
conference to reduce issues and define the ambit of the case. 
At callover51 a Judge may check if any parties had requested mediation. Mediation may 
be revisited as the likelihood of mediation may have become more apparent. The parties 
themselves may have come to the view that mediation was a desirable option. The 
issues may have been narrowed, making mediation a possibility. The possibility of 
mediation is never excluded even if the case appeared an unlikely candidate. If parties 
requested mediation, provided they were sincere in their request and there were no 
hidden agendas, a Judge would endeavour to assist them and arrange mediation. The 
Court was always willing and pro-active in encouraging mediation. It had been noted 
5J Callover: The procedure by which proceedings which have been placed in a fixture list pursuant to 
rules of Court or by direction are assessed by the Registrar of the High Court, to determine whether or not 
they are ready to be allocated a hearing date before a Judge or master (Spiller, 2001, p. 40). 
73 
that, with plan references, the lawyers liked several callovers as it gave them something 
to work towards in their negotiations. 
In one Court region they were using a case management system that gave a fixture date 
at callover. This meant the Court had quite rigid control of cases within the system. 
Lawyers then knew that, if they went into mediation and it 'unravelled', they would get 
a fixture if they went back to the Court. It was considered that this encouraged 
confidence among the parties. A problem with this case management system is the 
shortage of Judges to assist when one Judge is involved in a long hearing. 
Parties unwilling to mediate 
When a party declined mediation there were various responses from the Judges. A 
Judge may accept the parties' refusal and proceed to manage the case towards a hearing. 
A J.udge may encourage the parties to attend a pre-hearing conference in a bid to reduce 
the issues and define the ambit of the case. It was considered that, based on questions 
asked at callovers, sometimes parties were tentative about mediation out fear of being 
coerced52. A Judge explaining the Court assisted mediation process to the parties was 
believed to help the parties and allay such fears. 
Mediation of cases not suggested by Judges for mediation 
If the parties wish to mediate, despite a Judge not suggesting it or considering the case 
an unlikely candidate for mediation, then the Court let them. One Judge commented that 
if 30-40 parties could all agree to mediate then they (the Judge) would let them try. 
They wo~ld j~st need to be satisfied that all the parties had agreed. Unless they all 
agreed then there would be no point in using the Court's resources. It had been noted 
that some parties did not want to lose their fixture date so mediation was done very 
quickly if the fixture was within the next month or two. 
6.2.2 Judicial involvement during mediation 
The Judges' involvement in a case during mediation varied. A Judge may determine to 
have no contact with the Commissioner during mediation. Alternatively, contact may be 
confined to case management matters, such as letting the Judge know that more time 
was needed for the mediation. In some instances Commissioners informally sought 
advice from a Judge on procedural matters, questions of law or matters such as the 
52 Coercion: persuade (an unwilling person) to do something by using force or threats. (Concise Oxford 
Dictionary, 200 1). 
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public interest component of a case. The Judges' involved in giving such advice saw it 
as informal and non-binding. In some instances a Judge may advise a Commissioner 
that if they had any hesitation regarding the mediated outcome then they should make 
sure the case came before the Court for hearing. All Judges indicated that they did not 
want to know anything about the details of the mediation. The less they knew the better 
from the point of view of their impartiality if they were required to later hear the case. 
6.2.3 Judicial action post mediation 
After mediation was completed, a Commissioner would report back to the Judge with 
the outcome of the mediation. This may involve a file note along with any 
documentation. The ways the case may be dealt with were: 
Withdrawal of appeal/reference 
It w.as considered that there was little a Judge could do about this if that was what the 
parties requested. The Judge would check if there were any file notes from the 
Commissioners as to why the matter was withdrawn, for example, if parties were 
satisfied by a side agreement. A Minute was then made on the file to the effect that the 
appellant or referrer had withdrawn. 
• Record of determination 
Some parties wanted the Judge to record the reasons why they withdrew in the record of 
determination of the appeal. If that was the case the Judge recorded these. 
• . Another order 
The parties may wish the Judge to amend the original decision. 
Matters the Judges consider when viewing a mediated settlement 
The matters looked for varied and not all Judges looked for all of these matters. 
• Legality of the document or consent order. 
Some Judges looked to see that the document did not offend any general legal principles 
and that the agreed solution was within the Court's jurisdiction. It was noted that 
occasionally a mediator might overlook the fact that what the parties had agreed to was 
outside the scope of the particular case. 
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• The public interest 
The public interest may be considered. The comment was made that the parties had 
looked after their own private interests so the Judge would look to see if the agreement 
was consistent with the public interest as expressed in the purpose of the legislation and 
subordinate legislation, for example, the Regional Policy Statement or District Plan. 
• Capable of being given effect 
A Judge may look to see that the agreement was reasonably certain in terms so that it 
was capable of being given effect. 
• Appropriate in RMA terms 
A Judge may look to see if it was an 'appropriate' order with an appropriate 
memorandum. Appropriate was defined in RMA terms. From the response given, it was 
unclear as to what was appropriate in the RMA context. 
• Matters of national importance 
One Judge considered that it was not for the Judge to question the merits of the agreed 
solution. They did however look at jurisdictional aspects and whether or not matters of 
national importance had been dealt with satisfactorily. They acknowledged that their 
consideration of the latter was superficial. 
• Mutually agreed solution with correct documentation 
A Judge may look to see that all parties had agreed and that the documentation was 
acceptabre~ As to what was acceptable was not defined by the Judges. It is assumed that 
Environment Court Practice Note 17, which requires the text of a consent order to be 
submitted in writing with sufficient explanation as to what is proposed and why, is a 
minimum requirement (Environment Court, 1998). If a Judge had any reservations 
about the documentation then a Minute was issued and the matter referred back to the 
parties. The parties may confer without the Commissioner; the Judge may call a 
conference; or the mediation reopened, in order to achieve an outcome that covered the 
concerns raised. Side agreements made during mediation did not come to the Judge. 
Their contents, including any amounts of money paid, remained confidential to the 
parties. 
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Particular matters that the Judges considered should be present in a mediated 
settlement 
Each Judge had particular matters they looked for in a mediated settlement. The 
following list includes all those matters raised by the Judges in interviews. No one 
Judge indicated that they looked for all of these. 
• That all parties consent, i.e., that no party has been left out of the process; that there 
had been no pressure for parties to agree and that parties signed of their own 
volition. 
• That the order can. reasonably be made in RMA terms. There was no point in putting 
forward an agreement if it was going to fail to create a satisfactory environmental 
result. 
• That the agreement will bring a responsible outcome in RMA terms and is not just 
conceived to suit the narrow interests of the parties. 
• .That the settlement comes within the parameters of the original appeal or plan 
reference and is relevant to the case in point. 
6.3 Judges' views of mediation 
All the Judges interviewed considered the basic process was working well. Mediation 
was increasing in importance and was a valuable tool for managing the Court's 
workload. As a result of the legislation, case management system aI!9: Registry support, 
thousands of dollars were being saved and a more streamlined Court system was being 
developed. Commissioners were seen as willing and enthusiastic about mediation, equal 
to the task and developing further skills with experience. The public or client response 
had been thatthe Commissioners had been very helpful. This had been borne out by the 
number of successful outcomes. 
One Judge saw no need for any changes in the present mediation system. Others 
recognised that the Court was adjusting to mediation and some changes or 
improvements could be made. Suggestions were: 
• A system tailor-made for the Environment Court jurisdiction. Mediation in the 
Environment Court was seen as different from other forms of mediation. The 
Commissioners have acquired certain skills as members of the Court. Parties often 
looked to the Commissioner to acquaint them with options or advise how the Court 
would view the case if it went to a Court hearing. The Court remained neutral but 
was in a position to help the parties with the various possibilities and what the 
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realistic achievements might be. There was a need to devise a system that 
recognised this uniqueness. 
• Reviewing the process so that it was well set up and enabled the smooth allocation 
of Commissioners' time and liaison with the Registrar. 
• Case management. At least one region was trying a more structured case 
management system. A Judge suggested that the date for mediation and the venue 
could be arranged at callover to reduce the nee~ for the Registry to follow up. At 
callover, the Court could go to greater lengths to explore the venue options parties 
had in mind and the date. 
• Where mediation failed to reach total agreement between the parties, then the 
Commissioner should outline the issues in dispute for the Judge. 
• The Court needs to recognise that not every Commissioner is suited to mediation. 
Training, support and mentoring build confidence in the process. The Court puts a 
.lot of trust in Commissioners who mediate cases. 
6.4 Conclusions 
All Judges considered mediation had a role within the Court system. A general case 
management strategy emerged, with a more stringent approach being taken to case 
management in one region. There was variation in the approach taken by the Judges 
prior to, during and after mediation that had implications for both th_~Commissioners 
and participants. Variations were noted in the following areas: 
• Prior to mediation. 
The optioif or-mediation was put before the parties in a variety of ways, some more pro-
active than others. The Judges' response to a party's decision regarding participation in 
mediation also varied from acceptance to an explanation of the process. It is 
conceivable that participants may interpret a Judge's action in various ways and make 
assumptions that then determine their approach to mediation. 
• During mediation 
Some Judges gave advice to Commissioners during mediation while others did not. 
While this advice may have assisted the particular Commissioner it could, depending 
on the matters discussed, raise questions regarding the without prejudice nature of the 
mediation process. It may also determine whether or not the Commissioner allowed the 
case to continue in mediation. 
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• Post mediation 
The criteria used by the Judges to assess a mediated settlement varied, with each Judge 
emphasising slightly different criteria. An explanation of the criteria used by Judges 
when viewing mediated settlements may alter the present public understanding of the 
Judge's role when signing off on a matter. 
The majority of Judges recognised that there were areas for improvement within the 
current process from an administrative and case management viewpoint. Consistency of 
approach when assessing cases for mediation, managing cases and viewing mediated 
settlements would appear desirable in order to ensure that mediated outcomes meet the 
purpose of the RMA. 
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Chapter 7: Perspectives of the Commissioners 
7.1 Introduction 
In Court assisted mediation, Commissioners conduct the mediation. One of the themes 
in the literature reviewed earlier was that the role of the mediator was very important for 
the success of the mediation process. I therefore explored this in my interviews with 
both the Commissioners and the participants. I also sought the Commissioners' view of 
mediation and the way in which they conducted it. In this chapter I present my findings 
from the interviews. 
7.2 Findings from interviews with Commissioners 
The findings are presented under the following headings: 
• Training for mediation 
'. The role of the mediator prior to and during mediation 
• The mediation process 
• The future of mediation 
7.2.1 Training for mediation 
All Commissioners had had some formal training in mediation but the variation in the 
amount of training was considerable. All but one had undergone the-first level of 
LEADR training. One Commissioner was of the view that LEADR was the only 
organisation providing such intensive short-term training courses. Some 
Commissioners had completed an advanced LEADR course, others had attended annual 
refresher courses, It was recognised that training needed to be followed by actual work 
so that the skills learnt were not lost. Four Commissioners had also undertaken training 
with other organisations or individuals. These included IBM; arbitration; five-day and 
three-day advanced mediation courses run by Roger Kemp in Christchurch; public 
strategy negotiation at Harvard University and a short mediation course at Stanford 
University. In addition, two mentioned the informal, hands-on training and experience 
they had gained while working in a professional capacity prior to becoming a 
Commissioner. 
. Several Commissioners commented on the training provided. In reality, they saw 
mediation as applied common sense. Training was recognised as necessary, despite 
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reservations about the cost and perceived promotion by some trainers of fairly rigid 
rules for mediation. 
7.2.2 The role of the Commissioner 
The Commissioners were asked what they considered the role of the mediator was in 
mediation. Six used the term facilitator. One of this group commented that facilitation 
occurred before, during and after mediation. Various other roles identified were: 
intermediary between the parties and the Court; manager of the mediation process, both 
before and during mediation; assistant to the parties and catalyst. Tasks the mediator 
may undertake were: 
• To help people come together to resolve their problems. 
• To guide discussion to reach a resolution. 
• To provide a forum where people can reach an agreement without any coercion and 
.that they are reasonably happy with. 
• To ensure the process was fair. 
• To keep the process informal. 
• To empower the parties. 
• To watch and manage the release of tension and to control it so it didn't go beyond 
reasonable bounds. 
• To let people have their day in court, and feel that they have had-justice. 
• To let people feel they have been listened to, had a fair go and had their say. 
• To ensure confidentiality. 
• To facilitate lateral and creative thinking. 
• To act as a catalyst. By their presence they trigger action and reaction. 
• To provide a less costly and more efficient place [than the Court] where people 
could come to workable and enforceable agreements so they could get on with their 
lives. 
• To advise parties about the likely outcome if the parties went to Court, based on 
their own knowledge. Environmental mediation was unlike other forms of mediation 
in this respect. 
The Commissioners' responses indicated that they did not see their role as being 
confined to simply one task but varied, depending on the needs that arose during 
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mediation. Several, in explaining the mediator's role, referred to multiple roles they 
may take during mediation, e.g. catalyst, facilitator and encourager of lateral thinking. 
Role prior to mediation 
The action taken by the Commissioners, once they had been asked by the Court to 
conduct mediation, ranged from doing nothing to telephoning the parties. Six left it to 
the Court to contact the parties, set up the mediation and supply the parties with any 
information regarding the mediation process. The Registry did, in some circumstances, 
send a letter to the parties. The helpfulness of this letter to parties was questioned. Five 
Commissioners had their first contact with the parties on the day of the mediation. 
Occasionally, a pre-mediation meeting was arranged to set guidelines for the mediation. 
In one instance the parties had requested it. The Judge agreed as they also saw the need, 
due to the number of issues involved and the potential for the mediation to go off track. 
AnQther Commissioner indicated that they would very much like to run pre-mediation 
conferences. They would always hold one if there was any indication that a pre-
mediation conference was needed. They did not indicate how or when they decided that 
a pre-mediation conference was needed. 
Two Commissioners personally sent a letter to the parties that outlined the process and 
their expectations of the parties who participated. Another was considering sending out 
a similar letter. In response to a question as to who should get such a letter, it was 
considered that lawyers may not need a letter of explanation from Registry or the 
Commissioner, however non-lawyer parties needed to be sent something. One 
Commissioner did not send anything to the parties but instead rang them. Another sent a 
letter then rang the parties. 
Role during mediation 
At the commencement of mediation all Commissioners gave an explanation of the 
mediation process and set out the ground rules. One Commissioner indicated that the 
amount of information given may vary, depending on the perceived needs of the 
parties. For example, whether or not all parties in the case had legal representation. 
The following is a summary of the various matters raised by the Commissioners. The 
ground rules covered at the introductory phase of the mediation included: 
• An explanation of the mediator's role 
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Explaining, for example, that they have no statutory authority to make the parties come 
to a decision. It was noted by one Commissioner, that people were afraid of the Court. 
One of the tasks of the Commissioner, therefore, was to explain that they were not 
hearing the case like a Judge but rather were there to help the parties and listen to them. 
• An explanation of the parties' role 
The parties were required to stand back, consider the big picture and be willing to 
negotiate and compromise. 
• The mediation is without prejudice 
This was considered important in order that all parties were free to participate in lateral 
thinking. One Commissioner advised the parties that minimal notes were kept on the 
file. They personally did not think that notes regarding the mediation should be put on 
the file because the mediation was conducted without prejudice. They therefore 
considered the form that the Court asked Commissioners to fill in after mediation was 
too detailed and such details should not be put on the file. During interviews, a Judge 
had raised the matter of file notes, in particular maintaining the confidentiality of such 
notes. 
• Confidentiality 
What confidentiality meant in practice varied between Commissioners. For some, it 
meant that the parties did not discuss the details of the mediation outside the room. 
Participants could go back to a wider group and explain the results but not the details of 
the "discussion. One Commissioner became uneasy when parties took copious notes 
during mediation. They told the parties that a lawyer could use these notes in Court and 
encouraged them to use notes made by the Commissioner on the board or in the 
summary of mediation progress. For other Commissioners, confidentiality meant 
allowing the participants to go back to the parties they represented and discuss the 
mediation, especially in Plan references or where Maori were involved. If anything 
about the mediation was reported in the media then one Commissioner would send the 
case to Court. 
• Parties must show respect to other parties and not interrupt. 
• Breaking into groups for cooling off, discussion or caucusing may occur. 
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Parties could ask for this at any time. These sessions were strictly confidential. One 
Commissioner indicated that they were uncomfortable with being part of these sessions 
and usually they left the parties alone. Another Commissioner considered that it would 
be improper for matters to be discussed without all the parties being present during the 
discussion. Other Commissioners went into these sessions if the parties wished them to 
or to check on progress. 
• Power to act 
Some Commissioners required that the parties had the power to sign on the day. The 
power to act was seen as seldom being a problem with applicants and appellants. Some 
Commissioners recognised, however, that not all parties, especially Maori and Council 
representatives, were given the power to sign off a mediated settlement by those they 
represented or their delegated authority was narrow. 
• Goodwill was to prevail. 
• The agreement would go to a Judge for a consent order. Therefore it had to be inside 
the law and the RMA and should not bypass the public interest. 
• Any side agreements made were enforceable in the District CouI!not the 
Environment Court. 
One Commissioner indicated that they might give reminders of these ground rules 
during mediation. 
One Commissioner felt uncomfortable about supplying information regarding the cost 
of going to Court. This information could potentially be used as a lever to get parties to 
settle and if people felt pushed, mediation would not be a success. They preferred to 
make a general comment about possible cost saving then left it to the parties to decide. 
7.3. The mediation process 
7.3.1 Defining the process 
The majority of Commissioners, at the start of mediation, outlined the way in which 
mediation could to be conducted and sought the parties' input and agreement. One 
indicated that they spoke to a structured set of notes and explained mediation, the way it 
84 
was conducted and the ground rules. This could take up to twenty minutes. Even if this 
information had been given beforehand, they would go over it again. 
Six Commissioners were flexible and adapted the process to the parties. It was 
recognised that everyone must agree to the process before they would be willing to use 
it. The Commissioners did not see that they had a role in defining the process for the 
parties, rather they managed the process the parties had agreed to. One Commissioner 
indicated that if legal counsel were present and had a way of proceeding, which did not 
mean one party dominated, then they let them proceed. Another indicated that they 
would define the parameters within which they were working (as defined by the RMA), 
and then let the parties define the process. They considered there had to be flexibility to 
adjust the process during mediation as a party may come to feel unhappy or trapped 
within the process as initially defined. A Commissioner sensed this from the 
participant's body language or statements made. In a multi party mediation (i.e. more 
than four parties) time might need to be spent in defining how the process would be 
managed. This could take a considerable amount of time, e.g. half a day. The difficulty 
of getting all the parties together prior to mediation was mentioned. The use of the 
Court's conference line facilities was suggested as a possible alternative. The process to 
be followed appeared to be a verbal rather than a written agreement. Agreement may be 
in writing, where a pre-mediation conference was held. 
Two Commissioners defined the process and asked the parties if they had any questions 
or were happy with the process. As one commented, for many parties it was the first 
time they-had-been in mediation and therefore they did not have any experience of this 
form of dispute resolution. The Commissioner believed that what the parties wanted 
was fair treatment. 
Once again there was a variety of responses as to how the mediation process was 
conducted. The mediation model taught by LEADR was obviously a useful guide as a 
number of Commissioners made reference to it during the interviews. However, 
flexibility was necessary due to the different types of cases. The style of mediation 
could vary depending on the characteristics of the cases, e.g. multi-party, lawyer-to-
lawyer. The two main stages in the mediation process, as identified in the interviews, 
were defining issues and resolving issues. 
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Defining issues 
After the introductory comments were made and the ground rules set out, each party 
was asked to state the issues as they saw them. It varied as to who presented their case 
first. Often the local authority started as it had more expertise or tended to be fairly 
neutral. Sometimes a Commissioner asked the applicant. If there was disagreement as to 
who went first, a Commissioner would ask the applicant. The importance of the other 
parties listening during this phase was emphasised. A number of Commissioners used a 
whiteboard as a tool to help parties by writing up the issues so all could see. This gave 
visual recognition of the issues, parties concerns and any progress. For some parties this 
may be the first time this has been done. Sometimes the parties wanted to come up and 
use the whiteboard. LEADR encouraged writing up information at the end of the session 
but some Commissioners did this as they went along, as they believed it helped keep 
parties focused. Once issues had been defined, other parties were then given time to 
respond to what had been said. The parties may then prioritise the issues. 
It had been noted that, at this point in the mediation, there may be antagonism between 
the parties and emotions, such as anger, may be expressed. Often there was conflict 
between the local authority representative and parties. These emotions had to be 
recognised and managed in order that the mediation could move forward. If parties were 
emotional, a Commissioner may 'put on a human face' and suggest a cup of tea. 
Side issues 
Side issues could arise at this time and would be recognised if they were seen to 
potentially -impact on the mediation. Long standing grievances did surface and needed 
to be dealt with before the parties could move on to resolving the main issues. Often the 
side issues were the reason for the mediation. Side agreements were common. Matters 
that may form part of a side agreement were also noted on the whiteboard but kept 
separate from the RMA issues. Commissioners advised parties that any side agreement 
was outside the jurisdiction of the Environment Court. 
Resolution of issues 
The issues were then worked through one by one. Parties may be asked or encouraged 
to suggest ways to the resolve the issues. Each step was by agreement. During the 
mediation the parties may, at any point, ask for a private session or caucus. A 
Commissioner may initiate it when things appeared to be coming to a halt, new 
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information was being presented or old information presented in a new way. This gave 
parties time to consider the information raised. A Commissioner may act as a 
go-between in these sessions, taking ideas from one party to another. As noted 
previously, not all Commissioners felt comfortable with this role. A Commissioner may 
take a party out of the room and talk things over if it appeared a deadlock had been 
reached. 
Note taking 
Note taking during mediation varied. Some Commissioners used whiteboards while 
others did not. It often depended on what facilities were available at the venue. Some 
Commissioners preferred that parties took notes from their notes on the whiteboard. 
They would ask the parties if they were happy with notes being taken from the 
mediation. A Commissioner commented that the community got some comfort from 
not~s being made. Parties may comment on the accuracy of the data recorded. Other 
Commissioners made no comment on note taking. 
Role of mediator 
There was also variation in the part the Commissioner played in the parties reaching a 
settlement. Some Commissioners left it to the parties to work out solutions. Other 
Commissioners gave suggestions, put forward options, ideas or other ways of looking at 
things, especially when the parties appeared to have reached a stalemate. The comment 
was made that the Commissioner was there to assist parties into lateral and creative 
thinking. This was considered necessary because some participants found this difficult 
as they could-not or did not want to see the possibilities. 
7.3.2 Handling power imbalances 
All Commissioners recognised that a power imbalance could exist within each 
mediation. The imbalance could be real or perceived. A Commissioner commented that 
all parties had some power. The fact that they had got so far in the RMA process 
indicated they were not weak. Another had been impressed by the ability of community 
groups and individuals to succeed when they thought they were right, had something to 
work for and were honest. In some cases, however, the power imbalance was seen as 
huge. 
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Usually there was a financial or knowledge imbalance that affected the parties' 
- understanding of the system and their ability to have representation. Another area of 
imbalance was organisational. For example, a Council with seemingly endless 
resources, or private sector or citizens groups that had more power than Council 
through having better qualified people to assist or advise them. Community groups 
often lacked funds or had not got together in an organisational sense. 
A Commissioner had to ensure that any power imbalance did not impact on the 
mediation process. Some parties came into mediation thinking that they had power or 
took a stance of power. That power may have come from their position, status or 
financial resources. Sometimes a company thought they had more rights than citizens 
groups who appealed. These perceived or real imbalances mayor may not have an 
effect on the mediation. Most Commissioners sought to address the imbalance by 
empowering the parties. Some parties may be over represented but a minor party could 
hold its own. If it did not, a Commissioner may ask one party to reduce the number of 
parties representing it. It was noted that it was personalities rather than numbers that 
had effect and a Commissioner could sense that. Some groups went into mediation 
thinking they were disadvantaged but they were not if they knew their information. 
Lawyers in mediation 
Some Commissioners raised the role of lawyers in mediation as a lawyer's assistance to 
their client could be seen as creating an imbalance. One Commissioner considered that 
strong counsel could be sensible and not dominate the process, instead letting the 
parties do--the-work and then advise when an agreement was being prepared or ready for 
signing. Another commented that some counsel helped the situation by using very good 
skills53• Another Commissioner enlisted counsel to keep the parties inside the law and 
made them responsible for writing up the agreement. Some counsel, however, were 
considered to put on a legal show for their clients and the Commissioner needed to use 
the Courtroom door ('obviously we can't reach an agreement therefore let's proceed to 
Court') to get them to make an agreement for the parties to sign. 
Not all Commissioners considered that counsel should be present in mediation. One 
expressed doubt about the wisdom of having counsel present because of their role as 
53 This may reflect the lawyer's level of instruction and training in mediation. The Universities of 
Auckland, Waikato, Massey, Victoria and Canterbury offer papers on alternative dispute resolution. Some 
are taught through the respective Law Faculty. 
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advocate for their client. It had been noted that some people were in awe of lawyers as 
they usually go to them for advice.-Insome instances, the Commissioner felt that the 
parties might have been able to reach resolution if the lawyers had not been there. A 
Commissioner can ask lawyers not to be just an advocate for their clients. One 
Commissioner considered that lawyers had a duty to put the case properly and fairly to 
the Commissioner, similar to the wayan expert witness was supposed to behave in the 
Court situation. In the mediation situation lawyers were to work towards seeking a 
solution. 
It was believed that it might be easier for a Commissioner to make suggestions 
regarding the role of lawyers in mediation than mediators from the private sector. One 
Commissioner believed that their position in the Court helped them in that they had 
knowledge of and experience in Court and knew what the parties could or should do. 
An<?ther considered that when mediation was undertaken in a Court setting, the parties 
. heeded what the Commissioner said on account of the Commissioner's position in 
Court. Commissioners were full members of the Court and Court decisions were by 
consensus, not by the Judge alone54. The next time the parties or lawyer were in Court 
they may therefore be before the Commissioner, who was the mediator, therefore they 
heeded what the Commissioner said as their reputation was on the line. 
The impact of power imbalances on mediation 
Commissioners had noted that power imbalances affected mediation in a number of 
ways: those who considered they had power would not necessarily listen; they became 
angry when they considered their power was being usurped in some way; they were less 
inclined to negotiate or participate and were less co-operative. Sometimes a 
Commissioner needed to question or challenge such an attitude. 
The power imbalance also impacted on the process when parties were not able to 
present their case properly or had difficulty in a technical sense due to their inability to 
understand technical or scientific information. Some parties may not have been advised 
by anyone beforehand so came in with some fundamental misunderstandings. 
Inevitably it was the Councilor applicant, who had a wide range of experts, against 
community groups who just wanted to preserve their environment. The groups may lack 
knowledge or be ignorant at a scientific level. Unless any real or perceived power 
54 S.265 RMA. 
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imbalances were addressed, people may consider that their ability to participate in the 
process and achieve a fair outcome had been adversely affected. 
The majority of Commissioners thought that power imbalances could be overcome. In 
every exchange the Commissioner had to consider whether an advantage was being 
created. One suggested that the Commissioner should try to address this but if they 
failed the matter should go to the Court. In terms of their perceived role, the 
Commissioners believed they could redress imbalances in a number of ways: 
• Helping the parties understand both the mediation and Court processes by giving 
them information. When parties understood the process then they were more willing 
to work at mediation. 
• Encouraging a transformative process whereby people were able to see other 
viewpoints, were given time to think and were not demeaned by the process. 
• Letting experts and other parties come in to redress the imbalance. Councils were 
considered to play an important role in the power imbalance. 
• Helping the powerful realise that they had to be willing to co-operate. 
• Managing the process so that parties felt at ease. If the atmosphere in mediation was 
open then parties felt comfortable to tell the Commissioner if they felt intimidated, 
especially in a private session. 
• Asking the parties to focus on the issues and stopping the discus~ion when it became 
personal. 
• Enabling everyone to have his or her say without interruption. 
• Asking lawyers not to be just advocates for their client. 
• Getting -the parties to be helpful and getting the facts out. In an adversarial situation 
not all information comes out whereas in mediation all information can be made 
available. 
• Advising parties that they can still go to Court. Costs were possible but costs were 
not used as a threat to get people to settle. 
It was noted that power imbalances could exist prior to or develop during mediation. 
The Commissioner must work to keep the situation under control so that an imbalance 
does not develop. 
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7.3.3 Matters covered by mediation 
All but two Commissioners said that they raised matters that had not been raised by the 
parties themselves during mediation. The two Commissioners considered it was up to 
the parties to work it out and not for the mediator to make suggestions. It was 
recognised that some disputes may go wider than the appeal grounds that were subject 
to the mediation. There appeared to be two main ways in which matters, outside those 
raised by the parties in the proceedings, could be raised. 
1. By the parties as d.iscussion occurs. 
The parties could raise underlying or side issues. One Commissioner considered that it 
was totally unwise to limit matters to those under appeal, i.e. solely RMA issues. A 
number of Commissioners acknowledged that side issues might be the main issues of 
concern to the parties and the reason for the appeal. Side issues could be anything, were 
oft~n personal grievances and brought with them the desire for retaliation. They had to 
be acknowledged and dealt with if progress was to be made. 
One situation, where this could occur, was when individuals or groups came in as a 
s.271A party to the appeal and they could not go wider than the original grounds of the 
appeal. Side agreements could deal with the matters raised. Memoranda of 
understanding (gentlemen's agreements) allowed some issues to be dealt with so that 
trust could be rebuilt and a resolution reached. Such agreements helped 'get rid of the 
rats in the wood pile'. 
2. 'By the-Commissioners. 
• Matters were brought to the parties' attention and left for the parties to pursue and 
work through if they wished. One Commissioner considered that where they saw a 
possible solution, they had a responsibility to say, ' ... have you thought of looking at it 
this way? Is this something that...?' then let the parties work it out and build on the idea. 
• Suggestions of possible options or scenarios were made. The comment was made 
that it was hard to get this right so as to avoid a suggestion of mediation being seen as a 
directive. 
• Seed ideas were sown when it looked like the parties were not going to get there. 
This may be done in private sessions but the Commissioner had to be careful how this 
was done. 
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• If there were practical matters or matters related to the legislation, these would be 
raised. For example, if there was a reason why the agreement may 'unravel' because the 
parties had not considered a certain point. However, if the parties were moving towards 
an agreement that may not be workable, one Commissioner indicated they would leave 
it to be solved later on rather than stop the progress towards a solution. 
• Matters that could be fatal to the agreement, in which case the Commissioner would 
go back to the Judge for legal advice. One Commissioner considered that the 
Commissioner needed to very knowledgeable so as to know the alternatives. Another 
Commissioner considered that they could only raise issues that came within scope of the 
RMA appeal document. 
7.3.4 Purpose of the RMA 
The Commissioners were asked if, in their opinion, the purpose of the RMA was 
recognised and provided for during mediation. The responses varied. Six said that it 
was, one said sometimes, one said sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly. One 
Commissioner explained to the parties that the agreement would be judicially reviewed 
for compliance with the statutes and instruments and the rules of equity. Another said 
they left the purpose of the RMA out of it and worked towards a settlement, leaving it 
up to the Judge to decide if the settlement achieved the purpose of t~~ RMA. Their 
view was that the mediator was a facilitator, not a decision maker. In their opinion that 
was the Judge's role. Unless there was a blatant disregard of the RMA then it was 
considered that the Judge would not interfere. Another Commissioner spoke of a 
bottoIhlirte in-terms of the RMA that they would not go below. If the parties went 
below that bottom line then the Commissioner would send the matter to the Court. 
According to the Commissioners interviewed, most parties were aware of the purpose 
of the RMA and gave consideration to it during mediation. Some parties were very 
aware of the purpose of the RMA, especially interest groups, and they were determined 
to see certain things were recognised. The Commissioners saw their role in this respect 
to advise, educate and remind parties of the purpose of the RMA. They may ask the 
parties, especially if counsel was present, whether or not what was being proposed was 
possible under the RMA. One Commissioner considered that it was the mediator's role 
to keep people within the RMA and get an agreement that the Judge could sign off. If 
they did not, the parties may consider the mediation had been a waste of time. Three 
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Commissioners commented that people were usually more concerned with their own 
private affairs and what was in the agreement for them than with the purpose of the 
RMA. One Commissioner referred to the permissi ve nature of the RMA that enabled 
imaginative settlements to be made within the law. 
The Commissioners responses were that most of the time the settlement did meet the 
purpose of the RMA. Six Commissioners believed that, if it did not, the Judge would 
pick up on that and the memorandum would be sent back to the parties for 
reconsideration. Some.Commissioners would tell the parties outright that an agreement 
would not get past the Judge or that it was not an option given the legislation. Others 
would rely on the Judge to make that decision. 
7.3.5 Outcomes of mediation 
In the literature it had been suggested that mediation could help improve understanding 
and build relationships. I sought to explore the effectiveness of mediation in doing this 
where there was a great disparity of the beliefs between the parties. All but one 
Commissioner had been faced with the situation where there had been a great disparity 
in the beliefs between the parties. The lone Commissioner suggested that the reason 
they had not seen such cases was because the disparity was so great that those cases 
never came to mediation. 
The types of disparity identified had arisen as a result of social, cultural and economic 
conditions and antagonism. The majority of Commissioners considered that mediation 
helpe~ re~glv~ these disparities by: 
• Parties being empowered and given recognition. Their concerns were seen as 
legitimate. 
• Getting parties together to talk in the same room. For some parties this was the first 
time they had talked together. Initially parties may talk past each other, then talk to 
each other, and then talk about a solution. 
• By helping parties understand that other parties had thought about the issues of 
concern to them. They had an opportunity to state their mind and endeavour to 
understand each other's viewpoint. One Commissioner considered that even groups 
or individuals with strong viewpoints could 'move'. 
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• Helping parties decide which issues the Court could deal with and which required 
alternative settlements. Issues may be narrowed. 
• Information may be circulated which helped to close the gap between parties. 
• Holding mediation in neutral places. There was some difference of opinion on this. 
Some Commissioners thought the Court location helped the process by being 'in the 
shadow of the court room door' , while others thought it helpful to be outside the 
formal Courtroom environment. 
It was recognised that the courtroom was not an issue in many instances on account of 
the location of the mediation. Neutral territory was seen as important, e.g. hotels and 
community halls. Auckland Court now has a mediation room that is separate and 
considered more user-:-friendly than the courtroom. 
Commissioners recognised that in a small number of cases mediation did not improve 
relationships or understanding. It was suggested that"some parties saw mediation as a 
short cut and hoped to get an idea as to how their case would go before a Court hearing. 
Even in those situations it was considered that mediation might help by setting up 
processes that would aid all participants in the Court process. 
Some cases were resolved by mediation, others had the issues narrowed, in others the 
parties went away and worked out a settlement themselves before it got to Court. In 
others, the cases ended up in Court or were withdrawn. In some instances cultural 
differences -had to been taken into account. For example, losing face required that a 
Commissioner allow the parties time to consider and think about options put forward, at 
the same time making it clear that the parties could come back into mediation. 
Mediation brings improved outcomes 
In the literature it was suggested that mediation brought improved outcomes. When 
asked if they believed this had occurred, the majority of Commissioners shared this 
view. Some Commissioners gave a qualified 'yes'. Their views varied. 
• The Court was seen as producing the highest standard of outcome. It was considered 
that you could get better outcomes from the Court, if cases were well prepared and 
presented. However, not all parties necessarily did better in Court and some could 
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lose everything. Mediation brought an outcome by a more comfortable process. 
• If the outcome was in accord with the law and was a mutually acceptable outcome, 
then it may be an improved outcome. 
• If mediation enabled an outcome that suited the parties and was something the Court 
could not arrive at, then in that sense it was better. Mediation, while being a low-key 
process, could produce or use some quite high quality information. 
• If ongoing relationships are created or enhanced through well-managed mediation 
then it may be an improved outcome. 
7.4 The future of mediation 
All Commissioners supported the use of mediation. It was seen as: 
• A suitable process for dealing with many cases that come before the Court. 
• Promoting the enabling philosophy of the RMA. 
• Having standing and formality as a process when set up by the Court. People have to 
front up and face the issues. The Judges can deal with points of law. 
• Enabling issues to be resolved to the mutual satisfaction of participants and without 
recourse to a major hearing. 
• Allowing the parties to take ownership of the outcome and have their say in an 
environment that enabled and encouraged that. For some parties, even if the 
outcome is not what they want, they have done their best, had their say and affected 
the outcome. 
• Enabling all parties, even the least resourced, to have their say without being talked 
down to by lawyers or sneered at. 
• Enabling outcomes that could not be imposed by a higher authority. 
• Reaching resolution quickly where there is repeated mediation with similar groups, 
as can happen with plan references. The disadvantage is that the Commissioner may 
become too familiar with the parties. 
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Commissioners considered mediation would be a major dispute resolution tool in the 
21st century because of costs. Costs were seen as scaring people and deterring them 
from participating in RMA decision-making processes. The RMA had created a huge 
industry. For example, nine people (three parties plus a lawyer and planner) were 
estimated to cost $50,000 for one day in Court. Some Commissioners thought that 
mediation would be and should be used increasingly. It was contended that many, but 
not all, cases before the Court were suitable for mediation. The Court, by facilitating 
mediation, gave it standing and formality as a process. It was considered that if a Judge 
suggests mediation thyll the Court should provide a mediator. The free mediation 
service currently being offered by the Court was seen as positive for all participants. 
On the other side, a few Commissioners expressed the view that by suggesting 
mediation, the Court was suggesting to the parties that the case was not really important 
enough to worry the Court and take up its tIme. Asking the parties if they had 
considered mediation made counsel aware that the Court thought the parties could sort 
out the issues and there was no need for the Court to be involved. 
All Commissioners considered mediation should be voluntary. Mandatory mediation 
was not considered to be mediation. If people did not want to mediate, they would be 
much less willing to try and reach resolution, thus wasting the Court's and participants' 
time and money. Mandatory mediation was seen as draconian and could generate 
further antagonism in the community before a Court case. It was considered that already 
some people could be coerced into mediation. 
Some Co~issioners suggested that the Court should work towards very strong 
encouragement of mediation. Possible ways would be: a conference call or mediation 
type meeting where the mediation process could be explained. Where cases were taking 
a long time to get to Court then the Judge could say' ... do you think it would help if 
one of the Commissioner's had a session with you to see if you might be able to 
mediate something?' or ' ... we think these issues may be resolved by mediation. We'd 
like you to think about giving it a try. If you try and it doesn't work, then go to the 
Court and the Court will decide.' 
One Commissioner saw mediators doing the bulk of the Court's work. They recognised 
this may not be what the Judges wanted to hear but, with the large backlog of cases 
before the Court, something had to be done. Others saw mediation making up to 50% of 
a Commissioner's workload. Commissioners would continue to be facilitators and 
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should continue to conduct mediation. They were mobile and flexible. It was questioned 
whether a mediator needed to sit on the bench in order to be better able to handle 
mediation through their knowledge of what was acceptable or possible under the RMA. 
Commissioners also assisted the parties to communicate. It was believed that often the 
issues have come to the Court because people have failed to communicate earlier. 
In future more joint mediation may be used where there were a large number of parties. 
Regarding the provision of a court mediation room, the benefits were considered to be: 
no accommodation costs (assuming the Court bears the cost); it emphasises the 
neutrality of the venue and has the stamp of the Court. It also has the integrity of the 
Court and is not seen as a jack up between two strong parties, as can be the case if a 
mediation is held in a Council venue or legal office, as sometimes happens outside the 
Court centres. For this reason only Court mediators should use the Court mediation 
room in order to maintain the integrity of the Court process. 
It was suggested that the Commissioners should be given power by the Judges to do 
simple things on their own. It was believed that this could be possible if there was no 
law involved, e.g. a mediator could do the adjudication. It could be that mediation 
becomes a binding decision without going back to the Judge. The matter of legal 
training for mediators was raised but considered to be unnecessary. 
7.5 Summary 
All Commissioners had gained knowledge of mediation through training and had 
gained experience by conducting mediation. The standard training for Commissioners, 
funded by1:he-Court, was LEADR in conjunction with or as a supplement to other 
forms of specific training. Commissioners recognised the need for training. The 
majority of Commissioners saw the role of the mediator as primarily a facilitator of the 
mediation process. However it was not confined simply to that role but varied from 
facilitator to evaluator depending on the needs that arose during mediation. 
The pre-mediation action taken by the Commissioners varied. Some had no contact with 
the parties until the day of mediation, leaving it to the Court. Others rang or wrote to the 
parties. The Commissioners' role at the start of mediation was seen as setting the ground 
rules for the mediation process and outlining the process. The parties mayor may not be 
involved in designing the mediation process. Some matters, such as confidentiality, 
small group discussion and the power to sign, gave rise to some variation in treatment. 
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During the initial stages of the mediation the issues are outlined, discussed and possibly 
prioritised. Parties then worked through the issues. Private sessions may be used to 
allow the parties time to work through information. The Commissioner may join these 
sessions and, at times, act as a go-between for the parties. Real or perceived power 
imbalances were recognised to exist and could impact on mediation. Commissioners 
sought to address these, but recognised that they were not always successful. 
The role of the Commissioner, in helping the parties reach settlement, varied. Some 
Commissioners left it to the parties; others were active in stimulating lateral thinking. 
There was an awareness that any suggestions made during mediation should not appear 
as a directive to the parties. Matters that related to the law or considered fatal to the 
agreement were raised. Notes were taken during mediation but there appeared to be no 
consistent approach. Reservations were raised in the context of note taking, in 
paI!icular the potential for any notes to impact the without prejudice nature of 
mediation. 
Themajority of the Commissioners considered that the purpose of the RMA had been 
recognised and provided for in the mediations they had conducted. Most parties, 
particularly interest groups, were aware of the purpose of the RMA and wished to see 
certain matters recognised. Commissioners might remind the parties of the need to keep 
within the law as defined in the RMA. Some Commissioners relied on the Judge to be 
the final arbiter of whether or not the purpose of the RMA had been met. 
AU Commissioners supported the use of mediation and could see its use increasing in 
the future for financial reasons. All agreed it should be voluntary and that it may not be 
appropriate in some cases. The legislation had given Court assisted mediation standing 
and formality as a process. 
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Chapter 8: Perspectives of the Participants in Court Assisted 
Mediation 
8.1 Introduction 
All the ten participants interviewed had the experience of being involved in cases that 
had been resolved through Court assisted mediation. I was privileged that they agreed 
to an interview and allowed me, through my questions, to revisit what had, for some, 
been a significant experience in their lives. For those participants, my questions not 
only revisited their mediation experience but also touched what I would describe as 
'RMA scars' - the personal and/or perceived impact of a compromise or failure to 
secure a desired outcome. In these instances, a considerable amount of feeling still 
remained despite the time lapse since settlement. This type of disclosure meant that 
additional time was required to work through these situations. As a consequence, in 
many instances, interviews took longer than anticipated. 
Frequently the interview questions caused the participants to make unprompted 
comments on matters beyond those sought in the questions. Common courtesy dictated 
that I listen to each participant's viewpoint. Consequently I did not prevent people from 
sharing their perspective and experience if they so wished. It appeared that some 
participants appreciated the opportunity to honestly express their opinion of the 
mediation process on the condition of anonymity being retained. I have included the 
additional comments of participants in my findings where I consider they relate to 
mediation in the Environment Court. 
8.2 An overview of the Environment Court assisted mediation process 
The interviews with participants explored similar areas to those covered with the other 
stakeholder groups. This section brings together all participant responses so as to gain 
an understanding of how the process was being undertaken from the viewpoint of the 
participants. 
8.2.1 Pre-mediation phase 
Decision to enter mediation 
There were a number of reasons given by the participants for deciding to enter into 
mediation. 
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• Cost 
The majority of participants gave this as a reason for entering mediation. The 
importance of cost in the decision to mediate varied. For some individuals and 
community/iwi representatives, it was the main reason for entering mediation. For 
others, such as Councils, it was one of several reasons, while for one party, an 
applicant, cost was not an issue at all. There were three aspects raised in relation to 
costs. They were: 
The cost of going to Court 
The majority of participants were aware of the potential cost of taking their case to 
Court. An experienced participant55 considered most parties did not want to get into 
Court because they knew the cost of doing so. Court costs were seen as significant 
unless a party could represent themselves. Some first-time participants indicated that 
thei~ legal advisers or other parties, such as Council, had advised them of the potential 
cost of Court. Costs of say $20,000-$45,000 were seen as horrendous. Some believed 
they did not have the resources for either legal advice or Court action. Even when a 
legal adviser at a community law centre considered a case winnable, the cost of 
bringing the case to Court had caused a first-time participant to settle in mediation. 
The fear of costs 
Some individuals or communityliwi groups had been advised that the other parties 
would pursue costs in Court. They had been told that the Judge might award costs 
against them if they lost the case. For a few first time participants the fear of this 
happening-existed throughout mediation. It was recognised that such an award could 
financially break a party. In one case a communityliwi group had been asked to show 
their ability to pay costs in the event of their case failing in Court. They had found such 
action intimidating and believed this was intentional. 
Cost saving 
Some Council and community/iwi representatives considered that money spent on 
Court proceedings was an unwise use of resources. The cost of going to Court to settle 
a number of references on Plans (Regional or District) was considered significant. It 
was an issue for some Councils especially those with a large number of referrals, such 
as with a District Plan. Mediation offered a significant cost saving for some Councils. 
55 Experienced participant: A participant who has participated in more than one mediation. 
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A Council representative estimated that it could cost in the vicinity of $20,000 to 
present a case in Court. When multiplied by the number of references, this constituted a 
substantial amount of money. It was considered sensible to try to resolve some issues 
through discussion. Council representatives commented that some people viewed the 
lodging of a reference or appeal as a means to have another go to amend the Plan. In 
some cases it worked but other times it did not as a Council was limited in the extent to 
which it could make changes. 
One community/iwi representative commented that, as ratepayers, they were aware that 
they and other ratepayers eventually had to pay for Council going to Court. They 
recognised that Court action was a drain on Council's limited resources and therefore 
sought to resolve the dispute by alternative means. That way the money saved could be 
put towards the community. 
• Speedier process than Court 
For one participant (an applicant) speed, not cost, was the primary consideration. They 
wanted the dispute resolved quickly so they could get on with their business. 
Mediation was seen as being quicker than the Court process with its projected delay at 
that time of 12-18 months. In the case of a Council, speed was a consideration but not 
the only one. The majority of referrals on a Plan had been negotiated. Mediation was 
seen as a way of getting disputes over the Plan settled more quickly and getting the· 
Plan operative. 
• . Preferable form of dispute resolution 
Some participants represented Councils and community/iwi groups that took the 
approach of trying to resolve disputes by mediation, even if they considered the 
likelihood of mediation succeeding was small. If the parties in a dispute wished to 
mediate then they would participate. Mediation was seen as being quicker than going to 
a Court hearing. It was also friendlier, less adversarial and less costly in terms of 
money, staff time and the parties' time. In the case of a Council, preparation for a Court 
hearing was seen as diverting staff away from their work, thus taking valuable staff 
time, and to be avoided if possible. One Council representative considered mediation 
was a participatory or consultative process with the intention of getting to a resolution. 
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One participant believed that mediation with an independent third party would help 
clarify the issues in contention and increase understanding of the dispute. Two thought 
that the issue appeared to be one that could be resolved without going to Court and 
therefore mediation should be tried. 
• Improved decision-making 
One participant considered that all parties would get a better result from mediation than 
from the Court. It was believed that mediation potentially enabled a win-win situation. 
The Court was percei~ed as being less flexible. In the Court the parties were no longer 
managing the outcome and there were winners and losers. 
• A voiding the Court 
From comments made by participants during the answering of the prepared questions, it 
became apparent that, particularly for first time participants, the Court system was 
perceived as 'frightening'. Several first time participants commented that the Court was 
not a place where law-abiding citizens usually went. The parties opposing them had let 
them know their intention to pursue costs, should the case fail in Court. These first-time 
participants had believed such comments, felt threatened and intimidated by them and 
settled. 
• Potential outcome 
One participant had been advised of the likely outcome of their case, basically if they 
failed in Court then they would go back to the original position prior to the Council 
hearing. This -advice had distressed them as the dispute involved their livelihood and 
was, understandably, dominating their life. For that reason they decided not to go to 
Court but to see if they could gain an improvement in the situation through mediation. 
Preparation for mediation 
I asked a number of questions to ascertain the source and type of information the 
participants had at their disposal prior to mediation, any additional information that 
they considered would have been helpful to know and who, in their opinion, should 
supply such information. 
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Sources of information about the mediation process 
The participants surveyed ranged from the informed and experienced to the uninformed 
and inexperienced. The majority of participants had had previous experience with 
mediation. 
Of the first time participants, two had relied on their legal advisers for information. A 
Judge had suggested mediation to another participant who subsequently relied on the 
'little bit' of information given in the letter sent out from the Environment Court. Two 
other participants had relied on word of mouth and/or friends for advice. These 
participants considered they had to learn about mediation, and any associated rules, as 
they went along while other parties did not. The first time participants considered that 
participation in mediation would have been easier if it had been made clear what was 
involved. 
When responding to this question, one experienced participant offered the comment 
that, when they first went into mediation, they were unfamiliar with the process and the 
powers and functions of the mediator. They considered the Court did not give clear 
advice regarding these matters in the information it circulated. This particular 
participant had found, from subsequent experience, that many people were unfamiliar 
with the Court assisted mediation process and did not know about the functions and 
powers of the mediator. 
Helpful information to know before mediation 
•.. Aboutthe process . 
Four first time participants thought it would be helpful to know how the whole 
Environment Court process worked so they could decide whether to go into mediation 
or put their case before a Judge. Useful information was considered to be: appearing 
before the Judge, how the Judge would treat the parties and the mediation process. One 
participant commented that later, after seeing an Environment Judge in action on 
another case, they believed they could have handled the Court process. 
Several first-time participants commented on the nature of the information required 
prior to mediation. They considered independent information should be available from 
a 'regional' (community) law office. It should explain what to expect in mediation, 
what happens right through to the end of the mediation process and how to go about it. 
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Any information should be written in such a way that the average person in the street 
could understand it without having to use a lawyer. For an inexperienced layperson the 
process, with its uncertainty, was 'mind-boggling'. The documents or correspondence 
circulated were heavy reading and the time frames often short. One participant 
acknowledged that other parties might have been more experienced in reading such 
material. 
One experienced participant thought it would be helpful for participants to know that 
mediation was not a decision-making process, that it was not like litigation but was 
simply a process to facilitate discussion towards resolution. They considered that there 
should be some document that set out how mediation was undertaken, e.g. closed 
sessions with the mediator, and the confidentiality of mediation. 
• About the mediator 
Four experienced participants made the following comments about the role of 
Commissioners in mediation. It was considered that the role of the Commissioner 
should be clarified. Parties should be able to choose the mediator, especially when a 
Commissioner was used repeatedly to mediate disputes involving the same or similar 
parties. Not all parties were comfortable with using the same Commissioner. One 
participant had gained the impression in a subsequent mediation that the Commissioner 
had formed an opinion regarding the wisdom of the parties pursuing the matter in 
mediation and saw the matter as frivolous. Mediators should be competent, familiar 
with the legislation, able to bring a sharp focus to the debate and able to give parties 
direction if they seemed to be moving away from a solution or off the topic. 
An experienced participant had noticed that the style of the Commissioners varied. For 
example, one Commissioner may require that all parties remain in the room until an 
outcome is agreed upon and require them to have power to sign on the day. Another 
Commissioner may allow the parties to go back, over night, to their respective 
organizations or groups and get agreed positions on matters before signing. If the 
particular Commissioner, and thus style, had been known prior to mediation, some 
participants indicated that it might have affected how they approached mediation and 
who was sent to represent them. It was pointed out that not all organizations gave full 
delegated authority to those attending mediation. Maori groups indicated that they 
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would very seldom, if ever, have delegated authority and must go back to their iwi/hapu 
for approval before signing off. 
Helpful information to know during mediation 
First time participants considered they needed more information during the mediation 
process and that participation would have been easier if it had been made clearer what 
was involved. One suggested it would be useful to have a legal person to bounce matters 
off. Lawyers, representing other parties, were seen as being helpful while the mediator 
was there but not so h~lpful outside mediation. Several raised the difficulty of 
assimilating and responding to information in a very short time frame. Time was needed 
in order to understand both the information and the implications. The pressure to make 
decisions compounded this problem. In a mUlti-party mediation, one participant 
considered that individual face-to-face meetings to talk about their specific concerns 
cou~d have resolved their dispute straight away. 
Affect of information on participation in mediation 
I enquired whether the participants considered the availability of information had 
influenced their role or participation in mediation. Responses here varied from no 
change from the experienced to taking a more assertive role in mediation or bypassing 
it for the Court from the first time participants. Three participants considered it was 
very important that other parties were open and willing to listen to different viewpoints. 
Unless that willingness was present, mediation was seen as pointless and, as one 
individual put it, you might as well stand and talk to the mirror in the bathroom. 
Preferred information provider 
As to how participants should find out about mediation and what is involved, responses 
ranged from 'don't know', 'someone in the bureaucracy', 'someone independent, 
maybe the Court' to the Regional Council, District Council, Court or MtE. Six 
participants thought the Court should provide information. As one participant 
commented, 'the Court is promoting mediation therefore they should give information'. 
However another commented that 'anything to do with the justice system requires a 
lawyer and that costs'. They did not necessarily think the Court should provide 
information. Another commented that the Government was making laws that people 
could not understand, that required money [to buy expertise] to understand and 'it 
shouldn't be like that'. Another commented that any information should be written in 
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plain English, not by a university graduate. 'You want it in everyday English so that 
normal people can understand it without having to refer back to somebody else or a 
lawyer to understand if. Some first time participants indicated that they could not 
understand some of the information they received or it took time and re-reading to 
understand. 
One first time participant suggested that if parties had gone through a Regional Council 
'mediation' [s.99] they would be familiar with the process. Environment Court assisted 
mediation was seen as. 'just another round in the fighf. 
One participant commented that they had been aware the Court encouraged mediation 
as much as possible. One Council representative considered that the Court sending out 
a letter regarding the option of mediation was 'fine' because it was a Court process. It 
would be better if there were support from the Court in the form of information about 
the mediation process. This information could say that if the parties were not prepared 
to move then mediation was not for them. Another Council representative commented 
that perhaps some people did not understand the process and felt obliged to enter 
mediation. The tone of the Court's current letter made people feel obliged to enter 
mediation even though they did not want to move their position. So parties went into 
mediation to be in the best position if the case went to Court otherwise the Judge might 
not view their case so favourably. Awareness of the Court's high caseload was also 
mentioned. One non-Council participant considered support should be given to groups 
and individuals so the process, with the associated legal profession, did not intimidate 
people; Ratepayers were, through their rates, paying for the people who were 
employing 'top-notch' legal aid to oppose them. 
8.2.2 The mediation process 
I asked the participants how mediation was conducted and their involvement in aspects 
of the process, such as selection of the mediator, deciding the process and drafting 
agreements. I also sought to understand how they perceived the process. 
Selection of the mediator 
None of the participants were involved in the selection of their mediator. The Court 
allocated the Commissioner. Some issues arose with the selection of the Commissioner. 
The repeated use of a particular Commissioner was commented on. Concern was 
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expressed that a party asking for a different Commissioner may be seen as questioning 
or challenging the Court and might get the Court's 'back up'. 
One case had used a Commissioner to resolve the majority of issues then the parties 
brought in an outside mediator to finish the 'wash up' issues after a lengthy mediation. 
The parties had shared the cost of the mediator and one participant considered that cost 
sharing brought a level of commitment that had not been there before. The mediator 
had limited time to resolve the issues and worked long hours to get resolution. The 
comment was made that when people realise they have limited time and are pushed into 
a comer then they make decisions. 
Confusion could obviously arise when the parties to a private negotiation asked for 
Court assisted mediation. One first time participant was not aware that a Court 
apP?inted mediator had been brought in to facilitate mediation. During the interview it 
became apparent that the participant was confused about the role of the Commissioner, 
thinking the Commissioner was the Judge. Another matter raised by a participant was 
the Commissioner's prior knowledge of the parties. A Commissioner had rung one of 
the participants prior to mediation and said that if they knew any of the parties they 
could not take the case. No other participant mentioned this matter. 
Preparing an understanding of the process 
The perception of the participants in each of the cases researched was that the 
Commissioners decided how the mediation process was to be conducted with no input 
from the parties. All Commissioners outlined to participants how the mediation would 
be run. Some Commissioners then asked if the parties agreed. Some participants 
commented on the fact that there were no minutes kept of the mediation so nothing to 
refer back to. They had to rely on what they thought the Commissioner or other parties 
had said. This approach was considered problematic as the process was seen as 'pretty 
impromptu', 'fluid' and 'like walking on jelly' with the particular parties. At the start 
the lack of structure was not seen as a problem but in hindsight it was considered to be a 
problem. It was considered that it would have been an advantage to have something 
defined because of the acrimonious relationships between the parties in dispute. 
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Role of the Commissioner 
Participants explained their understanding of the role of the Commissioner in various 
ways - facilitator, coach, listener, analyst and reconciler. Their responses showed that 
the Commissioners' approach varied. The majority of participants considered the 
Commissioner initiated discussion of the issues, sought the parties' views, listened, 
looked for common views and worked to bring resolution. Some Commissioners had 
gone beyond the role of facilitator and had made suggestions, tried to point the parties 
in the direction of resolution and advised the parties whether the settlement would 
satisfy the Court. Part~cipants had noted that the issues and views being expressed by 
participants did not appear to be important to the Commissioner. 
Other aspects of the Commissioner's role commented on were: 
Time to consider matters 
All participants considered the Commissioner facilitating their mediation had given 
parties time to consider the matters being raised. Some allowed lengthy breaks during 
mediation, e.g. half an hour, while others limited the time. Seven participants thought 
the time allowed was adequate. Parties had been allowed time to go away and think 
about matters. In one case, the parties determined the time needed and held a Hui. 
Other participants expressed concern at the limited time allowed for considering 
proposed agreements or settlements. Some parties were required to have power to sign 
on the day and were not allowed time to return to their organisation for approval. This 
was an issue for some Council and communityliwi representatives who may come to 
the endoftheir limited delegated authority during mediation. Some Council 
representatives commented that Commissioners may ask them in small group 
discussions to make concessions that might create a settlement but they did not have the 
freedom to do this. 
S'd' 56 I e lssues 
Some issues raised during mediation were not part of the reference or appeal yet parties 
had wanted these side issues resolved before they would agree to a settlement. Council 
representatives made the following comments. The parties may not have had a problem 
56 Side issues: those matters that do not form part of the original reference or appeal. 
Side agreements are any agreements that are entered into to obtain the written approval of an affected 
person. They occur in a variety of settings, take a number of forms and are initiated for a number of 
reasons ranging from avoiding notification of an application, or seeking to mitigate adverse 
environmental effects, to realizing opportunities for making a financial gain. (peE, 1998, p.v). 
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with the original decision but would not withdraw the appeal or reference until the 
broader issues were addressed. This was considered to be an abuse of the Court 
mediation process but no Commissioner had been heard to say this to parties. It was 
believed that Commissioners were delegated to resolve certain matters and had no 
authority to go outside these. Council representatives had no ability to meet some of the 
wider concerns raised as side issues unless there was a law or policy change. A 
Commissioner could, in the closed sessions, put pressure on Council representatives to 
resolve the issues' ... what can we give them to resolve the issue'. This was seen as 
asking a Council repre,sentative to do what Council could not do. If such a situation 
occurred in Court, the Judge would say that it was beyond the scope of the appeal. It 
was considered that the Court, in attempting to get resolution, was mediating on 
everything and this was beyond or outside its authority. Mediation could therefore go 
from being very focused on the actual appeal or reference to being very broad. It was 
sug~ested that the Court should make clear in the preliminary information that parties 
in mediation must 'stick to the main issues', i.e. thos~ under appeal, not the broader 
issues. 
Record keeping by the Commissioner 
Some Commissioners used whiteboards, if available, to write up notes during 
mediation. The majority of parties did not receive any written record of what had been 
discussed or decided during mediation although, in one case, both the-Commissioner 
and Council had kept and circulated notes. Four participants (Council, community/iwi 
and individual) considered there should have been a formal record kept so as to avoid 
misunderstandings, misinterpretations and the need to recover ground when mediation 
was reconvened. One considered the Commissioner should keep a record, as they were 
independent. 
Without records, everything was open to challenge. Parties may agree verbally to a 
course of action but when the mediation was reconvened nothing had been done. The 
mediation seemed 'to go back to square one and the mediator allows that to happen'. It 
was considered that the Commissioner needed to summarise what the various parties 
had agreed to do, let the parties see this then get them to sign. If there was nothing on 
the 'to do' list then the Commissioner should question whether the parties should 
proceed with mediation. Some participants believed that sometimes mediation failed 
because of this lack of commitment. It was suggested that signing off in phases, or as 
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each issue was dealt with, would avoid this happening and would give closure on 
resolved issues. One community/iwi representative considered the mediation process 
was in danger of being compromised due to the overall lack of formality. 
Some participants had observed Commissioners making notes. Some Commissioners 
advised the parties they were taking notes as they had to report to the Court but the 
parties did not see these notes. Others did not tell the parties what they were going to do 
with the notes. One participant commented they had no problem with note taking if it 
benefited the process, but they were concerned if side agreements were documented, 
such as money being paid to get a party to withdraw an appeal. 
Mediator giving information or suggesting approaches 
Eight of the participants had been in mediation where a Commissioner had given 
information or made suggestions as to possible approaches. Some considered this 
information helpful. Others did not appreciate the advice, especially when it related to 
whether or not the case should continue. Parties did look to the Commissioner for 
guidance in some matters such as Court processes and whether the proposed settlement 
would 'get past' the Court. This was defined as a 'reality check'. 
Drafting and circulation of agreement 
This aspect of the process was looked at on a case-by-case basis because of the 
different participants' perspectives. All participants were aware of an agreement or 
memorandum being drawn up. In two cases Council had drawn up agreements with the 
involvem~nt of the parties. In the third case all the participants had a different 
understanding of who had actually drafted the agreement. Circulation of the document 
also varied. In two cases a Council undertook circulation. One Council representative 
commented that they realised the need for resolution so undertook to draft, circulate 
and modify the document so agreement could be reached. It was unclear who had done 
this in the third case as no consistent response was given. 
Dynamics within the mediation room 
Impact of mediation on parties view of the issues in dispute 
Participants were asked to indicate if their view of the issues in dispute had changed. 
Only one considered this happened. Of the remainder, three indicated their views had 
not changed despite their gaining a better understanding of the issues and the sincerity 
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of the other parties. Another responded 'definitely not' while another said the mediation 
had actually made them more opposed than previously. 
Recognition of issues of concern by other parties 
Four considered that the other parties had recognised their issues of concern, at least 
verbally, with two considering it was 'lip service'. Two participants were unsure if their 
issues of concern had been recognised by other parties while another four considered 
this had not happened. One participant in a multi-party mediation considered that their 
issues were not aired as the mediation concentrated on the concerns of the main groups 
and individuals were forgotten about. 
During the interviews reference was made to the strong personalities, dominant 
characters, strong or extreme viewpoints and intransigent attitudes present in mediation. 
Participants also raised the matter of lacking trust in the other parties. Some had 
difficulty believing what the other parties said, on account of their past experience. 
Power imbalance 
The majority of participants considered that a power imbalance existed in their 
mediation and impacted their participation. They were di vided as to whether or not this 
affected the final outcome. The power imbalance could be created by a number of 
factors: 
• A knowledge or information imbalance 
Some recQgni~ed that the power advantage lay with them in the mediation as they had 
legal and professional capabilities that the other party or parties did not, plus logic and 
the law on their side. As several put it, it was the resourced and/or knowledgeable 
versus the under resourced and/or less knowledgeable. Despite this imbalance, one 
Council representative considered that even the under resourced parties had power and 
leverage in the situation and knew how to use it. So the power imbalance could, in 
some instances, be perceptual rather than real. 
• A numerical imbalance 
One Communityliwi representative made reference to the number of parties, with their 
legal and technical experts, 'stacked up against' them. Their perception was that it did 
affect the final outcome. However the other 'powerful' party in the same mediation 
111 
considered that the supposedly weak party had leverage and knew how to use it to the 
'nth' degree. 
• A legal imbalance 
One Council participant considered there was an imbalance because ofthe law. For 
example, Council could not depart from an Operative Plan that had been through a 
public process. The Commissioner realised the situation and gave the possible Court 
scenario. All parties in this case recognised that this imbalance had affected the 
outcome. 
• A financial imbalance 
Councils were seen as well-resourced agencies coming up against community/iwi 
groups or individuals with limited or no resources. One participant raised the cost of 
part.icipating in mediation. Time off work, especially for the self-employed, 
photocopying of information to share in mediation, travel costs, even being 
appropriately dressed were issues. As they put it, that, plus the lack of information about 
the process and the RMA, meant 'we had used up half our energy before we even got 
there (to mediation),. They believed if they had more money they would have achieved 
more. Another participant considered if they had the money they would have gone 
straight to Court, ' I would have camped outside the door'. An experienced participant 
considered there was an element of wearing down the less resourced parties to the point 
where, in the end, they would settle. A party might be happy with the settlement 
because they were afraid of going to Court. It was believed that intimidation sometimes 
did come intoit. 
Comment was also made regarding lawyers in mediation. A lawyer could be useful if 
they assisted their client towards an agreement. However, when acting as advocate for 
their client, they were in an aggressive position. A lawyer could be seen as 'hedging 
their bets' by getting information for later use in the Court. Mediation was considered 
to be all about trust and the presence of a lawyer could sometimes undermine the level 
of trust. 
Perceived procedural advantages of the process 
Only two participants thought the process did not advantage one party over others, with 
one of those parties considering that the Commissioner did 'level the playing field'. Of 
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the remainder, two participants considered the weaker groupslindividuals gained an 
advantage in that the dispute was given the Court's scrutiny without the cost of going to 
Court. They believed the groupslindividuals had either got something they actually 
could not afford (i.e. court scrutiny) or the deal was better than they would have 
received in the Court. The reason for this was that their case was weak or they lacked 
resources to put together a good case. 
Some, the groupslindividuals with limited or no legal and technical resources, saw the 
process benefiting anyone who had knowledge and knew the system. The resourced 
participants thought the less resourced groups used leverage. One participant 
considered the process worked for those who were vocal but recognised these parties 
did not necessarily speak for the majority. 
In each case it was interesting to note that generally the experienced, resourced 
participants considered that mediation had been fair and the outcome satisfactory while 
the inexperienced with limited resources believed they had been disadvantaged in the 
process and were dissatisfied with the outcome. 
Pressure to make a decision 
All but one participant considered there was pressure to make a decision. The one, who 
said there was no pressure, considered there was a desire to work towards a solution 
rather than pressure. Participants noted that pressure to make a decision could come 
from a number of sources. The sources mentioned were: 
• The CQurt_with its time constraints and setting down of other appeals. 
• The Council who, during mediation, communicated its desire to get a plan reference 
settled so that the Plan could become operati ve. 
• The applicant, who wanted its consent confirmed so it could proceed with its plans. 
• The parties themselves who felt under pressure (self-imposed) to gain something, as 
they could not afford to go to Court. 
Some participants recognised that the pressure was on all groups, while others 
considered it was unique to them. One participant commented that some pressure was 
necessary otherwise the matter would never get resolved. 
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8.2.3 Post mediation 
Expectation of the mediation process 
The majority of participants entered the mediation process with expectations. All 
Council representatives considered their expectations of the process were realistic. Two 
community/iwilindividuals said their expectations had not been realistic, another did not 
have any, one 'hoped' rather than 'expected', another said their expectations were not 
high as this was their second mediation. 
For six, what they expected and what happened coincided, some more quickly than 
others. Of the remainder, the behaviour and actions they expected were not fulfilled. 
They considered their input was ignored and they felt intimidated and pressured to 
agree. One thought there would be a more specific agreement. One participant summed 
it up by saying that their expectation that everything would be resolved in mediation 
was unrealistic. The inference from their comment was that some things might not be 
able to be mediated. 
View of the mediated outcome 
The response to this question varied. Six of the participants accepted the outcome as 
either successful, good or correct with an acceptable or satisfactory resolution. All 
Council representatives considered the outcome good. Two communitylindividual 
participants saw the outcome as acceptable or satisfactory. Four partiCipants were 
dissatisfied with the outcome and used such terms as 'insufficient', 'totally 
dissatisfied' , and 'rubbish-been conned' . It was apparent they had learnt much through 
the pf(JCe~~ and would perhaps not settle so quickly in the future. 
The purpose of the RMA 
The range of responses to my question about whether or not the mediated settlement 
met the purpose of the RMA varied, depending on the participants overall knowledge 
of the RMA. 'What is the purpose of the Act?' was one question in response to mine. 
Six participants believed that it had been met. The four disagreeing were the same four 
who were dissatisfied with the outcome of their mediation. From their comments it 
became apparent they had a particular view of the purpose of the RMA, e.g. sustainable 
development, environmental protection, recognition of and provision for Maori values, 
and they considered that the settlement had failed to achieve that. 
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Awareness of the way the law was being interpreted and applied presumably helped 
some participants. Those participants (community/iwi groups and individuals) without 
this knowledge had worked out their own interpretation. The promotion of the RMA as 
user friendly, participation enabling legislation may have been a factor in participants 
taking this approach. For example one individual shared their understanding of 
sustainable development during the interview. Some participants were disappointed 
with what they had been told in mediation was possible under the law. 
The mediated settlement was a workable solution that will last 
All but three of the participants considered the mediated settlement would last. Several 
did comment that the mediated settlement would only last if the parties were prepared to 
work at it and meet their commitments. One participant remarked that it would take 
hard work, effort and understanding between parties to ensure this happened. Some 
parties acknowledged that the matter might be revisited when the Plan was reviewed. 
Renegotiation of the settlement 
Opinion was divided on this with varying degrees between 'uphold completely' and 
'complete review'. Some considered that, once a settlement had been reached, it should 
be upheld so that all parties had some certainty. Some considered that it should be 
upheld but if circumstances changed, e.g. some part was broken or there was a 
fundamental flaw or scientific advances, then it should be able to be-renegotiated. The 
majority supported the inclusion of review conditions in agreements. However 
reservations were expressed regarding open ended, undefined review. It was considered 
that pe.opl~ ha~ worked hard to reach the agreements and wanted them upheld. Some 
participants recognised that the substantive issues within their mediated settlements 
would automatically come up for review, e.g. Plan review, so they knew they would 
have an opportunity to re-open the debate on these issues in the future. 
Authority of the parties in mediation 
All but one party considered that those with the authority to implement the outcome 
were present throughout the mediation. Again the matter of delegated authority, 
particularly for Maori and Councils, was raised. Several participants indicated they had 
almost reached the 'no' point in mediation, i.e. they were at the end of their delegated 
authority and would have to go back to their superiors for greater authorisation. 
Delegated authority had, for some parties, been defined or confined to the issues in the 
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appeal and they could not go outside those issues. Maori did not have delegated 
authority and had to report back to the Tangata Whenua who then made the decision. 
8.3 The cost of participating in mediation 
8.3.1 Financial 
All but one party had put a figure on the potential cost of participation in a Court 
hearing prior to entering mediation. Costs were estimated to range from $5,000 to 
$260,000+, the latter being a multi party Plan referral. Most gave $10,000 as an 
estimated minimum. Some had been given figures by the other participants or it had 
been suggested by a Commissioner that it would be very expensive. What it actually 
cost to participate in mediation varied. For some it was time, mileage and several 
hundred dollars. For seven it was under $4000, with five of those $1000 or under. For 
two, costs exceeded $10,000 ranging up to $150,000 for a multi party mediation. 
One individual commented that a party to an earlier appeal had advised them that the 
Court awarded about a third of costs claimed. It was therefore advisable for participants 
to make their claims 'good' so that when the Court cut the claim back, the party got a 
'reasonable amount'. It could therefore be expected that when inflated cost figures were 
mentioned to opponents they would be considerable. A number of participants 
verbalised their fear of costs and indicated that the threat of Court costs being awarded 
against them was there throughout the mediation. 
One Council representative considered that, in some instances, it might be better for a 
Council to go to Court, particularly for disputes between neighbours. Often these were 
neighbourly rather than RMA disputes. It would be cheaper and quicker to write 
evidence and spend half a day in Court. Mediation could be left for the big cases where 
preparing evidence alone could cost $50,000- $100,000. Mediation in those situations 
would enable the parties to get agreement on the issues, allow the narrowing of issues 
in dispute and reducing the need for evidence. 
8.3.2 Time 
The time taken in mediation ranged from days to months. The majority of participants 
thought the time taken was worthwhile, some qualifying this with 'definitely' and 
'frustrating but worthwhile' . One Council representative commented that, while a 
settlement had been achieved, the matter should not have been before the Court in the 
first place therefore it was a waste of time in that respect. Three communityliwi 
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representatives and individuals thought mediation was not worth the time taken but 
they had learnt lessons through the process. As one participant put it, they now knew 
how to adapt and participate effectively. 
8.4 Participants view of mediation 
Despite their experience and criticisms of the process, all participants would, in future, 
promote and encourage the use of mediation for resolving environmental disputes. 
Some qualified their support for mediation in the following ways: 
• Mediate but do not settle if you are unhappy with the outcome. Go to Court if you 
consider you have a defendable case. Seek professional guidance on that. 
• Always seek to mediate unless the parties are diametrically opposed or the dispute 
involves an issue that is non-negotiable, e.g. the integrity of an operative Plan. 
• The Commissioners must run the process in a tight, efficient manner, i.e. keep 
records, so time is not lost re-covering ground. 
• Ensure that, if mediation fails, the case can quickly go before the Court. 
8.S Suggested improvements to the mediation process 
At the end of the interview I asked participants for any suggested improvements to the 
mediation process. The majority made suggestions. They were as follows: 
• The actioning of references and appeals by the Court within weeks and months 
rather than years. Time was important to businesses. 
• The availability of information regarding the various settlement options in the Court 
prior to the decision to enter mediation. 
• Thepwvision of written information on the mediation process so the parties have a 
better understanding of what happens in mediation. 
• Preparation by the Crown of a basic guide regarding Maori participation in 
mediation. 
• Providing a neutral environment for mediation, thereby removing the home ground 
advantage. 
• Providing competent, trained mediators. 
• Making mediation quicker by ensuring it does not drag out over time. 
• Taking a more community friendly approach, e.g. creating a two-tier system that 
keeps lawyers out in the first round of discussion, as they are often aggressive or 
adversarial. 
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• Requiring parties to sign and abide by a written mediation protocol. 
• The keeping of formal records to record progress. 
• Working out the boundaries of confidentiality. 
• Commissioners giving a reality check or steer as to what the Court would accept. 
• Having a neutral legal adviser and technical adviser in mediation. 
• Quickly moving failed mediations in to another process, e.g. Court hearing. 
8.6 Summary 
Most participants viewed mediation as a way to save money and time. Cost was a 
significant factor in the decision to enter mediation for a number of reasons, the main 
ones being the cost of taking a case to Court; the fear of costs being awarded against 
unsuccessful appellants and the drain of Court action on the ratepayer body at large. 
The majority of participants viewed the Court as expensive, adversarial, inflexible or 
frightening. 
In terms of their understanding of the mediation process, participants split into two 
main groups - those with knowledge of and experience in the mediation process and in 
a position of power (authority/financial) and those without. Lack of knowledge of the 
Court system in general, and the mediation process in particular, was widespread. Some 
participants considered this lack of knowledge had an impact on mediation. Some 
participants saw written information on the process as desirable. Experience appeared 
to help participants gain a realistic understanding of the mediation process. Participants' 
expectations of the mediation process, whether realistic or unrealistic, may well have 
contributed to their satisfaction with the mediated outcome. 
Commissioners were seen as undertaking certain core facilitative roles, although not all 
participants considered they fulfilled these roles satisfactorily. Some Commissioners 
were seen as going beyond that role by offering suggestions for resolution or giving an 
opinion on the possible outcome if a case went to Court. The resolution of side issues 
was seen as being beyond the sphere of the reference or appeal and therefore the 
Commissioner's mandate. Some participants considered they did not have the authority 
to resolve such issues and should not be asked to do so by a Commissioner. 
In some circumstances mediation increased the parties' understanding of the issues in 
dispute. It did not always build trust between the parties. It was recognised by a number 
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of participants that trust might develop as mediated settlements were honoured and 
upheld. It was considered that settlements would require commitment and hard work to 
implement. The renegotiation of settlements drew a range of comments with some 
participants believing that they would be able to revisit the issues in their dispute at Plan 
review. 
There were a number of areas where improvements could be made which would 
enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the mediation process. Discussion of these 
is incorporated into the general discussion of findings in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion of Research Findings 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates Environment Court assisted mediation using the criteria set out in 
Chapter 4. It also considers the implications of the findings for the continued use of 
mediation as a method of resolving environmental disputes in New Zealand. It is argued 
that modifications to the current practice in Court assisted mediation would enhance the 
effectiveness and public perception of the mediation process. 
9.2 Evaluation of the mediation process 
Based on the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3, a number of criteria were 
identified as prerequisites for successful mediation (Refer para.4.2, page 44). 
They were: 
• Parties' entry into mediation was voluntary. 
• Parties were competent to participate, i.e. informed and prepared for mediation. 
• On going participation in mediation was voluntary. 
• The mediator upheld natural justice and the process was procedurally fair. 
• The parties were involved in face-to-face discussion. 
• The mediator was competent to undertake the mediation. 
• Those with the authority to implement the outcome were present in mediation. 
• The outcome of mediation met the purpose of the RMA. 
• The mediated settlement was a workable outcome that parties considered would last. 
• Participation in mediation resulted in time and cost savings. 
These criteria will be used to evaluate the mediation process based on the 
research findings presented in the previous four chapters. 
9.2.1 Entry into mediation was voluntary 
The interview results indicated that all participants considered they had entered 
mediation voluntarily. Moore (1996) has suggested that actions can be taken that 
amount to pressure on parties to enter mediation. I looked to see if this may have 
occurred. As noted in Chapter 5, mediation is being promoted within the justice system 
generally. Information from the Court and in publications produced by MfE and other 
agencies would tend to confirm that parties are actively encouraged to consider 
mediation. A letter from the Court suggesting mediation, questioning at callover 
regarding mediation, an explanation of mediation or suggestion to mediate by the 
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Judge, had given some participants the impression of a strong encouragement for 
mediation by those administering the RMA. This encouragement, combined with prior 
threats regarding legal costs by opposing parties, security for costs and the cost of 
preparing a case for Court, reinforced the use of mediation in the cases I investigated. It 
could therefore be concluded that, while parties' chose to enter into mediation, some 
prior actions may have strongly influenced or exerted pressure on them to do so. Some 
of this pressure may have arisen from incorrect assumptions on the part of participants. 
9.2.2 Parties were competent to participate 
The competency that was looked for related to: the participants' ability to put their 
case; the knowledge they had of the mediation process so they could utilise its 
provisions for greatest benefit, and the level of support (technical/legal) they had at 
their disposal. Interview results showed a wide range in the level of participant 
competency. Council representatives could be considered to be competent as they were 
informed, had technicaillegal support and were experienced in mediation. However 
they too had once been inexperienced in mediation and had expected greater guidance 
from the Court. It was assumed that Councils selected officers who are competent 
communicatively to represent them in Court procedures. Groups or individuals with 
legal advisers were considered competent due to the information and experience their 
legal advisor brought to the process. 
Those groups or individuals without legal/technical advice had a limited level of 
competency. Many of the factors identified in Chapter 2 that affected participation were 
identified ~uri~g the interviews. Some participants recognised their limitations with 
respect to understanding the process and their ability to read and assimilate legal and 
technical information (particularly proposed settlements), in a short space of time. The 
presence of technical staff intimidated some participants initially. Commissioners had 
noted this 'intellectual' imbalance in mediation and sometimes sought, with the parties' 
agreement, to reduce the number of technical advisors present. Some participants used 
experiential and historical rather than technical information to support their viewpoiht 
and felt it was given limited recognition by other parties. Some Commissioners did not 
consider these limitations insurmountable. They had observed that, even without a high 
level of competency, parties were able to achieve worthwhile gains from mediation by 
working at the process and being honest. 
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9.2.3 On-going participation was voluntary 
All participants remained in mediation until the matter was resolved. As noted in 
the participants' findings, the pressure imposed by a possible Court hearing 
motivated some participants to keep working at mediation. At least two 
participants indicated that they would have gone to Court if the Court procedure 
was not so slow or they had the financial resources. This indicates some parties 
chose to stay in mediation because their BATNA was unattractive or, in some 
instances, non-existent rather than because they favoured mediation as a process. 
9.2.4 Naturaljustice and procedural fairness 
The mediation process, as outlined in the interview results, could be considered to 
uphold natural justice and be procedurally fair in the following ways: 
• All parties had an opportunity to attend mediation and put their viewpoint if they so 
chose. Some individuals may not have used that opportunity to the fullest where 
more communicatively competent parties were present. 
• Commissioners sought, where possible, to redress imbalances but not all imbalances 
could be redressed. 
• The time allowed to consider proposals during mediation was adequate in most 
situations, although some participants considered it to be insufficient when it came 
to the final settlement. 
• There was an element of ethicality as Commissioners had taken an oath of office to 
honestly and impartially perfonn the duties of their office (s.256). 
• The parties were not forced to settle by the Commissioner but felt pressured by 
external and personal factors. 
• The Commissioners were perceived as impartial. Only in one instance did a 
participant consider that the Commissioner was, by urging settlement, siding with 
another party. 
• Commissioners worked to help the parties create a settlement that reflected the 
agreement. They did not necessarily draft the agreement. 
• The extent of self-detennination was limited in that the mediated settlement had to 
be approved by the Judge, therefore was constrained by the provisions of the RMA. 
The process did not, however, 
• Provide consistent rules in all aspects of mediation. 
• Have a clear code of ethics for both Commissioners and participants. 
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• Guarantee the accuracy of the information used in decision-making. 
• Always overcome the potential for bias in terms of class, due to the level of 
competency required and 
• Provide grievance or appeal procedures for parties who believed that there was bias 
or the process was unjust. 
9.2.5 Face-to-face discussion 
All but one participant chose to attend all the mediation sessions. The participants who 
attended mediation indicated that it had increased their understanding of the matters in 
dispute and other participants' views and concerns. One participant commented that 
they 'saw them as people' rather than the opposition. This indicates that mediation did 
'transform' some situations. The majority indicated that their attitudes on the particular 
issues in dispute had not changed. 
It became apparent during the interview withthe participant who chose not to attend all 
mediation sessions, that there were still strong feelings regarding the issues in dispute. 
Attending mediation may have helped create understanding of the issues and provided 
this participant with an opportunity to express their concerns to the wider group. 
9.2.6 Mediator competency 
The Commissioners could be considered competent to conduct mediation in that they 
had, through training, gained knowledge of mediation. The training sessions funded by 
the Court were short courses held over a matter of days. The Commissioners' ability to 
conduct ~~di~tion was increasing with 'hi:lnds on' experience. 
In New Zealand, the variable nature of training, standards and ethics has raised the 
question of whether or not there should be a minimum standard or curriculum for all 
mediation training (Forbes, 1995, p. 416; Powell, 2000, p. 419). It is therefore possible 
that candidates for the position of Commissioner may have gained their knowledge of 
mediation through training courses that varied in content and standard. Requiring 
candidates for the position of Commissioner to have a minimum standard of training 
followed by practice would ensure a basic level of competency in mediation is acquired 
before Commissioners enter the Court. 
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9.2.7 Authority of parties to resolve the dispute 
The matter of the parties in mediation having authority to sign a mediated agreement on 
the day generated some discussion, particularly as Commissioners had been found to 
take different positions on the matter. The Commissioners' position in this matter may 
determine whether or not parties participate in mediation57 and their choice of 
representative in mediation. Participants therefore wanted to know the Commissioner's 
position prior to mediation as not all had full authority to sign off the mediated 
agreement during mediation. Some Council representatives were given limited 
delegated authority and; when that point was reached, had to go back to Council for 
further authority. Maori representatives were not given delegated authority but had to go 
back to the Tangata Whenua for approval. Consistency of approach by the 
Commissioners would appear highly desirable. 
9.2.8 Purposes of the RMA 
The recently published MtE guide on mediation states that the Judges have the power 
and responsibility to ensure that any consent order is, among other things, consistent 
with the purpose of the RMA (MtE, 2001). The research findings showed that the 
Judges did not explicitly refer to the purpose of the RMA when signing off agreements 
but rather referred to 'appropriate' in RMA terms, creating a 'satisfactory environmental 
result' and a 'responsible outcome in RMA terms'. 
Overall, the majority of stakeholders considered that mediated agreements met the 
purpose of the RMA. Both Commissioners and participants believed there were 
instances ~hel1 this goal was not met. Some Commissioners and participants expected 
the Judge to decide whether or not a settlement met the purpose of the RMA. This 
expectation may be unrealistic, given the limited information available to the Judge 
when considering a mediated agreement as well as the various criteria they use prior to 
signing a consent order. The parties are responsible for creating the mediated 
agreement. It may, however, be unrealistic to expect parties in mediation to think 
beyond self-interest to the purposes of the RMA, although a Commissioner may try to 
get them to do this. This may be difficult, as some participants did not know what the 
purpose of the RMA was or had different opinions as to what s.5 meant. 
57 Anecdotal evidence is that some Council representatives cannot meet such a requirement, made by a 
Commissioner prior to mediation. Mediation is being declined for that reason. 
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9.2.9 Settlement was a workable outcome that will last 
The majority of participants considered that the settlement would last. Some qualified 
this by saying that it would take hard work, effort and understanding to achieve this. 
Others indicated they would revisit the matter through the appropriate statutory Plan 
review or resource consent review process. This indicated that the matter in dispute, 
while settled, was not in fact resolved and participants would seek to reopen the matter 
if another opportunity arose. There was a belief that review of Regional and 
CitylDistrict Plans and review clauses in resource consents enabled this to happen. 
9.2.10 Participation benefits 
Cost saving 
Cost was given by all but one participant as a reason for entering mediation. The 
interview results showed that Court assisted mediation enabled a range of 
environmental disputes to be resolved at a reduced cost compared with the anticipated 
cost of litigation. In some instances the cost saving was considerable, e.g. a Council 
resolving a multi party dispute over their Plan. Some participants believed they could 
not afford the cost of going to Court. For others, the cost of litigation combined with the 
threat of costs being awarded by the Court, influenced their decision to mediate, as 
noted earlier. Some participants were aware that taking disputes to Court was a financial 
cost to all ratepayers and considered that this was an unwise and unproductive use of 
ratepayer funds. 
Even though the Court paid for the services of the Commissioner and the venue, there 
was a final!cial_ cost involved in attending mediation, preparing documentation or 
undertaking information gathering. For some participants meeting the cost of 
participating in mediation was difficult. 
The emphasis on costs indicates that mediation is seen as a more affordable form of 
dispute resolution. It does not necessarily mean that justice is achieved, as an under 
resourced party may have a valid case, defendable in Court, but makes compromises in 
mediation because they cannot afford a Court hearing. 
Time saving 
Mediation could take days or go on over months. The majority of participants thought 
the time spent in mediation was worthwhile. A minority considered that mediation had 
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been a waste of time - either the matter should not have been on appeal (based on their 
assessment of the law) or the outcome did not meet their expectations. The response of 
one participant indicates that shorter time delays in the Court may mean that some 
parties may, in future, decline mediation in favour of a Court hearing. 
Improved and more appropriate outcomes 
The participants were asked for their view of the mediated outcome. The majority 
thought the mediated agreement was 'successful', 'good', 'satisfactory' or 'acceptable'. 
A small number were dissatisfied with the outcome. 
Rebuilding trust between disputing parties 
It is believed that trust is built when parties understand each other. Mediation is 
believed to help improve understanding as parties listen to each other's concerns, 
discuss informatiori and aspirations, and work towards a solution that creates mutual 
gains. In the interviews it became apparent that, whil,e mediation had helped some 
participants gain a better understanding of the issues in dispute, the majority of 
participants' attitudes and views had not changed. Trust had not immediately been 
restored or built as a result of mediation. It was considered it may however develop over 
time as mediated settlements are honoured and upheld by the parties. 
On whether the other parties recognised issues of concern to a particular party, some 
believed there had been recognition at least verbally, while others considered it was lip 
service only. Openness and flexibility was difficult for some participants because of 
strongly held or entrenched views. Participants indicated they understood what the other 
parties were wanting but it did not change their attitude or stance. Mediation could 
therefore be considered to build understanding but not change attitudes. It may be 
unrealistic therefore to expect parties to a dispute that has been going on for some time 
to develop understanding, build relationships and restore trust in the space of a day or 
less. 
9.2.11 Summary 
The Court assisted mediation process, as presently undertaken by the Court, has enabled 
an increasing number of environmental disputes to be resolved in a way that meets the 
prerequisites for successful mediation. There are however limitations in the current 
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process. These benefits and limitations are outlined in the following section. Specific 
recommendations are then presented in the following chapter. 
9.3 The benefits of Court assisted mediation 
On the basis of the research findings presented above, Court assisted mediation as 
currently practised offers a number of advantages for stakeholders. 
The Court 
Section 268 enables thy' Court to use mediation as an additional method of dispute 
resolution within the RMA. The Court can, by suggesting to selected parties that their 
case may be suitable for mediation, act as a catalyst for getting the parties to consider 
and enter mediation. By narrowing the issues in dispute or resolving the dispute, 
mediation can reduce the number of cases awaiting determination by the Court or 
red~ce the time spent in Court hearings with their associated cost to the Court. Given 
the backlog of RMA cases presently before the Court and the concerns about the 
associated time delays, mediation is a means of relieving pressure on the Court. 
Regional and District Councils 
Mediation saves ratepayer money in a number of ways. It avoids the considerable 
financial cost of litigation and staff are not diverted away from their routine work to 
prepare for a Court hearing. It is less adversarial than the Court and is in accord with the 
philosophy of co-operative resolution followed by some Council's and Maori groups. 
The Councils are seen as working co-operatively with ratepayers rather than fighting 
them with.ratepayer money. 
Applicants 
Mediation enables a dispute to be resolved in a matter of days rather than waiting up to 
12 months for a Court hearing. This time saving can create considerable financial and 
personal benefits for the applicant as the issue is resolved and they can get on with their 
life or business. 
Community groups and individuals 
The Court provides the services of Commissioners to conduct mediation at a mutually 
acceptable venue free of charge. Participants may ask the Court to conduct a mediation 
or the Court may suggest to the parties that a dispute may be a suitable for mediation. 
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The cost difference between mediation and litigation is significant. Mediation therefore 
offers a less costly way for parties to continue to pursue their interests in Court. It also 
allows parties to be actively involved in reaching consensus decisions in matters which 
affect them, thereby increasing support for the implementation of the outcome. In some 
instances, the Commissioners were able to redress power imbalances to achieve a more 
equitable outcome. The non-adversarial, co-operative nature of the mediation process 
enables the sharing of participants' viewpoints in a controlled and safe environment and 
helps increase understanding of both the issues and the viewpoints of other parties. 
9.4 The limitations of Court assisted mediation 
Court assisted mediation is constrained in a number of respects, as demonstrated in the 
findings of this study. The RMA has left the procedures relating to the administration 
and implementation of mediation undefined in law. It is to be expected that where a 
rela~ively new decision making process is incorporated into legislation with little or no 
legislative guidance, some problems of implementation will arise. The monitoring of 
mediation was advocated prior to the introduction of the RMA to enable mediation 
procedure to develop in the light of practice (Chart, 1988). Procedures have developed 
but without the benefit of the insight gained from monitoring. The research findings 
identify a number of limitations in current practice that if addressed, could enhance the 
process thereby maximising the benefits of expenditure of taxpayer funds on Court 
assisted mediation and enhancing the environmental outcomes. These are as follows. 
Consideration of the public interest 
Reference.was.made to the 'public interest' by both Judges and Commissioners when 
considering the assessment of cases for mediation and determining whether to allow 
mediation to continue. In that no specific reference is made to the concept of public 
interest in the RMA, apart from s.274, it is assumed that the Judges were referring to 
the public interest as implied in s.5 of the RMA and the policies and rules of regional 
and district plans. 
The findings showed that while a Judge may not suggest mediation because of the wide 
public interest aspect of the case, they would not refuse mediation in such a case where 
parties sought it, as it may narrow the issues, leaving the core issues to come to Court. 
It is unclear how the Court can ensure that the wider public interest is considered or 
represented in mediation unless a party representing the public interest comes forward 
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under s.274. It is unclear how a s.274 party would know that mediation is going to 
occur, as they are only required to advise the Court of their wish to appear ten working 
days before a hearing. It has been recognised that parties may not provide for the public 
interest during mediation and for that reason the Court does not necessarily approve a 
consent order (Sheppard, 1997). 
Criteria for assessing cases for mediation 
Under s.268 the Environment Court (Judges and Commissioners) may ask that 
mediation be conducted. The legislation leaves it to the Court to decide when to ask. 
The criteria looked at by Judges when assessing cases for mediation varied, as did the 
trigger point for suggesting mediation. There appears to be a perception that some 
Judges are more 'pro' mediation than others, the implication being that one Judge may 
have a lower threshold for suggesting mediation than another. Public comment by 
Judges may have created this perception (Sheppard, 1997, p. 20; Bollard et al, 1998; 
Ken derdine , 1999, p. 16). In that Commissioners are also part of the Court and could 
suggest cases for mediation at callover, some guidance would appear desirable to 
ensure consistency of approach on the part of Judges and Commissioners when 
suggesting cases for mediation. 
Participation in mediation 
Mediation is promoted as being a voluntary process with parties entitled to refuse 
mediation in favour of having their case heard by the Court. Interview results indicate 
that Judges do not view disputes any differently if mediation had not been tried or had 
been tried.Jlnd. failed. Case law suggests a less lenient approach. Some participants had 
gained the distinct impression that the Court was strongly in favour of mediation and it 
was wise to enter mediation for that reason. The Department of Courts supports the 
greater use of mediation as a strategy for managing the Court's considerable workload 
and estimations are given in the Annual Forecasts of the number of cases that will be 
handled by the Court in anyone year. It has been suggested that the provision of 
mediation by the Court may mean busy Judges are tempted to press parties to mediate 
in order to reduce the Court's workload (Naughton, 1995, p. 381). One Judge did refer 
to the impact pressure of work sometimes had on the assessment of cases. It is therefore 
possible that Judges may be tempted to suggest mediation on account of their high 
workload, the requirement to meet projected outputs (Department for Courts, 2001, 
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p.31) and the overall endorsement of mediation within the Court system. No indication, 
however, was given by the Judges that this was the case. 
A Judge's 'suggestion' of suitability for mediation or explanation of mediation could be 
misinterpreted as a 'direction' or considered 'process compulsion' in that it was 
unsolicited by the parties (Forbes cited in PCE, 1996, p. 51). The parties can gain the 
impression that they should be able to resolve the issue and the case is not worth the 
Court's time. The desirability of Judges suggesting mediation is therefore questioned. 
Information that clearly explains the Court assisted mediation process may remove the 
need for Judges to suggest or explain mediation to parties. For that reason, a standard 
letter to all parties to Court proceedings, setting out and explaining all the dispute 
resolution processes available and advising of the Court's free mediation service 
appears preferable to Judges suggesting to selected parties that their dispute may be 
suitable for mediation. A suggested alternative, supported by some parties outside the 
Court, is compulsory consideration of the case for mediation rather than compulsory 
participation in mediation (Forbes, 1995). 
S.271A parties 
The interview results indicated that Judges considered all parties would have to agree to 
mediation for it to proceed. Such a requirement may, however, give undue power or 
leverage to one party, such as a s.271A party. It was suggested that a-s.271A party 
should have to show the Judge why a consensus agreement should not proceed. Such a 
requirement may put pressure on parties to mediate. It also is unclear whether or not a 
Judgecan.refu_se a s.271A party's explanation and require them to enter mediation or 
accept an agreement. 
Commissioner interaction with Judges during mediation 
Interaction by the Commissioners with the Judges during mediation varied. It is 
recognised that Commissioners may require guidance in some matters during mediation 
but the source and extent of this advice is unclear. Some parties may be uncomfortable 
with the Commissioner discussing the mediation with the Judge due to 'without 
prejudice' considerations. At least one participant was aware of a Commissioner 
discussing the case with a Judge. 
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Selection of the mediator 
Presently the Court decides the mediator (a Commissioner) with no input from the 
parties. The only basis for trust and confidence in the Commissioner by participants 
appears to be trust in the Court system and the Commissioners' position within it. The 
repeated use of the same mediator mayor may not help create a climate of trust. In 
some situations, such as Plan references, repeated use of the same Commissioner may 
develop familiarity among some parties (with both positive and negative consequences) 
or be questioned by a party. It is possible that, where a party questions the Court's 
choice of Commission,er, that party may be seen as challenging the Court. No procedure 
appears to exist for handling such situations. 
Competency of the mediator 
Given the Court's encouragement of ADR, the strategic role of a Commissioner in 
Court assisted mediation, and the significance of the disputes that are being resolved by 
mediation, Commissioners need to be trained, experienced and competent in mediation 
prior to their appointment to the Court rather than gaining it while holding office. 
Preparing an understanding of mediation 
The majority of parties did not consider they were involved in preparing an 
understanding of the way in which the mediation was to be conducted. The preparation 
of an understanding prior to mediation, however, would have enabled the various 
cultural and personal viewpoints and circumstances of the parties to be acknowledged 
and accommodated. It would also have provided guidance for participants and could be 
used asa r~minder by the Commissioner during mediation. Participants indicated that 
they were looking for greater certainty with regards the process. 
Record keeping and note taking 
Note taking during mediation arose in three contexts, that of recording the progress of 
mediation, participant note taking and Commissioner file notes. 
• Record of progress 
In the majority of situations Commissioners did not keep records of the progress made 
in mediation. Participants considered records would help avoid misunderstandings, 
prevent revisiting matters, assist the parties when drafting a settlement and avoid 
wasting time. 
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• Confidentiality and note taking 
The scope of confidentiality in the Court is unclear as individual Commissioner's 
interpretation of confidentiality varied. The informal way in which confidentiality is 
agreed to in Court assisted mediation, and the comments of participants would suggest 
that the observation 'In reality ... mediation is not as confidential as it is sometimes 
claimed to be' (BoulIe et aI, 1998, p. 277) has an element of truth in Court assisted 
mediation. An expectation that parties will respect confidentiality may be unrealistic 
and unenforceable should the parties decide to publish details (Goldblatt, 2000). Parties 
may become unwilling to enter mediation or share information during mediation if the 
information may later be used against them (PCE, 1996, p. 61; Goldblatt, 2000). The 
signing of a confidentiality agreement prior to mediation, such as the model agreement 
provided by AMINZ, would clarify this matter for the parties. 
• Commissioner file notes 
The nature and extent of file notes and their impact on the 'without prejudice' nature of 
the mediation process is not clear. It is left to an individual Commissioner's discretion 
as to what they include in the file notes. Such notes could be considered to be 
prejudicial to any future action by some parties. One Judge considered that such notes 
should be kept confidential. Some Commissioners felt uneasy at the possible depth of 
information supplied and it has been noted that not all are completing the file notes 
(Dougherty, W. pers.comm.). Given that the Court has refused access to a mediator's 
notes on the Court files (See Mortimer v Whangarei District Council C023/97), it is 
desirable that a Commissioner indicates the broad general nature of the contents of any 
file·notes to parties so as to avoid claims of prejudice. It is unclear whether or not the 
Court requires a private mediator, who is asked by the Court to conduct mediation 
under s.268, to complete a file note. 
Honesty 
The interview results raised the issue of the motives of parties in seeking mediation. 
Parties can use mediation to obtain information for use in another context. One Judge 
commented that, providing the parties were sincere in their request and there were no 
hidden agendas, they would assist them and arrange mediation. It is unclear how a 
Judge could assess that parties are sincere and there are no hidden agendas, as parties do 
not, at any stage prior to or during mediation, take an oath to tell the truth. 
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I· ... 
Side agreements 
Side agreements appeared relatively common and were used to resolve issues of 
concern that were hindering the resolution of the issues by mediation. Any side 
agreements reached during mediation did not come under the scrutiny of the Judges. It 
has been recognised that side agreements, while compensating the present parties, may 
not mean better environmental outcomes for the wider community or future generations 
(PCE,1998). 
Lodging proceedings in'the Environment Court can be a way of gaining leverage to 
resolve other outstanding issues that are not part of the substantive appeal. It was 
suggested in informal discussion with RMA practitioners that, by and large, Councils 
want to avoid the cost of going to Court so will settle out of Court. Appellants can 
therefore use this desire as a lever to get various concessions from Councils. 
Participants expressed concern about the use of mediation to resolve issues that were 
outside the scope of the original appeal, believing this was an abuse of the mediation 
process. Some participants felt pressured during mediation to make concessions, beyond 
their authority to do so, to resolve side issues. The enforceability of side agreements 
may also be questionable. Parties may therefore settle mediation based on an incorrect 
premise. The Court has expressed reservations about the practice of parties entering into 
side agreements (See Bellaney v Christchurch City Council C140/99) 
Transparency in all aspects of Court proceedings would appear highly desirable, given 
the nature and wider implications of environmental disputes. If side agreements are 
common aDd are the reason for settlement under the RMA, then it would appear 
desirable that they are noted and made part of the public record so that the parties 
responsible can be held accountable. The PCE has suggested that requiring disclosure of 
side agreements under the RMA may minimise the practice (PCE, 1998) and may 
discourage the mediation process being used for leverage. It would also make clear to 
the public, that reasons other than RMA considerations were responsible for the 
settlement. 
Judicial action when signing off a mediated settlement 
The interview results showed there was a perception, reinforced by the MfE publication 
on mediation, that the Judges undertook a form of 'quality control' when the 
documentation was put before them at the completion of mediation. A form of quality 
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control is undertaken but it would appear difficult for a Judge to decide that 'issues 
have not been dealt with superficially or that some parties have been intimidated into an 
agreement' as suggested in the MfE publication, given the varying level of information 
) 
contained on the file (see above). 
There is no guidance in the legislation about the criteria to be considered by the Judges 
when signing off mediated settlements. The interview results showed there was a range 
of matters looked for by Judges when considering a mediated settlement. Consistency is 
desirable. The Judges may not make a 'decision' regarding the mediated settlement 
meeting the purpose of the RMA, contrary to what some Commissioners and 
participants thought. For participants to make such an assumption indicates they have 
misunderstood their role in the mediation process. If participants are in doubt over the 
outcome meeting the purpose of the RMA then mediation should be concluded and the 
matter put before the Court 
Implementation of the settlement 
Some participants believed there would be an opportunity to re-open debate on the 
issues within their mediated settlements when statutory review was undertaken, e.g. 
Plan Review. This raises a question concerning the circumstances in which a mediated 
settlement is no longer valid. It has been suggested that mediated settlements may be 
able to be revisited but this has not been clearly spelt out in the legislation (Bollard et 
ai, 1998). If mediation continues to be promoted and suggested by the Court, then 
consideration needs to be given to a system for addressing any grievances that arise 
from the Il!ediation process. 
Recording of consents by the Court 
The change in Court administrative procedures, requiring the recording of all consent 
orders as decisions and Commissioners completing a file note, may enable more 
accurate data on mediation to be collated in the future. It is anticipated that this 
administrative change will lead to an increase in the number of decisions recorded after 
2000. This increase could be misleading unless the way in which the recording system 
operated prior to 2000 is fully understood. 
The variable approach to recording settlements taken prior to 2000 is considered to be 
unsatisfactory for three reasons. 
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First, the Environment Court is a Court of record, which implies that the decisions and 
settlements signed off by the Court are recorded and accessible to the public, thus 
upholding the principle of open justice (McDowell et ai, 1995, p. 232). It is highly 
desirable that all mediated settlements are available for public scrutiny so that justice 
'can be seen to be done' (Mulholland, 1991). 
Secondly, public participation in resource management has been encouraged under the 
RMA. Any member of the public can, under the open standing provisions contained in 
Part XII of the RMA, seek the enforcement of decisions or consent orders. Consent 
orders therefore need to be made public so that the wider public can, if they so wish, 
ensure that all parties uphold them. 
Thirdly, the effect and implementation of mediation needs to be monitored to ensure 
consistent outcomes and enable the mediation pro~ess and procedures to develop, as 
intended by Parliament. Variation in the practice of mediation under s.268 could lead to 
inconsistent environmental outcomes that are not in accord with the purpose of the 
RMA. Monitoring would identify any variation. It is uncertain who should undertake 
such monitoring. The MfE considers there is no explicit requirement for any party to 
monitor the effect and implementation of mediation under s.268 of the RMA. The 
monitoring of 'the effect and implementation of the RMA' by the Minister for the 
Environment, under s.24, is considered to be a generic function (MfE; pers.comm. 
2001). 
Private mediators 
The increased use of Court assisted mediation has the potential to impact on the 
function of the Court with Commissioners seeing their involvement in mediation 
increasing. There is a need to ensure that Commissioners are available for Court 
fixtures. These fixtures determine the availability of Commissioners and the timing of 
mediation. It may therefore be necessary for the Court to use private mediators in the 
future to meet the demand for mediation services. No guidance is given about the tenus 
under which private mediators would operate under s.268 RMA. 
Information needs of parties 
The general public perception is that the Court has rules and codes of conduct. These 
are assumed to apply in a 'court' mediation process and were looked for by 
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participants. By clearly setting out the mediation process and procedures followed 
when facilitating Court assisted mediation, the Court would be seen to be following fair 
and consistent participatory processes. Such an approach is required of local authorities 
and the Court when conducting hearings under the RMA. 
Any publication on mediation needs to clearly and concisely answer the information 
needs of readers. Participants indicated that they diligently read information, looking 
for guidance about the process on which they had embarked. For some participants 
preparing for mediation was not their primary occupation and was done in their 'spare 
time'. For that reason, reconsideration of some aspects of the MfE publication on 
mediation may be necessary (MfE, 2001, p. 13). As this is the only publicly available 
publication on environmental mediation in New Zealand, greater consideration needs to 
be given to the requirements of the target group. A survey of parties, who have been 
sent the publication by the Court, could provide insight into further areas where 
improvements could be made. 
9.5 Conclusion 
Based on the review of the research findings presented in this chapter, the next 
chapter briefly summarises the findings of the study and makes 
recommendations for good practice guidelines. 
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Chapter 10: Summary and Recommendations for Good 
Practice Guidelines 
10.1 Summary of research findings 
Environmental conflict is inevitable given differing social, cultural and economic 
expectations and values. The ability of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, such 
as litigation, to handle complex environmental disputes has been questioned. The 
support for and application of ADR techniques such as mediation has increased in the 
past 30 years. Within many nations, including New Zealand, ADR has received 
statutory recognition. 
In the past decade mediation under s.268 of the RMA has been used increasingly as a 
way of resolving environmental disputes in New Zealand. No monitoring of the effect 
or implementation of mediation has yet been undertaken unders.24 of the RMA and the 
full extent of the use of mediation is unknown. Recent changes to Court administrati ve 
procedures have the potential to enable a more accurate assessment to be made in the 
future. 
Court assisted mediation is endorsed by the Court and is considered by Judges during 
case management. The legislation gives no guidance on the way in w-hich mediation is 
to be conducted. In the absence of legislative guidelines, Judges have initiated 
mediation conducted by a Commissioner. Commissioners have drawn on their 
experience_ an~ infonnation obtained from mediation training sessions when conducting 
mediation. When mediation is completed, the Judges have signed off mediated 
settlements using their own interpretation of the law and experience to assess the 
settlement. The practice of Court assisted mediation is therefore developing over time 
and variations in practice are occurring. These variations can create uncertainty for 
participants, impact their participation in mediation and the effectiveness of the 
mediation provisions in the RMA. 
Until 2001, there was no readily available infonnation on the particular way in which 
mediation was conducted in the Environment Court. This lack of infonnation has 
impacted on the way in which some parties prepared for, and subsequently participated 
in, mediation. In some instances it could be considered to have impacted on the 
mediated settlement. Variations in the practice of mediation may also impact the 
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consistency of environmental outcomes. Matters such as those recommended in the 
good practice guidelines need to be addressed if the mediation process is to ensure 
equitable and consistent environmental outcomes, in terms of present and future 
generations, and retain public confidence as a process. 
10.2 Recommendations for good practice guidelines 
This study has shown that the way in which the Court assisted mediation process is 
currently being administered and conducted has limitations, some of which are 
impacting on the participation, effectiveness and satisfaction of parties. Other writers 
have also identified a rlUmber of these limitations. It is therefore recommended that 
changes be made to the way in which the Court currently fulfils its responsibilities 
under s.268. It is believed that environmental mediation under the RMA would be 
enhanced by the incorporation of the following suggestions into Court procedures and 
practice thereby enhancing resource management decision-making in New Zealand. 
10.2.1 Guidance on Environment Court processes 
There is a need for greater understanding of the· way in which the Environment Court 
operates. It is recommended that all parties to references or appeals lodged in the Court 
be advised of all the various ways in which the Court can resolve matters. Consideration 
needs to be given to the appropriateness and adequacy of existing publications on the 
Court's functions. Any revision needs to bear in mind the information needs of the 
potential users. An in-depth explanation in a readable style of the nature of and way in 
which the Environment Court conducts various dispute resolution procedures, such as 
hearings and mediation, is necessary. 
10.2.2 Guidance on mediation in the Environment Court 
It is recommended that A Guideline to Mediation in the Environment Court be prepared 
by the Court which clearly sets out the particular process, protocols and rules the Court 
follows when initiating and conducting mediation. The current publication by the MfE 
(MfE, 2001) gives a general explanation of mediation but does not specifically define 
the Court assisted process. Participants are still left without written guidelines on how 
the Court process will be conducted or the particular protocols that apply. It is 
considered that the nature of the mediation process as conducted by the Court needs to 
be explained and defined, to create consistency in the approach promoted by the Court 
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and to inform parties so they can prepare for effective participation in mediation. Such a 
guideline should cover the following matters: 
(i) The nature of the mediation process as conducted by the Court. 
(ii) Entry into mediation, in particular, when it may be suggested to parties and the 
implications of such suggestions. 
(iii) Commissioner selection, their position within the Court, credentials and role in 
mediation. Possible Court response where parties do not wish to use a particular 
Commissioner. 
(iv) Commissioner contact with the parties prior to and during mediation. 
(v) The purpose of pre-mediation meetings. 
(vi) An outline of the phases in the Court assisted mediation process. 
(vii) The role of the parties in defining the mediation process. 
(viii) The ground rules for mediation including: the Court's expectation of parties; a 
code of conduct for Commissioners and participants; good faith bargaining; 
respect for other parties; openness to listen and consider other viewpoints; 
confidentiality; note taking; private meetings and power to sign. 
(ix) The nature and extent of Commissioner record keeping during mediation. 
(x) The role of a Commissioner in any subsequent hearing. 
(xi) The role of s.5, the purpose of the RMA, in mediation. 
(xii) The legal nature of mediated agreements and how they are enforced. -
(xiii) The nature and enforceability of any side agreements. 
(xiv) Any mediation grievance procedures. 
10.2.3 _ Guidelines on the Court's administrative procedures 
It is recommended that the Court standardise its procedures with respect to the 
following matters: 
i) The criteria considered by Judges when initiating mediation or signing off a 
mediated settlement. 
ii) The code of conduct governing Commissioners when acting as mediators. 
iii) The nature and extent of any records made by Commissioners. 
iv) The recording and indexing of consent orders issued by the Court. 
v) The codes of conduct governing private mediators when asked by the Court to 
conduct mediation. 
vi) Noting the existence of side agreements in consent orders. 
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10.3 Recommendations for further research 
Matters that require further investigation are: 
(i) The adequacy of the Court assisted mediation process in ensuring the 
representation and consideration of the public interest. 
(ii) Monitoring of the effect and implementation of mediation under s.24 RMA. 
(iii) The extent to which private mediators are being used to resolve references and 
appeals in the Environment Court and the way in which they conduct the 
process. 
(iv) Whether or not procedures are required to address grievances with the practice 
of mediation. 
(v) The way in which the negotiation of references and appeals are conducted under 
theRMA. 
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Appendix 1 
Interview questions for stakeholders 
A Structured interview questions for Judges 
Process 
1. What process do you go through when you first see a new case? 
2. In that process, do you assess that case for mediation? 
3. How do you decide a case is or is not suitable for mediation? 
4. If you decided a case is suitable for mediation, what happens then? 
5. If you decide a case is not suitable, what happens then? 
6. What do you do if the parties are unwilling to mediate? 
7. If you decide a case is unsuitable for mediation, what do you do if parties 
request mediation? 
During the mediation process 
8. Do you have any involvement while a case is being mediated? 
9. If you do, what is it? 
Outcomes of mediation 
10. When signing off mediated cases, what matters do you consider? 
11. Are there any matters in particular that you consider must be present in a 
.. me..diated settlement? 
View of mediation 
12. Given the Court's current role in mediation as discussed above, do you think 
there should be any changes made in the process? 
13. If so, what should these be? 
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B Structured interview questions for mediators 
Training 
1. Have you had formal training in mediation? Specify. 
Role of the mediator 
2. What do you consider is the role of the mediator? 
3. What information about the mediation process do you give participants prior to 
and during mediation? 
4. How is the mediation process conducted? What is the role of parties in defining 
this process? 
Power imbalances between parties 
5. Have you observed power imbalances between mediating parties? 
6. Do you consider this imbalance has impacted the mediation process? 
7. Do you consider that the outcomes of mediated settlements met the purpose of 
the Act? 
Matters covered by mediation 
8. Have you ever raised matters, outside those raised by the parties, which you 
consider should be covered? If yes, what type of matters? 
9. Was the purpose of the Act recognised and provided for during the mediations 
you facilitated? 
10. During the mediation process did the parties give consideration to the purpose of 
the Act? 
11. Did you consider that the outcomes of mediated settlements met the purpose of 
the Act? 
Outcomes of-mediation 
12. Have you been involved in mediation where there is a great disparity of beliefs 
between the parties in dispute? 
13. Did mediation help to resolve this disparity? In what ways? 
14. Was that dispute able to be settled by mediation or did parties resort to 
alternative means of resolution? 
15. It has been said that mediation brings improved outcomes? What is your 
response to that statement? 
View of mediation 
16. What are your views on mediation? 
17. Should mediation be voluntary or mandatory? 
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18. What role do you think mediators should have in the future? 
C Structured interview questions for participants 
Decision to enter mediation 
It is suggested that parties have various reasons for entering mediation. 
1. Why did you enter mediation? 
2. When preparing for mediation, what was your source of information about the 
mediation process? 
3. In hindsight, is there any information about mediation that would have been 
helpful to know before/during mediation? 
." 4. Do you think this information would have influenced your role/participation in 
mediation? How? 
5. How do you think parties should find out about mediation and what is involved? 
The mediation process 
It is suggested that the mediator is very important for the success of the process. 
6. Who selected your mediator? 
7. Did the participants draw up an understanding of how the process was to be 
conducted prior to entering mediation? 
8. What was the mediator's role in your mediation? 
9. Did the mediator keep records of the proceedings? Were the parties advised of 
the contents of these records? 
10. .. Did· the mediator give out any information or suggest approaches for parties to 
consider during mediation? 
11. Was a memorandum of understanding drawn up? Who did this? Who circulated 
it? 
The dynamics within the mediation room 
12. Did your view of the issues in dispute change as a result of mediation? 
13. Do you think your issues of concern were acknowledged by the other parties? 
14. Do you think there was a power imbalance between the various parties? If yes, 
do you think it affected the final outcome? 
15. Do you think there was pressure to make a decision? 
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16. Do you think the process worked to the advantage of some parties and not 
others? 
The mediated agreement 
17. In hindsight, were your expectations of the mediation process realistic? What did 
you expect? What in fact happened? 
18. What is your view of the mediated outcome? 
19. Do you think the outcome met the purpose of the Act? 
20. Do you consider the mediated settlement is a workable solution that will last? 
21. Do you consider mediated settlements should be able to be renegotiated? 
22. Were those with the authority to implement the outcome present throughout the 
mediation? 
23. Did you have authority to make decisions during mediation? 
Rec.ommendations for improvements to the mediation process 
24. How do you think the mediation process could be improved? 
Time taken 
25. Over what period of time did mediation take place? - Days, weeks, months, 
years? 
26. Do you consider the time taken in mediation was worthwhile? 
Cost of participation 
Mediation is often suggested as a low cost way of resolving environmental disputes. 
27. What was the estimated cost of putting your case before the Court? 
28. What was the approximate cost of your participating in mediation? 
29. If, in future, you were involved in an environmental dispute that was under 
appeal, would you promote or discourage the use of mediation? Why? 
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Appendix 2 
Information given to stakeholders prior to seeking their 
consent to an interview 
Lincoln University 
Environmental Management and Design Division 
INFORMATION 
You are invited to participate as a subject in a research project entitled 'An evaluation of 
mediation in environmental dispute resolution under s.268 of the Resource Management 
Act 1991'. 
The aim of this project is to find out how environmental mediation is currently being 
practised in NZ. Using this information, it is planned to evaluate the practice of 
environmental mediation in NZ. It is hoped to be able to recommend ways in which 
future mediation could be enhanced. 
Your participation in this project will involve your participation in an interview with the 
researcher, which may take between 30 to 45 minutes. It is recognised that mediation is 
a confidential process and that all matters discussed during mediation are to be treated 
confidentially. You will not be asked to supply any information relating to the nature of 
the conflict, the parties involved or the final settlement. During the interview you will 
only be asked questions relating to your experience and perception of the mediation 
process and the final outcome. 
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: the identity of participants will not 
be made public without their consent. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, all data 
will be coded and kept secure. In writing the final report, reference to findings will be of 
a general nature, reference to geographical areas will not be included, no reference 
made to particular individuals or groups apart from general categories, e.g. mediators, 
Councils, public interest groups, land use conflicts, water/air discharge disputes. You 
will be able to view the research report when it is completed. 
The research project is being carried out by Nancy Borrie who can be contacted at 
She will be pleased to discuss any concerns you have about participation in the project. 
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